Cuberk

A missing authentication vulnerability in OpenSignLabs opensignserver through 2.37.0 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary stored documents via the fileupload Parse cloud function. The function mints MASTER_KEY-signed file access tokens for any caller-supplied URL without performing any session check, defeating the only access control protecting stored contract files.

Use of Hard-coded Credentials vulnerability in Zyxel Networks WAH7601 allows Read Sensitive Constants Within an Executable. This issue affects WAH7601: through 20.07.2026.

Exposure of sensitive system information to an unauthorized control sphere vulnerability in Zyxel Networks WAH7601 allows Web Application Fingerprinting. This issue affects WAH7601: through 20072026.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/mmu: Fix use-after-free on vendor module reload mmu_destroy_caches() destroys pte_list_desc_cache and mmu_page_header_cache, but leaves both pointers unchanged. The pointers live in kvm.ko, and therefore survive when a vendor module is unloaded while kvm.ko remains loaded. If creation of pte_list_desc_cache fails during a subsequent vendor module load, its assignment sets pte_list_desc_cache to NULL and the error path calls mmu_destroy_caches(). mmu_page_header_cache still points to the cache destroyed during the preceding vendor module unload. Passing that stale pointer to kmem_cache_destroy() causes a slab use-after-free. Reproduce the issue on a v7.1.3 kernel with CONFIG_KASAN=y, CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y, CONFIG_KVM=m, and CONFIG_KVM_INTEL=m. A one-shot test hook forces pte_list_desc_cache to NULL on the second invocation of kvm_mmu_vendor_module_init(): 1. Load kvm.ko and kvm-intel.ko, creating both caches. 2. Unload only kvm_intel, leaving kvm.ko loaded. 3. Reload kvm_intel and force initialization through the -ENOMEM path. KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kvm_mmu_vendor_module_init+0x5b/0x170 [kvm] ... kmem_cache_destroy+0x21/0x1d0 kvm_mmu_vendor_module_init+0x5b/0x170 [kvm] ... Allocated by task 16817: __kmem_cache_create_args+0x12c/0x3b0 __kmem_cache_create.constprop.0+0xb6/0xf0 [kvm] kvm_mmu_vendor_module_init+0x13b/0x170 [kvm] ... Freed by task 16820: kmem_cache_destroy+0x117/0x1d0 kvm_mmu_vendor_module_exit+0x21/0x30 [kvm] Clear both pointers immediately after destroying their caches so that the stored state reflects the caches' lifetime and repeated cleanup is safe. With the fix applied, the same injected vendor module reload fails with -ENOMEM as expected and produces no KASAN report.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpu: host1x: Fix use-after-free in host1x_bo_clear_cached_mappings __host1x_bo_unpin() drops the last reference to the mapping and frees it, so we can't dereference mapping afterwards. The cache itself outlives the mapping, so use the cache local variable instead.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: fix stale skb->prev after async crypto steals a GSO segment skb_gso_segment() leaves the segment list head with ->prev pointing at the last segment, an invariant validate_xmit_skb_list() relies on when it sets its tail pointer (tail = skb->prev). When validate_xmit_xfrm() walks a GSO list and some segments are stolen by async crypto (->xmit() returns -EINPROGRESS), those segments are unlinked from the list but the head ->prev is never updated. If the last segment is the one stolen, the returned head still has ->prev pointing at it, even though it is now owned by the crypto engine and may be freed. validate_xmit_skb_list() later does tail->next = skb, writing through that stale pointer -- a use-after-free. Repoint skb->prev at the last retained segment before returning.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/mad: Drop unmatched RMPP responses before reassembly Kernel-handled RMPP receive processing starts reassembly for active DATA responses before the response is matched to an outstanding send. The normal match happens later, after ib_process_rmpp_recv_wc() has either assembled a complete message or consumed the segment. That ordering lets an unsolicited response that routes to a kernel RMPP agent by the high TID bits allocate or extend RMPP receive state before the full TID and source address are checked against a real request. A reordered burst can therefore reach the receive-side insertion path even though the response would not match any send. For kernel-handled RMPP DATA responses, require the existing ib_find_send_mad() match before entering RMPP reassembly. The matcher already checks the full TID, management class and source address/GID against the agent wait, backlog and in-flight send lists. If there is no match, drop the response without creating RMPP state. This leaves the RMPP window behavior unchanged and only rejects responses that have no corresponding request.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: virt_concat: fix use-after-free in mtd_virt_concat_destroy_joins() mtd_concat_destroy() frees item->concat so calling mtd_virt_concat_put_mtd_devices(item->concat) leads to a use after free. Fix this by moving mtd_virt_concat_put_mtd_devices() before mtd_concat_destroy()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: virt_concat: fix use-after-free in mtd_virt_concat_destroy() mtd_concat_destroy() frees item->concat so calling mtd_virt_concat_put_mtd_devices(item->concat) after that leads to a use-after-free. Fix it by moving mtd_virt_concat_put_mtd_devices() before mtd_concat_destroy().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix root leak if its reloc root is unexpected in merge_reloc_roots() If we have an unexpected reloc_root for our root, we jump to the out label but never drop the reference we obtained for root, resulting in a leak. Add a missing btrfs_put_root() call.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Don't warn on core-sched forced idle in put_prev_task_scx() put_prev_task_scx() warns when a runnable task drops to a lower sched_class without SCX_OPS_ENQ_LAST, on the assumption that balance_one() would have kept it running. Core scheduling breaks that: a forced-idle SMT sibling reschedules through the core_pick fast path in pick_next_task(), which skips pick_task_scx() and thus balance_one(), so a runnable task can drop to idle with ENQ_LAST unset. Gate the warning on sched_cpu_cookie_match(): a cookie mismatch means core scheduling forced the idle, while a match (or core scheduling off) still catches a genuine missing-ENQ_LAST drop.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: reject optional IPTFS templates in outbound policies syzbot reported a stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find() which flows from xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one(). Commit 3d776e31c841 ("xfrm: Reject optional tunnel/BEET mode templates in outbound policies") disallowed optional tunnel and BEET in outbound policies to prevent this. Later when IPTFS added, it was not covered by that fix and can still trigger the out-of-bounds read; Extend the check to disallow optional IPTFS in outbound policies as well. IPTFS should be identical to tunnel mode. IN and FWD policies are not affected: xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one() is only reachable via the outbound path. Reproducer, before: ip link add dummy0 type dummy ip link set dummy0 up ip addr add 10.1.1.1/24 dev dummy0 ip xfrm policy add src 10.1.1.1/32 dst 10.1.1.2/32 dir out tmpl src fc00::dead:1 dst fc00::dead:2 proto esp reqid 1 mode iptfs level use tmpl src fc00::dead:1 dst fc00::dead:2 proto esp reqid 2 mode transport ping -W 1 -c 1 10.1.1.2 PING 10.1.1.2 (10.1.1.2) 56(84) bytes of data. [ 64.168420] ================================================================== [ 64.169977] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170 [ 64.169977] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800e1ffd20 by task ping/2844 [ 64.169977] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 2844 Comm: ping Not tainted 7.1.0-rc7-00180-geb23b588430a #98 PREEMPT(full) [ 64.169977] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 64.169977] Call Trace: [ 64.169977] <TASK> [ 64.169977] dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x70 [ 64.169977] ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170 [ 64.169977] print_report+0x152/0x4b0 [ 64.169977] ? ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x6d/0xa0 [ 64.169977] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 64.169977] ? rcu_read_unlock_sched+0xa/0x20 [ 64.169977] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x21b/0x230 [ 64.169977] ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170 [ 64.169977] kasan_report+0xa8/0xd0 [ 64.169977] ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170 [ 64.169977] __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170 [ 64.169977] __xfrm_dst_hash+0x24/0xc0 [ 64.169977] xfrm_state_find+0xa2d/0x2f90 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_state_find+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one+0x210/0x570 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? kernel_text_address+0x5b/0x80 [ 64.169977] ? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30 [ 64.169977] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x5e/0x90 [ 64.169977] ? arch_stack_walk+0x8c/0xe0 [ 64.169977] xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0x130/0x200 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup_rcu+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? __refcount_add_not_zero.constprop.0+0xb2/0x110 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx___refcount_add_not_zero.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0xd5/0x310 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x3d8/0xb80 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? ip_route_output_key_hash+0xc6/0x110 [ 64.169977] ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 [ 64.169977] xfrm_lookup_route+0x18/0xe0 [ 64.169977] ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x4c9/0x530 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x71/0xc0 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] release_sock+0xb0/0x170 [ 64.169977] udp_connect+0x43/0x50 [ 64.169977] __sys_connect+0xa6/0x100 [ 64.169977] ? alloc_fd+0x2e9/0x300 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx___sys_connect+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? preempt_latency ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/irdma: Prevent rereg_mr for non-mem regions When a QP/CQ/SRQ is created, a two step process is used where the buffer is allocated in userspace and explicitly registered with the normal reg_mr mechanism prior to creating the actual QP/CQ/SRQ object. These special registrations are indicated via an ABI field so the driver knows that they do not have a valid mkey and to skip the actual CQP command submission. Since these are real MR objects from the core's perspective, it is possible for a user application to invoke rereg_mr on them and cause a real CQP op to be emitted with the zero-initialized mkey value of 0. Fix this by preventing rereg_mr on these special regions.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/irdma: Prevent user-triggered null deref on QP create Previously, the user QP creation path would only attempt to populate iwqp->iwpbl if the user-provided req.user_wqe_bufs field was non-zero. The problem is that iwqp->iwpbl is unconditionally dereferenced later on in irdma_setup_virt_qp. While there was a check for iwqp->iwpbl != NULL, this check would only occur if req.user_wqe_bufs was non-zero. The end result is that a user could send a zero user_wqe_bufs value and trigger a null ptr deref. Fix this by unconditionally calling irdma_get_pbl and bailing if it fails, similar to the CQ and SRQ paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/siw: publish QP after initialization siw_create_qp() currently calls siw_qp_add() before the queues, CQ pointers, state, completion, and device list entry are ready. A QPN lookup can therefore reach a QP that is still being constructed. Move siw_qp_add() to the end of siw_create_qp(), after QP initialization and before adding the QP to the siw device list.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: fix double free and WARN_ON in add_mtd_device() error paths When device_register() or mtd_nvmem_add() fails inside add_mtd_device() for a partition, the error handling triggers mtd_release() via put_device() or device_unregister(). mtd_release() calls release_mtd_partition() which frees the mtd_info structure. However, callers such as mtd_add_partition() and add_mtd_partitions() also call free_partition() in their error paths, resulting in a double free. Additionally, release_mtd_partition() hits WARN_ON(!list_empty( &mtd->part.node)) because the partition node is still linked in the parent's partitions list when the release callback fires from the add_mtd_device() error path. Fix this by overriding dev->type and dev->release before put_device() in the error paths, so that device_release() invokes a no-op function instead of mtd_release(). For the mtd_nvmem_add() failure case, device_unregister() is replaced with device_del() to separate the device removal from the final kobject reference drop, allowing the override to take effect before put_device() is called. The callers' error paths (list_del + free_partition) remain the sole owners of mtd_info lifetime on add_mtd_device() failure, which is the expected contract. The normal partition teardown path is not affected: del_mtd_device() goes through kref_put() -> mtd_device_release() -> device_unregister() with dev->type still set to &mtd_devtype, so mtd_release() -> release_mtd_partition() continues to work correctly for the regular removal case.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: clear mode callbacks after failed mode setup xfrm_state_gc_task can run long after a failed IPTFS state setup. In the reproduced case, __xfrm_init_state() cached x->mode_cbs, IPTFS setup returned -ENOMEM before publishing mode_data, and the temporary module reference from xfrm_get_mode_cbs() was dropped immediately. The dead state then kept x->mode_cbs until deferred GC ran after xfrm_iptfs had been unloaded. Clear x->mode_cbs when mode init or clone fails before publishing mode_data. Those states never installed mode-specific state or the long-term IPTFS module pin, so deferred GC has nothing mode-specific to destroy and must not retain a callback table pointer past the temporary lookup reference. The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order within that path: failed setup path: 1. cache x->mode_cbs 2. mode setup fails before mode_data 3. drop the temporary module ref 4. dead state keeps x->mode_cbs cached GC/unload path: 1. xfrm_state_put() queues GC work 2. xfrm_iptfs unloads later 3. xfrm_state_gc_task runs 4. GC dereferences stale x->mode_cbs This also covers the failed clone path where clone_state() returns before publishing mode_data. Validation reproduced this kernel report: Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_STACKTRACE_FILTER=y failslab_stacktrace_filter matched xfrm_iptfs frames ack_error=-12 FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure BUG: unable to handle page fault Workqueue: events xfrm_state_gc_task RIP: xfrm_state_gc_task+0x142/0x650 Modules linked in: esp4_offload xfrm_user [last unloaded: xfrm_iptfs] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: cancel sched scan results work on unregister cfg80211_sched_scan_results() can queue rdev->sched_scan_res_wk from a driver result notification while a scheduled scan request is present. The work callback recovers the containing cfg80211_registered_device and then locks the wiphy and walks the scheduled-scan request list. wiphy_unregister() already makes the wiphy unreachable and drains rdev work items before cfg80211_dev_free() can release the object, but it does not drain sched_scan_res_wk. A queued or running result work item can therefore cross the unregister/free boundary and access freed rdev state. The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order within that path: scheduled-scan result path: unregister/free path: 1. cfg80211_sched_scan_results() 1. interface teardown stops and queues rdev->sched_scan_res_wk. removes the scheduled scan request. 2. cfg80211_wq starts the work 2. wiphy_unregister() drains other item and recovers rdev. rdev work items. 3. The worker locks rdev->wiphy 3. cfg80211_dev_free() destroys and and walks rdev state. frees rdev. Cancel sched_scan_res_wk in wiphy_unregister() alongside the other rdev work items. cancel_work_sync() removes a pending result notification and waits for an already running callback, so cfg80211_dev_free() cannot free rdev while this work item is still active. Validation reproduced this kernel report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in cfg80211_sched_scan_results_wk+0x4a6/0x530 Workqueue: cfg80211 cfg80211_sched_scan_results_wk [cfg80211] Read of size 8 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xce/0x630 cfg80211_sched_scan_results_wk+0x4a6/0x530 srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 kasan_report+0xac/0xe0 lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 process_one_work+0x8d0/0x18f0 (kernel/workqueue.c:3212) lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 worker_thread+0x5ad/0xfd0 __kthread_parkme+0xc6/0x200 kthread+0x31e/0x410 trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 ret_from_fork+0x576/0x810 __switch_to+0x57e/0xe20 __switch_to_asm+0x33/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ipw2100: fix potential memory leak in ipw2100_pci_init_one() The memory allocated in the ipw2100_alloc_device() function is not freed in some of the error paths in ipw2100_pci_init_one(). Fix that by converting the direct return into a goto to the error path return. The error path when pci_enable_device() fails cannot jump to fail, since at this point priv is not set, so perform error handling inline.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: Fix an error handling path in cfg80211_wext_siwscan() If the test against IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN fails, then 'creq' leaks. Use the existing error handling path to fix it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211_hwsim: clamp virtio RX length before skb_put hwsim_virtio_rx_work() passes the virtqueue used-ring length reported by the device straight to skb_put() on a fixed-size receive skb. A backend reporting a length larger than the skb tailroom drives skb_put() past the buffer end and hits skb_over_panic() -- a host-triggerable guest panic (denial of service). Clamp the length to the skb's available room before skb_put(). A conforming device never reports more than the posted buffer size, so valid frames are unaffected; a truncated over-report then fails the length/header checks in hwsim_virtio_handle_cmd() and is dropped, so truncating rather than dropping here cannot be turned into a parsing problem.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: libertas: fix memory leak in helper_firmware_cb() helper_firmware_cb() neglects to free the single-stage firmware image after a successful async load, leading to a memory leak in the USB firmware-download path. Fix this memory leak by calling release_firmware() immediately after lbs_fw_loaded() returns. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in the current wireless tree. An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. As we do not have compatible Libertas USB hardware for exercising this firmware-download path, no runtime testing was able to be performed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: defer link RX stats percpu free to RCU sta_remove_link() frees a removed MLO link's RX stats percpu buffer right away, but defers only the link container to RCU: sta_info_free_link(&alloc->info); kfree_rcu(alloc, rcu_head); The RX fast path reads link_sta under rcu_read_lock and writes the percpu stats. A reader that resolved link_sta before the removal keeps the pointer. The container stays alive from the kfree_rcu, so the read still works. But the percpu block it points to is already freed. This needs uses_rss. That is when pcpu_rx_stats exists. The full STA teardown frees the deflink stats only after synchronize_net(). The link removal path had no such barrier. The race is hard to win in practice, but the free should still wait for RCU. Free the link together with its data from a single RCU callback, so the percpu block is reclaimed only after readers drain.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: convert pmsr_free_wk to wiphy_work to fix deadlock When a netlink socket that owns a PMSR session is closed, cfg80211_release_pmsr() clears the request's nl_portid and queues pmsr_free_wk to call cfg80211_pmsr_process_abort() asynchronously. If the interface tears down concurrently, cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down() is called under wiphy_lock and calls cancel_work_sync(&pmsr_free_wk) to wait for any running work. The work function acquires wiphy_lock via guard(wiphy) before calling process_abort. This is a deadlock: wdev_down holds wiphy_lock and blocks inside cancel_work_sync(); pmsr_free_wk blocks trying to acquire that same wiphy_lock. Neither thread can proceed. The same deadlock is reachable from cfg80211_leave_locked(), which calls cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down() for all interface types under wiphy_lock. Fix this by converting pmsr_free_wk from a plain work_struct to a wiphy_work. The wiphy_work dispatcher holds wiphy_lock when running work items, so the explicit guard(wiphy) in the work function is no longer needed. wiphy_work_cancel() can be called safely while holding wiphy_lock - since wiphy_lock prevents the work from running concurrently, wiphy_work_cancel() never blocks, eliminating the deadlock. Remove the cancel_work_sync() for pmsr_free_wk from the NETDEV_GOING_DOWN handler. cfg80211_leave(), called unconditionally just before it, already cancels any pending work under wiphy_lock via wiphy_work_cancel() inside cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: nl80211: free RNR data on MBSSID mismatch nl80211_parse_beacon() rejects EMA RNR data when there are fewer RNR entries than MBSSID entries. The rejected RNR allocation has not been attached to the beacon data yet, so free it before returning the error.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: validate PMSR FTM preamble range PMSR FTM request parsing accepts preamble values outside the enumerated nl80211 preamble range. Reject out-of-range values before using them in the parser capability bit test using the policy. [drop unnecessary check]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: free AP_VLAN bc_buf SKBs outside IRQ lock ieee80211_do_stop() removes AP_VLAN packets from the parent AP ps->bc_buf while holding ps->bc_buf.lock with IRQs disabled. It then calls ieee80211_free_txskb() before dropping the lock. ieee80211_free_txskb() is not just a passive SKB release. For SKBs with TX status state it can report a dropped frame through cfg80211/nl80211, and that path can reach netlink tap transmit. This is the same reason the pending queue cleanup in ieee80211_do_stop() already unlinks SKBs under the queue lock and frees them after IRQ state is restored. The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order within that path: AP_VLAN management TX: AP_VLAN stop: 1. attach ACK-status state 1. clear the running state 2. queue a multicast SKB on 2. take ps->bc_buf.lock with IRQs parent ps->bc_buf disabled 3. unlink the AP_VLAN SKB 4. call ieee80211_free_txskb() Unlink matching AP_VLAN SKBs from ps->bc_buf under the existing lock, but move them to a local free queue. Drop the lock and restore IRQ state before calling ieee80211_free_txskb(). WARNING: kernel/softirq.c:430 at __local_bh_enable_ip

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: use wiphy work for socket owner autodisconnect nl80211_netlink_notify() walks the cfg80211 wireless device list when a NETLINK_GENERIC socket is released. If the socket owns a connection, the notifier queues the embedded wdev->disconnect_wk work item. That work is a plain work_struct today. NETDEV_GOING_DOWN cancels it, but a NETLINK_URELEASE notifier that already observed conn_owner_nlportid can queue it after that cancel returns. _cfg80211_unregister_wdev() then removes the wdev from the list and waits for RCU readers, but synchronize_net() does not drain work queued by such a reader. Make the autodisconnect work a wiphy_work instead. The callback already needs the wiphy mutex, and wiphy_work runs under that mutex. This lets teardown cancel pending autodisconnect work while holding the mutex, without a cancel_work_sync() vs. worker locking concern. Also cancel the wiphy work after list_del_rcu() and synchronize_net(). Any NETLINK_URELEASE notifier that had already reached the wdev list has then either queued the work and it is removed, or can no longer find the wdev.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: initialize SDIO data work before cleanup brcmf_sdio_probe() stores the newly allocated bus in sdiodev->bus before allocating the ordered workqueue. If that allocation fails, the function jumps to fail and calls brcmf_sdio_remove(). brcmf_sdio_remove() unconditionally cancels bus->datawork. Initialize the work item before the first failure path that can reach brcmf_sdio_remove(), so the cleanup path always observes a valid work object. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then confirmed by manual review of the probe error path and the remove-time work drain. The problem pattern is an early setup failure that reaches a cleanup helper which cancels an embedded work item before its initializer has run. A QEMU PoC forced alloc_ordered_workqueue() to fail at the same point in brcmf_sdio_probe(), before INIT_WORK(&bus->datawork) is reached. The resulting fail path calls brcmf_sdio_remove(), and DEBUG_OBJECTS reports the invalid work drain with brcmf_sdio_probe() and brcmf_sdio_remove() in the stack.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: bound element ID read when checking non-inheritance cfg80211_is_element_inherited() reads the first data octet of the candidate element (id = elem->data[0]) to look it up in an extension non-inheritance list. It does so after testing elem->id, but without verifying that the element actually has a data octet. A zero-length extension element (WLAN_EID_EXTENSION with length 0) therefore makes it read one octet past the end of the element. _ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() runs this check for every element of a frame once a non-inheritance context exists -- e.g. while parsing a per-STA profile of a Multi-Link element in a (re)association response, or a non-transmitted BSS profile -- so a crafted frame from an AP can trigger a one-octet slab-out-of-bounds read during element parsing: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_is_element_inherited Read of size 1 ... in net/wireless/scan.c Return early (treat the element as inherited) when an extension element carries no data, mirroring the existing handling of empty ID lists. The bug was found by fuzzing ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() under KASAN.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_ffa: Fix out-of-bound writes in ffa_setup_and_transmit() Sashiko (locally) reports multiple out-of-bound issues in ffa_setup_and_transmit: 1) Writing ep_mem_access->reserved can write out of bounds for FFA versions < 1.2 as ffa_emad_size_get() returns 16 bytes in that case while reserved has an offset of 24. Instead of zeroing fields, memset the struct to zero first based on the FFA version. 2) Make sure there is enough size to write constituents. While at it, convert the only sizeof() in the driver that uses a type instead of variable.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_ffa: Fix Endpoint Memory Access Descriptor offset calculation Use the descriptor's `ep_mem_offset` to calculate the start of the endpoint memory access array and to comply with the FF-A spec instead of defaulting to `sizeof(struct ffa_mem_region)`. This requires moving `ffa_mem_region_additional_setup()` earlier in the setup flow. Also, add sanity checks to ensure the calculated descriptor offsets do not exceed `max_fragsize`.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix UAF in sock clone early bailouts Similar to recent commit 9b51a6155d14 ("bpf,fork: wipe ->bpf_storage before bailouts that access it"), sk_clone() performs an initial shallow copy of the socket field ->sk_bpf_storage via sock_copy() for the cloned socket newsk. If sk_clone() bails out early (e.g. if sk_filter_charge() fails) prior to calling bpf_sk_storage_clone(), newsk->sk_bpf_storage still points to the parent socket's BPF local storage. When newsk is subsequently freed via sk_free(), the deallocation path (__sk_destruct() -> bpf_sk_storage_free()) destroys the parent socket's BPF local storage, leading to a use-after-free (UAF) on the parent socket. Fix this by resetting newsk->sk_bpf_storage to NULL immediately after sock_copy() in sk_clone(), and remove the now redundant initialization from bpf_sk_storage_clone().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ppp: defer channel free to an RCU grace period to fix pppol2tp RX UAF pppol2tp_recv() runs in the L2TP UDP-encap softirq RX path: l2tp_udp_encap_recv() -> l2tp_recv_common() -> pppol2tp_recv() -> ppp_input(&po->chan) It runs under rcu_read_lock() holding only an l2tp_session reference and takes NO reference on the internal PPP channel (struct channel, chan->ppp) that ppp_input() dereferences. The pppox socket is SOCK_RCU_FREE, so 'po' and the embedded ppp_channel are RCU-safe. But the internal struct channel is a separate allocation that ppp_release_channel() frees with a plain kfree(): close(data socket) -> pppol2tp_release() -> pppox_unbind_sock() -> ppp_unregister_channel() -> ppp_release_channel() -> kfree(pch) For a channel that is bound (PPPIOCGCHAN) but not attached to a ppp unit (no PPPIOCCONNECT, pch->ppp == NULL) and not bridged, teardown skips both ppp_disconnect_channel()'s synchronize_net() and ppp_unbridge_channels()'s synchronize_rcu(), so the kfree() has no grace period. rcu_read_lock() in pppol2tp_recv() does not protect against a plain kfree(), so an in-flight ppp_input() on one CPU can dereference the channel just freed by close() on another CPU. The bug is reachable by an unprivileged user. Defer the channel free to an RCU callback via call_rcu() so the grace period fences any in-flight ppp_input(). The disconnect and unbridge teardown paths already fence with synchronize_net()/synchronize_rcu(); call_rcu() does the same here without stalling the close() path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/iucv: take a reference on the socket found in afiucv_hs_rcv() afiucv_hs_rcv() looks up the destination socket under iucv_sk_list.lock, drops the lock, and then passes the socket to the afiucv_hs_callback_*() handlers without holding a reference. AF_IUCV sockets are not RCU-protected and are freed synchronously by iucv_sock_kill() -> sock_put(), so a concurrent close can free the socket in the window between read_unlock() and the handler, which then dereferences freed memory (for example sk->sk_data_ready() in afiucv_hs_callback_syn()). Take a reference with sock_hold() while the socket is still on the list and release it with sock_put() once the handler has run.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: core: wake eh reliably when using scsi_schedule_eh Drivers which use the scsi_schedule_eh function to run the error handler currently risk the error handler thread never waking once all commands are timed out or inactive. There is no enforced memory order between setting the host into error recovery state and counting busy commands. This can result in a race with scsi_dec_host_busy where neither CPU sees both conditions of all commands inactive and the host error state to request waking the error handler. To fix this, run the scsi_schedule_eh's scsi_eh_wakeup from a new work item which will use rcu to ensure scsi_schedule_eh's call to scsi_host_busy will occur after the error state is globally visible and will be seen by any current scsi_dec_host_busy callers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ata: sata_dwc_460ex: enable SATA interrupts only after IRQ handler is registered sata_dwc_enable_interrupts() is called before platform_get_irq() and ata_host_activate(), leaving the SATA controller's interrupt mask enabled without a registered handler. If a later step fails (irq request, phy init, etc.) or if the controller asserts an interrupt during probe, the irq line may fire with no handler, causing a spurious interrupt storm. Move sata_dwc_enable_interrupts() after ata_host_activate() so that interrupts are only unmasked once the handler is registered and the core is fully initialized.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: revalidate LOAD_CONN_PARAM queued update MGMT_OP_LOAD_CONN_PARAM queues conn_update_sync() when a single parameter update changes an existing LE central connection. The queued work currently stores a borrowed hci_conn_params entry from hdev->le_conn_params. A later LOAD_CONN_PARAM request can clear disabled parameters and free that entry before hci_cmd_sync_work() runs the queued callback. Do not keep the borrowed hci_conn_params pointer in queued work. Queue the hci_conn instead and hold a reference until the queued callback completes. When the work runs, revalidate that the connection is still present, look up the current hci_conn_params entry, and cancel the update if userspace removed that entry while the work was pending. Copy the interval values from the current params entry under hdev->lock, then drop the lock and keep using hci_le_conn_update_sync() to issue the update. Validation reproduced this kernel report: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in conn_update_sync+0x2a/0xf0 [bluetooth] Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810c697126 by task kworker/u17:0/377 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work [bluetooth] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xce/0x5f0 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 conn_update_sync+0x2a/0xf0 [bluetooth] hci_cmd_sync_work+0x187/0x210 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x4fd/0xbc0 worker_thread+0x2d8/0x570 kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Allocated by task 466: hci_conn_params_add+0xa6/0x240 [bluetooth] load_conn_param+0x4e1/0x850 [bluetooth] hci_sock_sendmsg+0x96b/0xf80 [bluetooth] Freed by task 474: kfree+0x313/0x590 hci_conn_params_clear_disabled+0x9b/0xc0 [bluetooth] load_conn_param+0x4bf/0x850 [bluetooth] hci_sock_sendmsg+0x96b/0xf80 [bluetooth]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: extend conn_hash lookup critical sections Using RCU-protected pointers outside the critical sections without refcount is incorrect and may result to UAF. Extend critical section to cover both hci_conn_hash lookup and use of the returned conn. Add surrounding rcu_read_lock() also when return value is not used, in preparation for RCU lockdep requirement to hci_lookup_le_connect(). This avoids concurrent deletion of the conn before we are done dereferencing it. Also, make sure to hold hdev->lock when accessing hdev->accept_list.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: mgmt: fix locking in unpair_device/disconnect_sync Dereferencing RCU-protected pointers outside critical sections is invalid and may lead to UAF. Take hdev->lock for hci_conn lookup and hci_abort_conn(). Don't use RCU to ensure the conn is fully initialized at this point.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: mgmt: hold reference for hci_conn in mgmt_pending_cmds Dereferencing RCU-protected pointers outside critical sections is invalid and may lead to UAF. Use of hci_conn in hci_sync callbacks also needs to hold refcount to avoid UAF. Take appropriate locks for hci_conn lookups, and take refcount for hci_conn pointers stored in mgmt_pending_cmd so that the pointer stays valid. When accessing conn->state, ensure hdev->lock is held to avoid data race.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: hold hdev->lock for hci_conn_params lookups hci_conn_params_lookup requires hdev->lock be held, otherwise the list iteration or param access is not safe. Hold hdev->lock for params lookups in hci_sync.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_qca: Clear memdump state on invalid dump size qca_controller_memdump() allocates qca->qca_memdump before processing the first dump packet. For a sequence-zero packet it then disables IBS, marks memdump collection active, and reads the advertised dump size. If the controller reports a zero dump size, the error path frees the local qca_memdump object and returns without clearing qca->qca_memdump or undoing the collection state. A later memdump work item initializes its local pointer from qca->qca_memdump and skips allocation when that pointer is non-NULL, so it can operate on freed memory. The stale collection and IBS-disabled flags can also leave waiters or later transmit handling blocked behind an aborted dump. Clear the saved pointer and memdump state before returning from the invalid-size path, matching the cleanup used when hci_devcd_init() fails. A static analysis checker reported the stale memdump state, and manual source review confirmed the invalid-size failure path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb/client: handle overlapping allocated ranges in fallocate smb3_simple_fallocate_range() can skip holes when an allocated range returned by the server starts before the current fallocate offset. The skipped hole is not zero-filled, but fallocate still returns success. A later write to that hole may therefore fail with ENOSPC. The function queries allocated ranges so that it can preserve existing contents and write zeroes only into holes. However, the server may return a range that starts before the current fallocate offset. For example, assume the fallocate request is [100, 400) and the only allocated range returned by the server is [0, 200): Request: [100, 400) Server range: [ 0, 200) allocated Correct: [100, 200) allocated data, skip [200, 400) hole, zero-fill Current: [100, 300) skipped [300, 400) zero-filled afterwards The current code adds the full server range length, 200, to the current offset 100 and moves to 300. As a result, the hole in [200, 300) is skipped without being zero-filled. Fix this by advancing only over the part of the allocated range that overlaps the current fallocate offset. Ignore ranges that end before the current offset and reject ranges whose end offset overflows. This also prevents a malformed range length from causing an out-of-bounds zero-buffer read.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: raw: add locking for raw flags bitfield With commit 890e5198a6e5 ("can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock") the formerly separate integer values have been integrated into a single bitfield. This led to a read-modify-write operation when changing a flag in raw_setsockopt() which now needs a locking to prevent concurrent access. Instead of adding a lock/unlock hell in each of the flag manipulations this patch introduces a wrapper for a new raw_setsockopt_locked() function analogue to the isotp_setsockopt[_locked]() approach in net/can/isotp.c [mkl: use Closes tag instead of Link]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Reject unhashed UDP sockets on sockmap update UDP sockets get SOCK_RCU_FREE set when (auto-)bound. This means sk_is_refcounted(unbound) = true, while sk_is_refcounted(bound) = false. Because sockmap accepts unbound UDP sockets, a BPF program can increment a socket's refcount via lookup. If the socket is subsequently bound, the transition from unbound to bound causes bpf_sk_release() to skip the decrement of the refcount, causing a memory leak. unreferenced object 0xffff88810bc2eb40 (size 1984): comm "test_progs", pid 2451, jiffies 4295320596 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 7f 00 00 01 7f 00 00 01 d2 04 1b b7 04 d2 00 00 ................ 02 00 01 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...@............ backtrace (crc bdee079d): kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x557/0x660 sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x240 sk_alloc+0x30/0x460 inet_create+0x2ce/0xf80 __sock_create+0x25b/0x5c0 __sys_socket+0x119/0x1d0 __x64_sys_socket+0x72/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x5f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Instead of special-casing for refcounted sockets, reject unhashed UDP sockets during sockmap updates, as there is no benefit to supporting those. This effectively reverts the commit under Fixes, with two exceptions: 1. sock_map_sk_state_allowed() maintains a fall-through `return true`. 2. In the spirit of commit b8b8315e39ff ("bpf, sockmap: Remove unhash handler for BPF sockmap usage"), the proto::unhash BPF handler is not reintroduced. Historical note: this issue is related to commit 67312adc96b5 ("bpf: reject unhashed sockets in bpf_sk_assign").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/checksum: Fix csum_partial() without vector facility Currently csum_partial() calls csum_copy() with copy=false and dst=NULL. On machines without the vector facility, csum_copy() falls back to cksm(dst, ...), causing the checksum to be calculated from address zero instead of the source buffer. The VX implementation already checksums data loaded from src. Make the fallback do the same by passing src to cksm().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/vf: Fix VF CCS attach/detach race with in-flight BO moves xe_bo_move() attaches VF CCS read/write batch buffers (BBs) to a BO after it transitions NULL/SYSTEM -> TT, and detaches them after it transitions TT -> SYSTEM. Both operations were done synchronously on the CPU immediately after building the move's copy/clear fence, without waiting for that fence to signal. This creates two races with VF migration: - Attach happens too late relative to the copy job it is meant to protect. If the copy job is submitted before the CCS BBs are attached, a VF migration event that pauses execution mid-copy can observe partially copied CCS metadata without the attach state needed to correctly save/restore it. - Detach happens too early relative to the copy job that moves data out of TT. The CCS BBs are torn down right after the copy fence is obtained, while the actual blit may still be in flight. A VF migration event that pauses execution mid-copy can then race the save/restore path against the still-running blit, and the CCS BBs it would need to make sense of the paused state have already been removed. Fix both races: - Move the attach call to before the copy/clear job is submitted, so the CCS BBs are already registered by the time the copy runs. On attach failure, unwind and bail out of the move. xe_migrate_ccs_rw_copy() now takes the destination resource explicitly, since bo->ttm.resource is not updated to the new resource until after the move commits. - Detach only after explicitly waiting for the copy fence to signal, instead of tearing down the CCS BBs immediately after obtaining it. While here, also fix xe_sriov_vf_ccs_attach_bo() to properly unwind and propagate errors: the per-context loop previously never broke out on error, silently discarding earlier failures. Unwind by clearing each attached context directly via xe_migrate_ccs_rw_copy_clear() instead of reusing xe_sriov_vf_ccs_detach_bo(), which requires both contexts to be attached before it will clean up either one. (cherry picked from commit d45ad0aa7a1eb5d7288b5ed948b05695611dc39e)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/guc: Keep scheduler timeline name alive The scheduler keeps a pointer to the timeline name, but q->name is freed with the exec queue while scheduler fences can still reference it. Store the name in struct xe_guc_exec_queue so it shares the scheduler's RCU-deferred lifetime. (cherry picked from commit 41075f0eb5dcbd3b065d15f15ef7bbe9315188e8)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/guc: Hold device ref until queue teardown completes GuC exec queue destruction can run asynchronously. If the final device put happens from a destroy worker, drmm cleanup can end up draining the same workqueue and deadlock. Hold a drm_device reference for the queue lifetime and drop it after queue teardown completes. This keeps drmm cleanup from running while async destroy work is still pending. Move GuC destroy work to a module-lifetime Xe workqueue and flush it on PCI remove so hot-unbind/rebind still waits for pending destroy work. With queue-held device refs, guc_submit_sw_fini() cannot run with live GuC IDs. Replace the fini wait with an assertion and remove the unused fini_wq. v2: - Rebase v3: - Switch to queue-lifetime drm_dev_get()/drm_dev_put() model. (Matt) - Queue async teardown on system_dfl_wq instead of xe->destroy_wq. (Matt) - Drop separate deferred drm_dev_put worker. - Remove stale drain_workqueue(xe->destroy_wq) from guc_submit_sw_fini(). v4: - Replace the guc_submit_sw_fini() wait with an assertion and remove the now-unused fini_wq. (sashiko) v5: - Move destroy work to a module-lifetime Xe workqueue instead of system_dfl_wq. (Matt) - Flush the module-lifetime destroy workqueue during PCI remove to preserve the old device-remove wait semantics. v6: - Keep SVM pagemap destroy work on the per-device destroy_wq to avoid letting it outlive the xe_device/drm_device. (Sashiko) - Use WQ_MEM_RECLAIM for xe->destroy_wq because SVM pagemap destroy work can be queued from the reclaim path. v7: - Drop the per-device xe->destroy_wq and use the module-level destroy WQ for SVM pagemap destroy as well. (Matt) - Rename xe_exec_queue_destroy_wq_*() helpers to xe_destroy_wq_*() helpers because the WQ is no longer exec-queue specific. (Matt) v8: - Rebase. v9: - Keep SVM pagemap destroy work on the per-device WQ_MEM_RECLAIM destroy_wq because it can be queued from reclaim and embeds the dev_pagemap used by devres teardown. (Sashiko) - Keep the module-level destroy WQ GuC-only and drop WQ_MEM_RECLAIM from it. - Update the module-WQ kdoc to document the GuC/SVM split. v10: - Keep xe->destroy_wq per-cpu while adding WQ_MEM_RECLAIM to fix the workqueue allocation warning. v11: - Drop the SVM pagemap destroy comment as it was revision-specific. (Thomas) v12: - Rebase. (cherry picked from commit da1124abac689cc2b1d8995e5f0a816f8a122edb)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: pin conn during async oplock break notification smb2_oplock_break_noti() and smb2_lease_break_noti() store a ksmbd_conn pointer in an async ksmbd_work and then queue that work on ksmbd-io. The work only increments conn->r_count, which prevents teardown from passing the pending-request wait after the increment, but it does not pin the struct ksmbd_conn object. If connection teardown races with an oplock break notification, the last conn reference can be dropped before the queued worker finishes. The worker then uses the freed conn in ksmbd_conn_write() and ksmbd_conn_r_count_dec(). Take a real conn reference when publishing the conn pointer to the async work item, and drop it after the notification work has decremented r_count. Apply the same lifetime rule to lease break notification, which uses the same work->conn pattern.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/amdxdna: Fix use-after-free of mm_struct in job scheduler amdxdna_cmd_submit() stores current->mm in job->mm without holding any reference. aie2_sched_job_run() later access job->mm from the DRM scheduler worker thread. With only a raw pointer and no structural reference, the mm_struct can be freed before the scheduler runs the job. Fix this by calling mmgrab() to hold a structural mm_count reference for the lifetime of the job, paired with mmdrop() in every cleanup path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: fix TIME_WAIT socket reference leak on PSP policy failure Release the TIME_WAIT socket reference and jump to discard_it upon PSP policy failure in both IPv4 and IPv6 receive paths. This prevents a memory leak of tcp_tw_bucket structures.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dpll: fix NULL pointer dereference in dpll_msg_add_pin_ref_sync() When a dpll_pin is shared across multiple dpll_device instances and those devices are being unregistered (e.g. during driver module removal), a NULL pointer dereference can occur in dpll_msg_add_pin_ref_sync(). This happens under the following conditions: - A pin is registered with two or more dpll devices (dpll_A, dpll_B) - The pin has ref_sync pairs with other pins - During unregistration of dpll_A's pins, a ref_sync partner pin is unregistered first, removing it from dpll_A->pin_refs - But since the partner pin is still registered with dpll_B, its dpll_refs is not empty, so dpll_pin_ref_sync_pair_del() does NOT run and the partner stays in the pin's ref_sync_pins xarray - When the pin itself is then unregistered from dpll_A, the delete notification calls dpll_msg_add_pin_ref_sync() which finds the partner in ref_sync_pins, passes dpll_pin_available() (partner is still registered with dpll_B), but dpll_pin_on_dpll_priv(dpll_A, partner) returns NULL because partner was already removed from dpll_A->pin_refs - The NULL priv pointer is passed to the driver's ref_sync_get callback, which dereferences it BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000034 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:zl3073x_dpll_input_pin_ref_sync_get+0x73/0x80 [zl3073x] Call Trace: dpll_msg_add_pin_ref_sync+0xb8/0x200 dpll_cmd_pin_get_one+0x3b6/0x4b0 dpll_pin_event_send+0x72/0x140 __dpll_pin_unregister+0x5a/0x2b0 dpll_pin_unregister+0x49/0x70 Fix this by skipping ref_sync pins whose priv pointer cannot be resolved for the current dpll device.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_tunnel_key: Defer dst_release to RCU callback Fix a race-condition use-after-free in tunnel_key_release_params(). The function releases the metadata_dst of the old params synchronously via dst_release() while deferring the params struct free with kfree_rcu(). A concurrent tunnel_key_act() reader on the datapath may still hold the old params pointer (under rcu_read_lock_bh) and proceed to call dst_clone(&params->tcft_enc_metadata->dst) after the writer's dst_release has already pushed the dst's rcuref to RCUREF_DEAD. zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com produced a poc which i (and Victor) verified that KASAN reports: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in atomic_sub_return_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:326 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:109 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:173 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dst_release+0x5b/0x370 net/core/dst.c:168 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88806158de40 by task poc/9388 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9388 Comm: poc Tainted: G W 7.1.0-rc7 #7 PREEMPT(lazy) Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, + 10.1 machine, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 print_report+0x139/0x4ad mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:595 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:186 kasan_check_range+0x125/0x200 mm/kasan/generic.c:200 instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 atomic_sub_return_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:326 __rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:109 rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:173 dst_release+0x5b/0x370 net/core/dst.c:168 refdst_drop include/net/dst.h:272 skb_dst_drop include/net/dst.h:284 skb_release_head_state+0x293/0x400 net/core/skbuff.c:1163 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1187 [..] Allocated by task 9391: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 __kasan_kmalloc+0x9a/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5296 __kmalloc_noprof+0x2f1/0x830 mm/slub.c:5308 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 offload_action_alloc+0x2f/0x130 net/core/flow_offload.c:35 tcf_action_offload_add_ex+0x1ba/0x880 net/sched/act_api.c:258 tcf_action_offload_add net/sched/act_api.c:293 tcf_action_init+0x66e/0xa20 net/sched/act_api.c:1547 tcf_action_add+0xf6/0x5d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2101 [..] Freed by task 9391: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 mm/kasan/generic.c:584 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:253 __kasan_slab_free+0x6b/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:285 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2689 slab_free mm/slub.c:6251 kfree+0x21f/0x6b0 mm/slub.c:6566 tcf_action_offload_add_ex+0x4ad/0x880 net/sched/act_api.c:284 tcf_action_offload_add net/sched/act_api.c:293 tcf_action_init+0x66e/0xa20 net/sched/act_api.c:1547 tcf_action_add+0xf6/0x5d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2101 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88806158de00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 64 bytes inside of freed 256-byte region [ffff88806158de00, ffff88806158df00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88806158d600 pfn:0x6158c head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_map ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: fix auth_hmacs array size in struct sctp_cookie The auth_hmacs array in struct sctp_cookie is supposed to store a complete SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ALGO parameter, which consists of a struct sctp_paramhdr followed by N HMAC identifiers. However, the array size was calculated using an extra 2 bytes instead of sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr), which is 4 bytes. When four HMAC identifiers are configured, the HMAC-ALGO parameter stored in the endpoint is larger than the auth_hmacs buffer in the cookie. As a result, sctp_association_init() copies beyond the end of auth_hmacs when initializing the association, corrupting the adjacent auth_chunks field. This can lead to an invalid HMAC identifier being accepted and later cause an out-of-bounds read in sctp_auth_get_hmac(). Fix the array size calculation by including the full SCTP parameter header size.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bnxt_en: Handle partially initialized auxiliary devices bnxt_aux_devices_init() calls auxiliary_device_init() before all fields used by bnxt_aux_dev_release() are initialized. After auxiliary_device_init() succeeds, later errors must unwind with auxiliary_device_uninit(), which invokes the release callback. The release callback assumes that aux_priv->id, aux_priv->edev, edev->net and edev->ulp_tbl are all populated. If allocation fails after auxiliary_device_init(), the release path can otherwise dereference or clear partially initialized state. Allocate and attach the bnxt_en_dev and ULP table before calling auxiliary_device_init(), so the release callback only sees a fully initialized auxiliary private object. If auxiliary_device_init() itself fails, free those allocations directly because device_initialize() has not run and the release callback will not be invoked. This issue was found by a static analysis checker and confirmed by manual source review.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: core: sysfs: add lock to bos_descriptors_read() Add a lock to the function bos_descriptors_read(). This function accesses udev->bos, which could be simultaneously freed in usb_reset_and_verify_device(), a function that is commonly called in drivers all over the kernel.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: at76c50x-usb: avoid length underflow in at76_guess_freq() at76_guess_freq() checks only that the received frame is at least a bare 802.11 header (24 bytes) before subtracting the fixed management-body offset: len -= el_off; For both beacon and probe response frames, el_off is 36. If the frame is shorter than el_off, subtracting it causes the calculated IE length to wrap. The length is eventually passed to cfg80211_find_elem_match() as a very large unsigned value, so the element walk runs beyond the RX skb. This path is reached from at76_rx_tasklet() while scanning. If the device delivers a truncated beacon or probe response, the oversized IE length causes an out-of-bounds read during scanning. Skip the IE lookup if the frame does not reach the variable elements, before subtracting el_off.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: core: port: Deattach Type-C connector on component unbind connector_unbind() is the mirror of connector_bind(), but it is missing the symmetric call to typec_deattach() that connector_bind() makes via: if (port_dev->child) typec_attach(port_dev->connector, &port_dev->child->dev); When a Thunderbolt dock is unplugged, two teardown paths race: 1. The component framework calls connector_unbind() first, which sets port_dev->connector = NULL without calling typec_deattach(). This leaves port->usb2_dev/port->usb3_dev in struct typec_port pointing at the USB device that is about to be freed. 2. usb_disconnect() then calls typec_deattach(port_dev->connector, ...), but port_dev->connector is already NULL, so the call is a no-op and port->usb2_dev is never cleared. 3. Concurrently, UCSI detects a PD partner-disconnect event and calls typec_unregister_partner(), which reads port->usb2_dev (now a dangling pointer to freed memory) and passes it to typec_partner_unlink_device() -> sysfs_remove_link() -> dev_name() on the freed device, corrupting the typec/UCSI partner state. This corruption leaves the Thunderbolt tunnel in an inconsistent state on the next dock hot-plug. On affected hardware the dock's I225/igc NIC fails to enumerate: AER fires a slot reset while the igc driver is still initialising ("PCIe link lost"), and the subsequent igc_reset attempt hits igc_rd32 on an already-detached device: igc 0000:2e:00.0 eth0: PCIe link lost, device now detached igc: Failed to read reg 0x0! WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 129 at drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c:7005 igc_rd32+0xa4/0xc0 [igc] Call Trace: igc_disable_pcie_master+0x16/0xa0 [igc] igc_reset_hw_base+0x14/0x170 [igc] igc_reset+0x63/0x110 [igc] igc_io_slot_reset+0x9e/0xd0 [igc] report_slot_reset+0x5d/0xc0 pcie_do_recovery+0x209/0x400 aer_isr_one_error_type+0x235/0x430 aer_isr+0x4e/0x80 irq_thread+0xf4/0x1f0 4. UCSI later handles the PD partner-disconnect and calls typec_unregister_partner(), which still sees the stale port->usb2_dev and tries to remove its sysfs link a second time: kernfs: can not remove 'typec', no directory WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 55 at fs/kernfs/dir.c:1706 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xe9/0xf0 Workqueue: events ucsi_handle_connector_change [typec_ucsi] Call Trace: sysfs_remove_link+0x19/0x50 typec_unregister_partner+0x6e/0x120 [typec] ucsi_unregister_partner+0x107/0x150 [typec_ucsi] ucsi_handle_connector_change+0x3ec/0x490 [typec_ucsi] process_one_work+0x18e/0x3e0 worker_thread+0x2e3/0x420 kthread+0x10a/0x230 ret_from_fork+0x121/0x140 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 With worse timing the same stale pointer is dereferenced after the backing memory is freed, turning the warning into a use-after-free. Fix the asymmetry: call typec_deattach() before clearing port_dev->connector, matching what connector_bind() does on the bind side. typec_partner_deattach() is already protected by port->partner_link_lock, so it serialises safely with the concurrent typec_unregister_partner() path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: musb: omap2430: Do not put borrowed of_node in probe omap2430_probe() stores pdev->dev.of_node in a local np variable. This is a borrowed pointer and the probe function does not take a reference to it. The success and error paths nevertheless call of_node_put(np). This drops a reference that is owned by the platform device, and can leave pdev->dev.of_node with an unbalanced reference count. Do not put the borrowed platform device node from omap2430_probe(). References taken for the child MUSB device are handled by the device core, and the ctrl-module phandle reference is still released separately.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: dummy_hcd: prevent fifo_req reuse during giveback dummy_hcd embeds a single shared usb_request (dum->fifo_req) that the "emulated single-request FIFO" fast-path in dummy_queue() reuses for small IN transfers: it copies the caller's request into it (req->req = *_req) and queues it, treating list_empty(&fifo_req.queue) as "the slot is free". The completion side (dummy_timer/transfer/nuke/dummy_dequeue) follows the standard pattern: list_del_init(&req->queue) unlinks the request, then the lock is dropped and usb_gadget_giveback_request() invokes req->complete(). But list_del_init() makes fifo_req.queue look empty *before* the completion callback returns, so a concurrent dummy_queue() on another CPU sees the slot as free, reuses fifo_req and runs req->req = *_req -- overwriting req->complete while dummy_timer is mid-calling it. The indirect call then jumps to a clobbered pointer, causing a general protection fault / page fault in dummy_timer (syzkaller extid faf3a6cf579fc65591ca). The clobbering write is an in-bounds memcpy on a live shared object, so KASAN cannot flag it. Add a fifo_req_busy bit covering the shared request's whole lifetime: set it in dummy_queue() when the FIFO fast-path takes fifo_req (making it the fast-path guard, replacing the list_empty(&fifo_req.queue) test), and clear it after the completion callback has returned, via a dummy_giveback() helper used at all four gadget-request giveback sites. The shared slot can no longer be reused until its completion callback has finished.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: printer: fix infinite loop in printer_read() printer_read() uses the same variable for the requested copy size and the number of bytes actually copied to user space. copy_to_user() returns the number of bytes not copied, so when it fails to copy anything, the computed copied length becomes zero. In that case len, buf, current_rx_bytes and current_rx_buf are left unchanged. If RX data is available and the user buffer remains unwritable, the read loop can repeat indefinitely. Track the copied length separately and return -EFAULT, or the number of bytes already copied, if an iteration makes no progress.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_ncm: validate datagram bounds in ncm_unwrap_ntb() When unpacking host-supplied NTBs, ncm_unwrap_ntb() checks datagram length against frame_max but does not verify that the datagram fits within the declared block length. Additionally, when decoding multiple NTBs from a single socket buffer, subsequent block lengths are not checked against the actual remaining buffer data. With these checks missing, a malicious USB host can specify datagram offsets and lengths that point beyond the block, or supply secondary NTB headers declaring lengths larger than the buffer. skb_put_data() then copies adjacent kernel memory from skb_shared_info into the network skb. Fix this by verifying that sufficient buffer space remains for the NTB header before parsing, handling zero-length block declarations, ensuring that block lengths never exceed the remaining buffer space, and verifying that each datagram payload stays strictly within the block boundary.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_tcm: synchronize delayed set_alt with teardown The f_tcm set_alt() path defers endpoint setup to a work item and completes the delayed status response from process context. The delayed work uses f_tcm private state and may complete the setup request after disconnect or function teardown has already moved on. Cancel and drain the delayed set_alt work when the function is unbound or freed. For disable paths, which are reached under the composite device lock, use a small state machine and a non-sleeping cancellation path instead of cancel_work_sync(). If the work is already running, mark it cancelled and let the worker own the cleanup; otherwise tcm_disable() can cancel the queued work and clean up immediately. Also serialize the final delayed-status completion with the cancellation check while holding the composite device lock. This prevents a disconnect from clearing delayed_status while the worker is about to complete the control request. Validation reproduced this kernel report: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tcm_delayed_set_alt+0x6c/0xef0 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xce/0x630 ? tcm_delayed_set_alt+0x6c/0xef0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x320 ? tcm_delayed_set_alt+0x6c/0xef0 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 ? tcm_delayed_set_alt+0x6c/0xef0 tcm_delayed_set_alt+0x6c/0xef0 ? __pfx_tcm_delayed_set_alt+0x10/0x10 ? process_one_work+0x4cb/0xb90 ? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 ? tcm_delayed_set_alt+0x9/0xef0 process_one_work+0x4d7/0xb90 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x37/0xf0 ? __pfx_tcm_delayed_set_alt+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 worker_thread+0x2d8/0x570 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540 ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __switch_to+0x2e9/0x730 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 544: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 tcm_alloc+0x68/0x180 usb_get_function+0x36/0x60 config_usb_cfg_link+0x125/0x1b0 configfs_symlink+0x322/0x890 vfs_symlink+0xc2/0x270 filename_symlinkat+0x295/0x2f0 __x64_sys_symlinkat+0x62/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 661: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70 kfree+0x2f9/0x530 config_usb_cfg_unlink+0x173/0x1e0 configfs_unlink+0x1fa/0x340 vfs_unlink+0x15c/0x510 filename_unlinkat+0x2ba/0x450 __x64_sys_unlinkat+0x63/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: uvc: clamp SEND_RESPONSE length to the response buffer uvc_send_response() builds the UVC control response from a user-supplied struct uvc_request_data: req->length = min_t(unsigned int, uvc->event_length, data->length); ... memcpy(req->buf, data->data, req->length); req->length is clamped to uvc->event_length, which is taken from the host control request wLength (up to UVC_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE, 64), and to data->length, which comes from the UVCIOC_SEND_RESPONSE ioctl and is only checked for being negative. The source buffer data->data is only 60 bytes, so a response with uvc->event_length and data->length both greater than 60 makes memcpy() read past the end of data->data. Clamp req->length to sizeof(data->data) as well.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: io_edgeport: cap received transmit credits The interrupt-status packet reports transmit credits returned by the device. edge_interrupt_callback() adds the 16-bit value to txCredits without checking maxTxCredits. edge_write() uses txCredits minus the software FIFO count as the amount of data that fits. Since the FIFO is allocated with maxTxCredits bytes, txCredits exceeding maxTxCredits can cause OOB write in ring buffer. Cap accumulated credits at maxTxCredits. Conforming devices should never hit the cap.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Fix ISM dc_lock deadlock during suspend [Why] System hang observed during suspend/resume while video is playing. amdgpu_dm_ism_disable() is called under dc_lock and waits for ISM delayed work via disable_delayed_work_sync(). The work handlers themselves take dc_lock, producing an ABBA deadlock when a worker is in flight at suspend time. [How] Split the disable path into two phases with opposite locking contracts: 1. amdgpu_dm_ism_disable() -- quiesces workers, must NOT hold dc_lock. 2. amdgpu_dm_ism_force_full_power() (new) -- drives the ISM FSM back to FULL_POWER_RUNNING, must hold dc_lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath9k: hif_usb: don't dereference hif_dev after re-arming firmware request ath9k_hif_request_firmware() re-arms an asynchronous firmware load via request_firmware_nowait(), passing hif_dev as the completion context, and then still dereferences hif_dev: dev_info(&hif_dev->udev->dev, "ath9k_htc: Firmware %s requested\n", hif_dev->fw_name); The re-armed callback ath9k_hif_usb_firmware_cb() runs on the "events" workqueue and, when the firmware is missing, walks the retry chain into ath9k_hif_usb_firmware_fail() -> complete_all(&hif_dev->fw_done). That releases the wait_for_completion(&hif_dev->fw_done) in a concurrent ath9k_hif_usb_disconnect(), which then kfree()s hif_dev. The trailing dev_info() in the frame that re-armed the request can therefore read freed memory (hif_dev->udev, the first field of struct hif_device_usb): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ath9k_hif_request_firmware Read of size 8 ... by task kworker/... ath9k_hif_request_firmware ath9k_hif_usb_firmware_cb drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:1247 request_firmware_work_func Allocated by ...: ath9k_hif_usb_probe drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c Freed by ...: ath9k_hif_usb_disconnect -> kfree drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c The fw_done barrier only makes disconnect wait for the firmware chain to *terminate*; it does not protect the outer ath9k_hif_request_firmware() frame that re-armed the request and keeps touching hif_dev afterwards. Drop the post-request dev_info(): it is the only use of hif_dev after the async request is armed, and it is purely informational (the dev_err() on the failure path runs only when request_firmware_nowait() did not arm a callback, so hif_dev is still alive there). This was first reported by syzbot as a single, non-reproduced crash that was later auto-obsoleted, and was independently rediscovered by the reFuzz fuzzer, which produced a C reproducer (USB-gadget connect/disconnect of an ath9k_htc device whose firmware download fails). The vulnerable code is unchanged and still present in v7.1-rc6, where the slab-use-after-free reproduces under KASAN once the (sub-microsecond) race window is widened.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: fix NULL pointer dereference in ath11k_hal_srng_access_begin In ATH11K_QMI_EVENT_FW_READY, ATH11K_FLAG_REGISTERED is set unconditionally even when ath11k_core_qmi_firmware_ready() fails. This leaves the driver in an inconsistent state where initialization is considered complete although the firmware ready handling did not finish successfully. During the subsequent SSR, the driver enters the restart path based on this incorrect state and dereferences uninitialized srng members, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference. Call trace: ath11k_hal_srng_access_begin+0xc/0x60 [ath11k] (P) ath11k_ce_cleanup_pipes+0x17c/0x180 [ath11k] ath11k_core_restart+0x40/0x168 [ath11k] Fix this by: - skipping firmware_ready if ATH11K_FLAG_REGISTERED is already set - setting ATH11K_FLAG_REGISTERED only when firmware_ready succeeds - setting ATH11K_FLAG_QMI_FAIL and aborting the FW_READY handling on error Tested-on: WCN6750 hw1.0 AHB WLAN.MSL.2.0.c2-00204-QCAMSLSWPLZ-1

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (corsair-psu) Stop device IO before calling hid_hw_stop hid_hw_stop() does not stop the device IO. This results in a race condition between hid_input_report() and the point immediately following the execution of hid_device_io_start() within corsairpsu_probe(). If the probe operation fails after "io start" has been initiated, this race condition will result in a uaf vulnerability [1]. CPU0 CPU1 ==== ==== corsairpsu_probe() hid_device_io_start() ... unlock driver_input_lock hid_hw_stop() kfree(hidraw) __hid_input_report() ... acquire driver_input_lock hid_report_raw_event() hidraw_report_event() ... access hidraw's list_lock // trigger uaf Consequently, when corsairpsu_probe() fails and hid_hw_stop() needs to be executed, the io_started flag is first cleared while holding the driver_input_lock to prevent potential race conditions involving input reports. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rt_spin_lock+0x83/0x400 kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:56 Call Trace: hidraw_report_event+0x5d/0x3a0 drivers/hid/hidraw.c:577 hid_report_raw_event+0x311/0x1730 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2076 __hid_input_report drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2152 [inline] hid_input_report+0x44e/0x580 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2174 hid_irq_in+0x47e/0x6d0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:286 __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x3b3/0x5e0 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657 dummy_timer+0x8a9/0x47d0 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:2005 Allocated by task 10: hidraw_connect+0x57/0x430 drivers/hid/hidraw.c:606 hid_connect+0x5bf/0x19d0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2277 hid_hw_start+0xa8/0x120 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2387 corsairpsu_probe+0xd9/0x3c0 drivers/hwmon/corsair-psu.c:782 Freed by task 10: hidraw_disconnect+0x4f/0x60 drivers/hid/hidraw.c:662 hid_disconnect drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2362 [inline] hid_hw_stop+0x101/0x1e0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2407 corsairpsu_probe+0x327/0x3c0 drivers/hwmon/corsair-psu.c:826 Fix the problem by calling hid_device_io_stop() before calling hid_hw_stop(). [groeck: Updated subject and description; call hid_device_io_stop() only if IO has been started]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (corsair-cpro) Stop device IO before calling hid_hw_stop Calling hid_hw_stop() does not stop the device IO. This results in a race condition between hid_input_report() and the point immediately following the execution of hid_device_io_start() within the driver probe function. If the probe operation fails after "io start" has been initiated, this race condition will result in a UAF vulnerability. Fix the problem by calling hid_device_io_stop() before calling hid_hw_stop().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (nzxt-smart2) Stop device IO before calling hid_hw_stop Calling hid_hw_stop() does not stop the device IO. This results in a race condition between hid_input_report() and the point immediately following the execution of hid_device_io_start() within the driver probe function. If the probe operation fails after "io start" has been initiated, this race condition will result in a UAF vulnerability. Fix the problem by calling hid_device_io_stop() before calling hid_hw_stop().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (nzxt-kraken3) Stop device IO before calling hid_hw_stop Calling hid_hw_stop() does not stop the device IO. This results in a race condition between hid_input_report() and the point immediately following the execution of hid_device_io_start() within the driver probe function. If the probe operation fails after "io start" has been initiated, this race condition will result in a UAF vulnerability. Fix the problem by calling hid_device_io_stop() before calling hid_hw_stop().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: watchdog: pretimeout: Fix UAF in watchdog_unregister_governor() When a watchdog governor is unregistered, it updates existing watchdog devices that were using this governor by falling back to `default_gov`. If the governor being unregistered is currently set as `default_gov`, the `default_gov` is never cleared. This leads to 2 use-after-free issues: 1. New watchdog devices registered after this point will inherit the dangling `default_gov`. 2. Existing watchdog devices using the unregistered governor will have their `wdd->gov` reassigned to the dangling `default_gov`. Fix the UAF by clearing `default_gov` if it matches the governor being unregistered.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: watchdog: airoha: Prevent division by zero when clock frequency is zero clk_get_rate() can return 0 when the clock provider is not properly configured or the clock is unmanaged. The driver uses wdt_freq as a divisor directly in airoha_wdt_probe() to compute max_timeout and in airoha_wdt_get_timeleft() to compute the remaining time, which results in a division by zero. Add a check for wdt_freq == 0 in probe and return -EINVAL with dev_err_probe() to prevent the division by zero and provide a diagnostic message.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: fix potential buffer underflow in ath11k_hal_rx_msdu_list_get() When the first entry in msdu_details has a zero buffer address, the code accesses msdu_details[i - 1] with i == 0, causing a buffer underflow. Fix similarly to ath12k_wifi7_hal_rx_msdu_list_get() by adding a separate check for i == 0 before the main condition to prevent the out-of-bounds access. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firewire: net: Fix fragmented datagram reassembly fwnet_frag_new() keeps a sorted list of received fragments for a partial datagram. When a new fragment is adjacent to an existing fragment, the code checks whether the new fragment also closes the gap to the next or previous list entry. Those neighbor lookups currently assume that the current fragment always has a real next or previous fragment. At a list edge, the next or previous entry is the list head, not a struct fwnet_fragment_info. The gap checks also compare against the old edge of the current fragment instead of the edge after adding the new fragment. As a result, a fragment that bridges two existing ranges may leave two adjacent ranges unmerged, so fwnet_pd_is_complete() can miss a complete datagram. Check for the list head before looking up the neighboring fragment, and compare the neighbor against the new fragment's far edge when deciding whether to merge all three ranges. This issue was found by a static analysis checker and confirmed by manual source review.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath6kl: fix OOB read from firmware num_msg in TX complete handler The firmware-controlled num_msg field (u8, 0-255) drives the loop in ath6kl_wmi_tx_complete_event_rx() without validation against the buffer length. This allows out-of-bounds reads of up to 1020 bytes past the WMI event buffer when the firmware sends an inflated num_msg. Add a check that the buffer is large enough to hold the fixed struct and the num_msg variable-length entries.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath6kl: fix OOB read from firmware IE lengths in connect event The firmware-controlled beacon_ie_len, assoc_req_len, and assoc_resp_len fields in ath6kl_wmi_connect_event_rx() are not validated against the buffer length. Their sum (up to 765) can exceed the actual WMI event data, causing out-of-bounds reads during IE parsing and state corruption of wmi->is_wmm_enabled. Add a check that the total IE length fits within the buffer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: carl9170: bound memcpy length in cmd callback to prevent OOB read When the firmware sends a command response with a length mismatch, carl9170_cmd_callback() logs the mismatch and calls carl9170_restart() but then falls through to memcpy(ar->readbuf, buffer + 4, len - 4). Since len comes from the firmware and can exceed ar->readlen, this copies more data than the readbuf was allocated for. Bound the memcpy to min(len - 4, ar->readlen) so that the response is still completed -- avoiding repeated restarts from queued garbage -- while preventing an overread past the response buffer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: carl9170: fix OOB read from off-by-two in TX status handler The bounds check in carl9170_tx_process_status() uses `i > ((cmd->hdr.len / 2) + 1)` which is off by two, allowing 2 extra iterations past valid _tx_status entries when the firmware- controlled hdr.ext exceeds hdr.len/2. Fix by using the correct comparison `i >= (cmd->hdr.len / 2)`.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: carl9170: fix buffer overflow in rx_stream failover path The failover continuation in carl9170_rx_stream() copies the full tlen from the second USB transfer instead of capping at rx_failover_missing bytes. When both transfers are near maximum size, the total exceeds the 65535-byte failover SKB, triggering skb_over_panic. Limit the copy size to the missing byte count. [Fix checkpatch CHECK:PARENTHESIS_ALIGNMENT]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: tas2781: bound firmware description string parsing The TAS2781 firmware parser reads several variable-length description strings with strlen() before checking that the string terminator is present inside the firmware blob. A malformed firmware image without a NUL terminator can therefore make the parser walk past the end of the firmware buffer before the later size checks run. Add a small bounded string-length helper and use it for all description fields that are parsed from the firmware buffer. Keep the existing size checks for the fixed bytes that follow each string.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/amd: Fix IRQ unsafe locking in gdom allocation Lockdep complains: [ 259.410489] ===================================================== [ 259.417287] WARNING: HARDIRQ-safe -> HARDIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 259.424667] 7.0.0-g51db1d8d2113 #54 Not tainted [ 259.429718] ----------------------------------------------------- [ 259.436516] qemu-system-x86/10143 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: [ 259.444670] ff3b2b1c60305170 (&xa->xa_lock#25){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __domain_flush_pages+0x17c/0x4b0 [ 259.454485] and this task is already holding: [ 259.460991] ff3b2b1c98504cc0 (&domain->lock){-.-.}-{3:3}, at: amd_iommu_iotlb_sync+0x25/0x60 [ 259.470408] which would create a new lock dependency: [ 259.476041] (&domain->lock){-.-.}-{3:3} -> (&xa->xa_lock#25){+.+.}-{3:3} [ 259.483615] but this new dependency connects a HARDIRQ-irq-safe lock: [ 259.492447] (&domain->lock){-.-.}-{3:3} [ 259.492449] ... which became HARDIRQ-irq-safe at: [ 259.503705] lock_acquire+0xb6/0x2e0 [ 259.507790] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3e/0x60 [ 259.512748] amd_iommu_flush_iotlb_all+0x20/0x50 [ 259.517996] iommu_dma_free_iova.isra.0+0x1b8/0x1e0 [ 259.523534] __iommu_dma_unmap+0xc2/0x140 [ 259.528100] iommu_dma_unmap_phys+0x55/0xc0 [ 259.532863] dma_unmap_phys+0x274/0x2e0 [ 259.537238] dma_unmap_page_attrs+0x17/0x30 [ 259.542000] nvme_unmap_data+0x13e/0x280 [ 259.546473] nvme_pci_complete_batch+0x45/0x70 [ 259.551524] nvme_irq+0x83/0x90 [ 259.555123] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x92/0x360 [ 259.560466] handle_irq_event+0x39/0x80 [ 259.564841] handle_edge_irq+0xb2/0x1a0 [ 259.569214] __common_interrupt+0x4e/0x130 [ 259.573882] common_interrupt+0x88/0xa0 [ 259.578256] asm_common_interrupt+0x27/0x40 [ 259.583019] cpuidle_enter_state+0x119/0x5d0 [ 259.587877] cpuidle_enter+0x2e/0x50 [ 259.591962] do_idle+0x153/0x2c0 [ 259.595657] cpu_startup_entry+0x29/0x30 [ 259.600128] start_secondary+0x118/0x150 [ 259.604601] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [ 259.609266] to a HARDIRQ-irq-unsafe lock: [ 259.615384] (&xa->xa_lock#25){+.+.}-{3:3} [ 259.615386] ... which became HARDIRQ-irq-unsafe at: [ 259.627039] ... [ 259.627039] lock_acquire+0xb6/0x2e0 [ 259.633071] _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x50 [ 259.637250] amd_iommu_alloc_domain_nested+0x140/0x3c0 [ 259.643078] iommufd_hwpt_alloc+0x272/0x800 [iommufd] [ 259.648813] iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x14e/0x200 [iommufd] [ 259.654547] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x9d/0xf0 ... Since amd_iommu_domain_flush_pages() necessarily holds domain->lock to do the flush, switch the allocation side in gdom_info_load_or_alloc_locked() to HARDIRQ-safe allocation. The IOMMU_DESTROY->free path has the same issue, so switch that path to HARDIRQ-safe locking as well.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: hda: cs35l41: validate and free ACPI mute object cs35l41_get_acpi_mute_state() evaluates a _DSM method to get the ACPI mute state and reads the first byte from the returned object. However, the returned ACPI object is owned by the caller and is never freed after use, so each successful query leaks the _DSM result object. The code also assumes that the returned object is a buffer with at least one byte. A malformed firmware response can return a different object type or an empty buffer, and the direct ret->buffer.pointer dereference can then access an invalid pointer. Use the typed _DSM helper, validate that the returned buffer contains at least one byte, and free the ACPI object after reading it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm_mpam: guard MBWU state before adding it to garbage __destroy_component_cfg() adds each RIS mbwu_state object to the MPAM garbage list when destroying component configuration. However, mbwu_state is allocated per RIS and only for RISes with MBWU monitors. A component can therefore have comp->cfg allocated while some RISes still have ris->mbwu_state set to NULL. Passing a NULL mbwu_state to add_to_garbage() dereferences the NULL pointer inside the macro. Skip RISes that do not have an mbwu_state object before adding them to the garbage list.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: atm: ueagle-atm: reject descriptors that confuse probe and disconnect uea_probe() distinguishes a pre-firmware device from a post-firmware one using the USB id (UEA_IS_PREFIRM()), and stores a different object as the interface data in each case: a 'struct completion' for a pre-firmware device (to be waited on in .disconnect()), or a 'struct usbatm_data' for a post-firmware one. uea_disconnect() instead tells the two apart by the number of interfaces of the active configuration (a pre-firmware device exposes a single interface, ADI930 has 2 and eagle has 3), and casts the interface data accordingly. Because the two handlers use different criteria, a crafted device that advertises a pre-firmware id together with a multi-interface descriptor (or a post-firmware id with a single interface) makes them disagree: the small 'struct completion' stored by uea_probe() is then passed to usbatm_usb_disconnect(), which casts it to 'struct usbatm_data' and takes instance->serialize, reading past the end of the allocation: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __mutex_lock+0x152a/0x1b80 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880470e2c60 by task kworker/1:2/982 ... __mutex_lock+0x152a/0x1b80 usbatm_usb_disconnect+0x70/0x820 uea_disconnect+0x133/0x2c0 usb_unbind_interface+0x1dd/0x9e0 ... which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 96-byte region [ffff8880470e2c00, ffff8880470e2c60) Reject such inconsistent descriptors in uea_probe() so that both handlers always make the same pre/post-firmware decision.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: validate DFS referral PathConsumed parse_dfs_referrals() validates that the response contains the fixed referral entry array and, on for-next, the per-referral string offsets. However, the response also contains a PathConsumed value that is later used for DFS path parsing. If a malformed response provides a PathConsumed value larger than the search name, later DFS parsing can advance beyond the end of the path. Validate PathConsumed against the search name length before storing it in the parsed referral.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovpn: avoid putting unrelated P2P peer on socket release ovpn_peer_release_p2p() is called when an OVPN UDP socket is being destroyed. It checks the currently published P2P peer and releases it only if that peer still uses the socket being destroyed. A peer replacement can publish a new peer before the old UDP socket is destroyed. When the old socket destruction path runs afterwards, ovpn_peer_release_p2p() observes the new peer through ovpn->peer. Since the new peer uses a different socket, the function takes the socket mismatch branch. That branch still calls ovpn_peer_put(peer). At this point, however, peer is the currently published replacement peer, not the peer associated with the socket being destroyed. Dropping its reference can free it while ovpn->peer still points to it, leading to later use-after-free accesses from the peer and socket cleanup paths. KASAN reports this as a slab-use-after-free on the kmalloc-1k ovpn_peer object. In the reproducer, the object is allocated from ovpn_peer_new() via ovpn_nl_peer_new_doit(), and freed through ovpn_peer_release_rcu() from RCU callback processing. Observed access sites include ovpn_peer_remove(), ovpn_socket_release(), ovpn_nl_peer_del_notify(), and unlock_ovpn(). Fix this by returning from the socket mismatch branch without putting the peer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovpn: fix use after free in unlock_ovpn() unlock_ovpn() iterates over the release_list using llist_for_each_entry() and drops the peer reference inside the loop body via ovpn_peer_put(). If this drops the last reference, the peer is eventually freed. However, llist_for_each_entry() reads peer->release_entry.next in the loop advance expression, which runs after the body. By that time the peer may have already been freed, resulting in a use after free when advancing to the next list entry. Fix this by using llist_for_each_entry_safe(), which caches the next pointer before executing the loop body.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: occ: validate poll response sensor blocks The OCC poll response parser walks a counted list of sensor data blocks. It used the static backing-array capacity as the parse boundary, but a transport response makes only data_length bytes current and valid. A truncated response can therefore make the parser consume a block header or block extent outside the current response. Use data_length as the parent boundary, prove the fixed poll header and each current block header before reading them, and prove the complete block before advancing. Keep parsed sensor metadata local until the complete response has passed validation, then publish it. Propagate malformed-response errors before publishing the OCC as active.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btusb: validate Realtek vendor event length btusb_recv_event_realtek() reads the event code at data[0] and the Realtek subevent code at data[2] before deciding whether to consume a vendor event as a coredump. For example, the two-byte event ff 00 contains a complete vendor-event header declaring zero parameters. The old classifier still reads a nonexistent third byte and can misclassify the event as a coredump if the adjacent byte is 0x34. Require the HCI event header and first parameter to be present before inspecting the Realtek subevent code. Short events continue through the normal HCI receive path, which owns their protocol validation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/packet: avoid fanout hook re-registration after unregister packet_set_ring() temporarily detaches a socket from packet delivery while reconfiguring its ring. It records the previous running state, clears po->num, unregisters the protocol hook when needed, drops po->bind_lock, and later restores po->num and re-registers the hook from the saved was_running value. That unlocked window can race with NETDEV_UNREGISTER. The notifier can observe the socket as not running, skip __unregister_prot_hook(), and invalidate the per-socket binding by setting po->ifindex to -1 and clearing po->prot_hook.dev. A one-member fanout group can still retain its shared fanout hook device pointer. When packet_set_ring() resumes, re-registering solely from the stale was_running state can re-add the fanout hook after the device has been unregistered. Treat po->ifindex == -1 as an invalidated binding after reacquiring po->bind_lock. This is distinct from ifindex 0, the normal unbound/wildcard state: ifindex -1 marks an existing device binding that was invalidated when the device was unregistered. Restore po->num as before, but do not re-register the hook if device unregister already detached the socket.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject redirect helpers without a bpf_net_context The bpf_redirect*() helpers and skb_do_redirect() obtain the per-task bpf_redirect_info via bpf_net_ctx_get_ri(), which dereferences the current->bpf_net_context unconditionally. That context is established on the paths that run tc BPF such as sch_handle_{ingress,egress}(), *except* for the case where {cls,act}_bpf was attached to a proper qdisc. A program running from there reaches the NULL deref in two ways: * It calls bpf_redirect() directly, which dereferences the context at the top of the helper: tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: red limit 1MB min 10KB max 20KB \ avpkt 1000 burst 100 qevent early_drop block 10 tc filter add block 10 pref 1 bpf obj redirect.o * It simply returns TC_ACT_REDIRECT without helper call: tcf_qevent_handle() then dispatches to skb_do_redirect(), which dereferences the context Rather than extending bpf_net_context management into the qdisc path, make the redirect helpers refuse to operate when no context exists, and have tcf_qevent_handle() drop a TC_ACT_REDIRECT verdict instead of calling skb_do_redirect(). Previous behaviour was a crash, so nothing regresses by not supporting it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bonding: fix devconf_all NULL dereference when IPv6 is disabled When booting with the 'ipv6.disable=1' parameter, the devconf_all is never initialized because inet6_init() exits before addrconf_init() is called which initializes it. bond_send_validate(), however, will still call bond_ns_send_all() even ipv6 is indeed disabled. It will lead to NULL derefence of net->ipv6.devconf_all in ip6_pol_route(). BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000000c [...] Workqueue: bond0 bond_arp_monitor [bonding] RIP: 0010:ip6_pol_route+0x69/0x480 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? __pfx_ip6_pol_route_output+0x10/0x10 fib6_rule_lookup+0xfe/0x260 ? wakeup_preempt+0x8a/0x90 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? sched_balance_rq+0x369/0x810 ip6_route_output_flags+0xd7/0x170 bond_ns_send_all+0xde/0x280 [bonding] bond_ab_arp_probe+0x296/0x320 [bonding] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f bond_activebackup_arp_mon+0xb4/0x2c0 [bonding] process_one_work+0x196/0x370 worker_thread+0x1af/0x320 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xe3/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x199/0x260 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Fix this by adding ipv6_mod_enabled() condition check in the caller.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rds: drop incoming messages that cross network namespace boundaries rds_find_bound() looks up the destination socket using a global rhashtable keyed solely on (addr, port, scope_id). Network namespaces are not part of the key, so a sender in netns A can deliver an incoming message (inc) to a socket that lives in a different netns B. When this happens, inc->i_conn points to an rds_connection whose c_net is netns A, but the receiving rs lives in netns B. Once the child process that created netns A exits, cleanup_net() calls rds_loop_exit_net() -> rds_loop_kill_conns() -> rds_conn_destroy(), freeing that connection. If the survivor socket in netns B still holds the inc, any subsequent dereference of inc->i_conn is a use-after-free. There are two dangerous sites in rds_clear_recv_queue(): 1. inc->i_conn->c_lcong (offset 88 of freed rds_connection, size 200) read via rds_recv_rcvbuf_delta() -- confirmed by KASAN. 2. inc->i_conn->c_trans->inc_free(inc) (function pointer at offset 80) called via rds_inc_put() when the inc refcount reaches zero -- same race window, potential call-through-freed-object primitive. The bug is reachable from unprivileged user namespaces (CLONE_NEWUSER + CLONE_NEWNET), available since Linux 3.8. Fix this by rejecting the delivery in rds_recv_incoming() when the socket returned by rds_find_bound() belongs to a different network namespace than the connection that carried the message. Use the existing rds_conn_net() / sock_net() helpers and net_eq() for the comparison.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: fix io_thread race in rxrpc_wake_up_io_thread() rxrpc_wake_up_io_thread() checks local->io_thread before waking it, but then reloads the pointer for wake_up_process(). local->io_thread is cleared with WRITE_ONCE() when the I/O thread exits, so the second load can see NULL even if the first load did not. Take a READ_ONCE() snapshot and use it for both the NULL check and the wake_up_process() call, as rxrpc_encap_rcv() already does.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dpaa2-switch: put MAC endpoint device on disconnect fsl_mc_get_endpoint() returns the MAC endpoint device with a reference taken through device_find_child(). The switch port connect path stores that device in mac->mc_dev and keeps it for the lifetime of the connected MAC object. However, the disconnect path only closes the MAC and frees the dpaa2_mac object. It does not drop the endpoint device reference stored in mac->mc_dev, so every successful connect leaks that device reference when the MAC is later disconnected. Drop the endpoint device reference before freeing the dpaa2_mac object.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: airoha: Fix potential use-after-free in airoha_ppe_deinit() airoha_ppe_deinit() replaces the NPU pointer with NULL via rcu_replace_pointer() but does not wait for existing RCU readers to exit before calling ppe_deinit() and airoha_npu_put(). This can cause a use-after-free if a reader in an RCU read-side critical section still holds a reference to the NPU when it is freed. The init path (airoha_ppe_init) already calls synchronize_rcu() after rcu_assign_pointer(), but the deinit path introduced in commit 6abcf751bc08 ("net: airoha: Fix schedule while atomic in airoha_ppe_deinit()") omitted the matching barrier when switching from rcu_read_lock()/rcu_dereference() to rcu_replace_pointer(). Add synchronize_rcu() before ppe_deinit() to ensure all existing RCU readers have completed before the NPU resources are released.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dpaa2-eth: put MAC endpoint device on disconnect fsl_mc_get_endpoint() returns the MAC endpoint device with a reference taken through device_find_child(). The Ethernet connect path stores that device in mac->mc_dev and keeps it for the lifetime of the connected MAC object. However, the disconnect path only disconnects and closes the MAC before freeing the dpaa2_mac object. It does not drop the endpoint device reference stored in mac->mc_dev, so every successful connect leaks that device reference when the MAC is later disconnected. Drop the endpoint device reference after closing the MAC and before freeing the dpaa2_mac object.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: airoha: Fix DMA direction for NPU mailbox buffer airoha_npu_send_msg() always maps the mailbox buffer with DMA_TO_DEVICE, but some callers expect the NPU to write response data back into the same buffer: - airoha_npu_wlan_msg_get() (NPU_OP_GET): NPU writes response into the buffer, then the caller reads it via memcpy() - airoha_npu_ppe_stats_setup() (NPU_OP_SET): NPU writes back npu_stats_addr field in the response On non-cache-coherent architectures like EN7581 (Cortex-A53 without hardware cache coherency for NPU DMA), DMA_TO_DEVICE unmap is a no-op — it does not invalidate the CPU cache. If the NPU-written cache line is still present in the CPU cache when the caller reads the buffer, the CPU observes stale data instead of the NPU response. This is a timing-sensitive bug: small mailbox buffers (~24 bytes) typically fit in a single cache line and may survive in the cache until the caller reads them, producing silent data corruption rather than a crash. The bug is more likely to trigger when the caller reads the response immediately after dma_unmap_single() without intervening cache-evicting operations. Fix by using DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL for both map and unmap, which ensures dma_unmap_single() invalidates the CPU cache on non-coherent systems. The mailbox buffers are small so there is no performance concern.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/amd: Wait for completion instead of returning early in iommu_completion_wait() need_sync is a per-IOMMU flag shared by all domains and devices behind that IOMMU. It is set whenever a command is queued with sync == true and cleared when a completion-wait (CWAIT) command is queued. However, a cleared need_sync only means that a covering CWAIT has been queued, not that all previously queued commands have actually completed in hardware. iommu_completion_wait() read need_sync locklessly and returned early when it was false. This breaks the "block until all previously queued commands have completed" contract in a multi-CPU scenario: CPU2: queue inv-B => need_sync = true CPU1: queue CWAIT(N); need_sync = false; then wait_on_sem(N) CPU2: read need_sync == false => return 0 (no wait!) CPU2 returns without waiting for any sequence number even though its inv-B may not have completed yet (CWAIT(N), queued after inv-B, has not been signaled). CPU2 then proceeds to, for example, free page-table pages while the IOMMU can still walk stale translations, opening a use-after-free window. This is a logical race in the meaning of the flag, not a memory-visibility issue, so barriers alone do not help. Fix it without losing the optimization of avoiding redundant CWAIT commands: take iommu->lock before testing need_sync, and when it is false do not return early but wait for the last allocated sequence number (cmd_sem_val). Since need_sync == false implies no sync command was queued after the last CWAIT, that CWAIT is FIFO-ordered after every not-yet-completed command, so waiting for its sequence number guarantees all prior commands (possibly queued by another CPU) have completed. The common path with pending work is unchanged and no extra hardware command is issued.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfp: Check resource mutex allocation nfp_cpp_resource_find() allocates a CPP mutex handle for the matching resource-table entry and then reports success. nfp_resource_try_acquire() immediately passes that handle to nfp_cpp_mutex_trylock(). However, nfp_cpp_mutex_alloc() returns NULL on failure. If that happens for a matching table entry, the resource lookup still returns success and the following trylock dereferences a NULL mutex pointer while opening the resource. nfp_resource_acquire() already treats failure to allocate the table mutex as -ENOMEM. Do the same for the resource mutex and fail the lookup before publishing the rest of the resource handle. This issue was found by a static analysis checker and confirmed by manual source review.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wan: wanxl: Only reset hardware after BAR mapping wanxl_pci_init_one() stores the freshly allocated card in driver data before the PLX BAR is mapped. Several early probe failures then unwind through wanxl_pci_remove_one(), including failure to allocate the coherent status area or to restore the DMA mask. wanxl_pci_remove_one() unconditionally calls wanxl_reset(), and wanxl_reset() dereferences card->plx. On those early failures card->plx is still NULL, so the error path can dereference a NULL MMIO pointer. Only issue the hardware reset once the BAR mapping exists. The remaining cleanup in wanxl_pci_remove_one() already checks whether later resources were allocated. This issue was found by a static analysis checker and confirmed by manual source review.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: bound uAP association event IEs to the event buffer mwifiex_process_uap_event() handles EVENT_UAP_STA_ASSOC by exposing the (re)association request IEs that the firmware copies into the event: sinfo->assoc_req_ies = &event->data[len]; len = (u8 *)sinfo->assoc_req_ies - (u8 *)&event->frame_control; sinfo->assoc_req_ies_len = le16_to_cpu(event->len) - (u16)len; event->len is supplied by the device firmware and is never validated, and the subtraction is unchecked. assoc_req_ies points into adapter->event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE], a fixed-size array embedded in the kmalloc()'d struct mwifiex_adapter. On the ap_11n_enabled path mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() walks these IEs with cfg80211_find_ie(), whose for_each_element() loop dereferences each element header. A firmware-reported event->len larger than the bytes actually received makes assoc_req_ies_len describe IEs that extend past event_body, so the walk reads out of the adapter slab object, a slab-out-of-bounds read (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_find_ie). An event->len smaller than the header instead makes the int subtraction negative, which wraps to a huge size_t when stored in assoc_req_ies_len. The same length is handed to cfg80211_new_sta(), so a more modest over-claim can also copy stale event_body bytes into the NL80211_CMD_NEW_STATION notification. A malicious or malfunctioning mwifiex device (USB/SDIO/PCIe) can deliver such an event while the interface is in AP/uAP mode. Validate event->len before use: reject a length that underflows the header or that would place the IEs outside the event_body[] buffer the event was copied into. event->len here is struct mwifiex_assoc_event.len, a payload field internal to this event, not the transport frame length, so it is validated in this handler rather than at the generic MWIFIEX_TYPE_EVENT receive path, which only sees the event cause and the transport frame length. The bound is against event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE] rather than the actually-received length because the transports store the event differently (USB and SDIO leave the 4-byte event header in event_skb, PCIe strips it via skb_pull), whereas event_body is the single fixed buffer all of them copy the event into. This is the event-path analogue of the receive-path bounds checks added in commit 119585281617 ("wifi: mwifiex: Fix OOB and integer underflow when rx packets").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/amd: Bound the early ACPI HID map The ivrs_acpihid command-line parser appends entries to a fixed four-element early_acpihid_map array. Unlike the sibling IOAPIC and HPET parsers, it does not reject a fifth entry before incrementing the map size. Check the capacity at the common found label before parsing the HID and UID or writing the entry.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/intel: Fix out-of-bounds memset in dmar_latency_disable() dmar_latency_disable() intends to zero out only the single latency_statistic entry for the given type, but the memset size was computed as sizeof(*lstat) * DMAR_LATENCY_NUM, which clears the entire array starting from &lstat[type]. When type > 0, this writes beyond the end of the allocated array, corrupting adjacent memory. Fix by using sizeof(*lstat) to clear only the target entry.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: serialize udp bearer replicast list updates tipc_udp_rcast_add() and cleanup_bearer() both update ub->rcast.list with list_add_rcu() / list_del_rcu(), but nothing serializes them. The add runs from the encap receive softirq (via tipc_udp_rcast_disc()) without rtnl_lock(), so it can race the cleanup delete and corrupt the list: list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffff8880298d7ab8, but was ffff88802449ad38. (prev=ffff888027e3ec98) kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:62! RIP: __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x17a/0x200 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer Call Trace: cleanup_bearer (net/tipc/udp_media.c:811) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3302) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3466) The bearer can be enabled from an unprivileged user namespace, as the TIPCv2 generic-netlink ops carry no GENL_ADMIN_PERM. Add a spinlock to struct udp_bearer and take it around the list_add_rcu() in tipc_udp_rcast_add() and the list_del_rcu() loop in cleanup_bearer() so the two writers can no longer corrupt the list. Reject a duplicate peer under the same lock before allocating, and remove tipc_udp_is_known_peer(). The old lockless pre-check in tipc_udp_rcast_disc() was racy: two softirqs discovering the same peer could both find it absent and add it twice. cleanup_bearer() runs from a workqueue after tipc_udp_disable() clears the bearer's up bit, so an encap softirq can still reach tipc_udp_rcast_add() and add a peer after cleanup_bearer() has already emptied the list, leaking that entry when the bearer is freed. Mark the bearer disabled under rcast_lock once the list is emptied and refuse further additions.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rds: Fix inet6_addr_lst NULL dereference when IPv6 is disabled When booting with the 'ipv6.disable=1' parameter, inet6_addr_lst is never initialized because inet6_init() exits before addrconf_init() is called to initialize it. An attempt to bind an RDS socket to an ipv6 address results in a crash in __ipv6_chk_addr_and_flags() KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] RIP: 0010:__ipv6_chk_addr_and_flags+0x1df/0x7e0 Call Trace: <TASK> ipv6_chk_addr+0x3b/0x50 rds_tcp_laddr_check+0x155/0x3b0 [rds_tcp] rds_trans_get_preferred+0x15d/0x2d0 [rds] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2d/0x110 rds_bind+0x1433/0x1d60 [rds] ? rds_remove_bound+0xd50/0xd50 [rds] ? aa_af_perm+0x250/0x250 ? __might_fault+0xde/0x190 ? __sys_bind+0x1dc/0x210 __sys_bind+0x1dc/0x210 ? __ia32_sys_socketpair+0x100/0x100 ? restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x53/0x100 __x64_sys_bind+0x73/0xb0 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1c/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7f47f8269ea9 </TASK> The following code reproduces the issue: struct sockaddr_in6 addr; s = socket(PF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); inet_pton(AF_INET6, ADDRESS, &addr.sin6_addr); addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6; addr.sin6_port = htons(PORT); bind(s, &addr, sizeof(addr)); Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: txgbe: fix FDIR filter leak on remove Perfect FDIR filters can be added while the interface is down and are kept on the software list for later restore. unregister_netdev() only calls ndo_stop when the device is up, so txgbe_fdir_filter_exit() in txgbe_close() is skipped in that case and the filters are leaked on driver remove. Free the filter list from txgbe_remove() as well.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: fix auth_chunk_list capacity check in sctp_auth_ep_add_chunkid sctp_auth_ep_add_chunkid() uses SCTP_NUM_CHUNK_TYPES (20) as the capacity limit for ep->auth_chunk_list, allowing it to hold up to 20 chunk entries (param_hdr.length up to 24). However, the copy destination asoc->c.auth_chunks in struct sctp_cookie is only SCTP_AUTH_MAX_CHUNKS (16) entries (20 bytes). When more than 16 chunks are added, sctp_association_init() memcpy overflows the destination by up to 4 bytes. Fix by using SCTP_AUTH_MAX_CHUNKS as the capacity limit, matching the destination capacity.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pds_core: fix deadlock between reset thread and remove pci_reset_function() acquires device_lock before performing the reset. pdsc_remove() is called by the PCI core with device_lock already held. If pdsc_pci_reset_thread() is running when pdsc_remove() is called, destroy_workqueue() will block waiting for the work to complete, while the work is blocked waiting for device_lock - deadlock. Use pci_try_reset_function() which uses pci_dev_trylock() internally. This acquires both the device lock and the PCI config access lock without blocking - if either lock is contended, it returns -EAGAIN immediately. This avoids the deadlock while also ensuring proper config space access serialization during the reset. The pci_dev_get/put calls are also removed as they were unnecessary - the driver-owned workqueue is destroyed in pdsc_remove(), guaranteeing the work completes before remove returns. The PCI core holds its reference to pci_dev throughout the entire unbind sequence.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pds_core: fix use-after-free on workqueue during remove In pdsc_remove(), the workqueue is destroyed before pdsc_teardown() is called. This ordering allows two paths to queue work on the destroyed workqueue: 1. If pdsc_teardown() -> pdsc_devcmd_reset() times out, the error path in pdsc_devcmd_locked() queues health_work. 2. A NotifyQ event can trigger the ISR and queue work before free_irq() is called in pdsc_teardown(). Fix by moving destroy_workqueue() after pdsc_teardown() so the workqueue outlives every queuer; destroy_workqueue() then flushes any work still pending. Draining the queued work also requires ordering the teardown so the resources that work touches are freed last: - In pdsc_qcq_free(), after freeing the interrupt, cancel_work_sync() the queue's work and only then clear qcq->intx, so pdsc_process_adminq()'s read of qcq->intx for interrupt-credit return cannot race with the clear. - Free adminqcq before notifyqcq: the shared adminq ISR is released when adminqcq is freed, and the adminq work accesses notifyqcq, so both must be stopped before notifyqcq is freed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pds_core: fix auxiliary device add/del races Two paths add or delete the same slot (pf->vfs[vf_id].padev): a VF's pdsc_reset_done() and the PF's devlink enable_vnet/disable_vnet handler. They serialize on config_lock, but neither guards the slot under it correctly. add() registers and stores a new auxiliary device without first checking the slot, so a second add of an already-populated slot leaks the first device. del() makes that check outside config_lock, so two concurrent dels can both pass it; the first clears the slot, and the second dereferences a NULL pointer. Check and update the slot under config_lock in both paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel: ethosu: Fix element size accounting for cmd stream validation There are 2 issues with the element size handling in the command stream validation which result in too small of a size calculated when the element size is 16/32/64 bits. For NHWC format, the element size is simply missing from the calculation. The bitfield for the element size is different between IFM/IFM2 and OFM. IFM and IFM2 encode the precision in parameter bits 2:3, while OFM uses bits 1:2.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: validate stream count in sctp_process_strreset_inreq() When processing a RESET_IN_REQUEST from a peer, sctp_process_strreset_inreq() derives the stream count from the parameter length but does not check whether the resulting RESET_OUT_REQUEST would exceed SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN. The OUT request header (sctp_strreset_outreq, 16 bytes) is 8 bytes larger than the IN request header (sctp_strreset_inreq, 8 bytes). Generally, the IP payload is bounded to 65535 bytes, so the stream list cannot be large enough to trigger the overflow. However, on interfaces with MTU > 65535 (e.g., loopback with IPv6 jumbograms), a stream list that fits within the incoming IN parameter can cause a __u16 overflow in sctp_make_strreset_req() when computing the OUT request size, leading to an undersized skb allocation and a kernel BUG: net/core/skbuff.c:207 skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:2625 skb_put net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:1535 sctp_addto_chunk net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:3695 sctp_make_strreset_req net/sctp/stream.c:655 sctp_process_strreset_inreq The local setsockopt path validates the generated reset request size. However, for an incoming-only reset, it accounts for the smaller IN request even though the peer must generate an OUT request with the same stream list. Such a request cannot be completed successfully by the peer. Reject peer IN requests whose corresponding OUT request would exceed SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN. Also tighten the local check so it does not send an IN request that would require an oversized OUT request from the peer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mctp i3c: clean up notifier and buses if driver register fails mctp_i3c_mod_init() registers the I3C bus notifier and then walks the existing buses with i3c_for_each_bus_locked(mctp_i3c_bus_add_new, NULL) before registering the I3C device driver. If i3c_driver_register() fails, the function returns the error directly, leaving the notifier registered and every mctp_i3c_bus object created for the existing buses allocated. The notifier is left pointing into the module that failed to load and the bus list is leaked. Mirror the module exit path on this failure: unregister the notifier and tear down the buses that were added before returning the error. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix infinite loop in __tipc_nl_compat_dumpit cmd->dumpit callback can return a negative errno, causing an infinite loop due to the while(len) condition. As the loop never terminates, genl_mutex is never released, and other tasks waiting on it starve in D state. Check dumpit's return value, propagate it and jump to err_out on error.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cifs: fix cifsFileInfo leak on kmalloc failure in deferred close drain paths In cifs_close_deferred_file(), cifs_close_all_deferred_files(), and cifs_close_deferred_file_under_dentry(), when a pending deferred close is cancelled via cancel_delayed_work(), the subsequent kmalloc_obj() to add the file to the local processing list may fail under memory pressure. The loop breaks immediately, but the cancelled work is no longer pending (it would have called _cifsFileInfo_put()), and the cfile is never added to file_head for processing. The cifsFileInfo reference and the open server handle both leak. Fix by saving the cfile that failed allocation in a local variable, breaking as before, and calling _cifsFileInfo_put() on it after releasing the lock. Any files later in the iteration are unaffected since their deferred work is still pending and will fire normally.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7925: guard link STA in decap offload mt7925_sta_set_decap_offload() iterates over the vif valid_links mask when updating decap offload state for an MLO station. The station may not have a link STA for every valid link of the vif, so mt792x_sta_to_link() can return NULL for a link that belongs to the vif but not to the station. The function currently dereferences mlink before checking whether the link WCID is ready. If mlink is NULL, setting or clearing MT_WCID_FLAG_HDR_TRANS dereferences a NULL pointer. Skip links without a station link before touching mlink->wcid.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7915: guard HE capability lookups mt7915_mcu_bss_he_tlv() and mt7915_mcu_sta_bfer_tlv() both run after checking HE support, then dereference the HE PHY capability returned by mt76_connac_get_he_phy_cap(). That helper can return NULL when no capability entry matches the vif type. Fetch the capability before appending the TLV and skip the HE-specific setup when no matching capability is available.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: connac: fix possible NULL-pointer deref in mt76_connac_mcu_uni_bss_he_tlv() mt76_connac_get_he_phy_cap routine can theoretically return NULL so check cap pointer before dereferencing it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7996: check pointer returned by mt76_connac_get_he_phy_cap() mt76_connac_get_he_phy_cap routine can theoretically return NULL so check cap pointer before dereferencing it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7925: fix crash in reset link replay During reset recovery, mt7925_vif_connect_iter() replays firmware state for links tracked in mvif->valid_links. After MLO link changes or MCU timeout recovery, the driver bitmap can temporarily contain a link whose mac80211 bss_conf has already gone away. This can pass a NULL bss_conf to mt76_connac_mcu_uni_add_dev(), matching the crash where x1, the second argument, is NULL: pc : mt76_connac_mcu_uni_add_dev+0x8c/0x1f8 [mt76_connac_lib] lr : mt7925_vif_connect_iter+0x9c/0x168 [mt7925_common] x2 : ffffff80a77f6018 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff8099402080 Call trace: mt76_connac_mcu_uni_add_dev+0x8c/0x1f8 [mt76_connac_lib] mt7925_vif_connect_iter+0x9c/0x168 [mt7925_common] mt7925_mac_reset_work+0x264/0x2f8 [mt7925_common] Skip missing bss_conf entries before replaying the link. Non-MLO AP/STA reset replay is unchanged because the helper still returns &vif->bss_conf for the legacy link.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7996: fix possible NULL-pointer deref in mt7996_mcu_sta_bfer_eht() mt76_connac_get_eht_phy_cap routine can theoretically return NULL so check cap pointer before dereferencing it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/vf: Add drm_dev guards when detaching CCS read/write buffers CCS read/write buffers are freed during BO destruction. In some cases, BOs may be destroyed after the device is unbound but while the DRM structure remains valid, leading to NULL pointer dereferences when accessing device resources. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9376 Comm: xe_pat Not tainted 7.2.0-rc2+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy) RIP: 0010:xe_sriov_vf_ccs_rw_update_bb_addr+0x4d/0xa0 [xe] RSP: 0018:ffffcf304110b9c8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff8a85c38a0a00 RBX: 00000000810ef000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8a85c39c1888 RBP: ffffcf304110b9e8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a85c39c1888 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8a85c39b4f28 R15: ffff8a85c3885000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a878b809000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010314a002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> xe_migrate_ccs_rw_copy_clear+0x98/0x120 [xe] xe_sriov_vf_ccs_detach_bo+0x2c/0x60 [xe] xe_ttm_bo_delete_mem_notify+0xc8/0xe0 [xe] ttm_bo_cleanup_memtype_use+0x26/0x80 [ttm] ttm_bo_release+0x29e/0x2d0 [ttm] ttm_bo_fini+0x39/0x70 [ttm] xe_gem_object_free+0x1f/0x30 [xe] drm_gem_object_free+0x1d/0x40 ttm_bo_vm_close+0x5f/0x90 [ttm] remove_vma+0x2c/0x70 tear_down_vmas+0x63/0xf0 exit_mmap+0x20d/0x3f0 __mmput+0x45/0x170 mmput+0x31/0x40 do_exit+0x2ba/0xac0 do_group_exit+0x2d/0xb0 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x18/0x20 x64_sys_call+0x14a0/0x2390 do_syscall_64+0xdd/0x640 ? count_memcg_events+0xea/0x240 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1ec/0x2f0 (cherry picked from commit 1ae415a6eefe5004954a1d352b1718faca8844ef)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: fix 802.1X-SHA256 call trace warning Based on wpa_auth as 1x_256 mode, need to set up "use_fwsup" with BRCMF_PROFILE_FWSUP_1X. Or it will happen trace warning when call brcmf_cfg80211_set_pmk(). [ 4481.831101] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 4481.831102] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2997 at drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c:7242 brcmf_cfg80211_set_pmk+0x77/0xd0 [brcmfmac] [...] [ 4481.831202] Call Trace: [ 4481.831204]  <TASK> [ 4481.831205]  nl80211_set_pmk+0x183/0x250 [cfg80211] [ 4481.831233]  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xea/0x150 [ 4481.831237]  genl_rcv_msg+0x104/0x240 [ 4481.831239]  ? cfg80211_probe_status+0x2c0/0x2c0 [cfg80211] [ 4481.831257]  ? genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x150/0x150 [ 4481.831259]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x4e/0x100 [ 4481.831261]  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 [ 4481.831262]  netlink_unicast+0x236/0x380 [ 4481.831264]  netlink_sendmsg+0x250/0x4b0 [ 4481.831266]  sock_sendmsg+0x5c/0x70 [ 4481.831269]  ____sys_sendmsg+0x236/0x2b0 [ 4481.831271]  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6d/0xa0 [ 4481.831272]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x86/0xd0 [ 4481.831274]  ? avc_has_perm+0x8c/0x1a0 [ 4481.831276]  ? preempt_count_add+0x6a/0xa0 [ 4481.831279]  ? sock_has_perm+0x82/0xa0 [ 4481.831280]  __sys_sendmsg+0x57/0xa0 [ 4481.831282]  do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 4481.831284]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 4481.831286] RIP: 0033:0x7fd270d369b4

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vc4: hvs/v3d: Fix null dereference in unbind The hvs and v3d drivers use dev_get_drvdata(master) in their unbind functions. Since the vc4-drm gets removed before its dependent drivers (vc4_hvs/vc4_v3d) the vc4_hvs_unbind/vc4_v3d_unbind functions try to get drvdata of its master and fails with a null dereference error. Use the data pointer passed to the unbind functions directly instead of dev_get_drvdata(master). This avoids using potentially freed memory.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: amt: re-read skb header pointers after every pull Several AMT receive and transmit paths cache a pointer into the skb head (ip_hdr(), ipv6_hdr(), eth_hdr() or the AMT message header) and then call a helper that can reallocate that head before the cached pointer is used again. pskb_may_pull(), ip_mc_may_pull(), ipv6_mc_may_pull(), iptunnel_pull_header(), ip_mc_check_igmp() and ipv6_mc_check_mld() can all free the old head and move the data, so a pointer taken before the call dangles afterwards and the later access is a use-after-free of the freed head. The affected sites are: amt_rcv() caches ip_hdr() before amt_parse_type() pulls, then reads iph->saddr. amt_dev_xmit() caches ip_hdr()/ipv6_hdr() before ip_mc_check_igmp()/ ipv6_mc_check_mld() and pskb_may_pull(), then reads the group address. amt_multicast_data_handler() caches eth_hdr() before pskb_may_pull(), then writes the L2 header. amt_membership_query_handler() caches the AMT header, the outer and inner eth_hdr() and ip_hdr() before iptunnel_pull_header() and several pulls, then reads and writes them. amt_igmpv3_report_handler() and amt_mldv2_report_handler() cache ip_hdr()/ipv6_hdr() and the current group record and read the record count from the report header inside the record loop, across the *_mc_may_pull() calls. amt_update_handler() caches ip_hdr() and the AMT membership-update header before pskb_may_pull(), iptunnel_pull_header(), ip_mc_check_igmp() and the report handler, then reads iph->daddr and amtmu->nonce / amtmu->response_mac. Fix each site by either snapshotting the scalar that is used after the pull before the first pull runs, or re-deriving the header pointer from the skb after the last pull that can move the head. Values that are stable across the pull (source and group address, the response MAC and nonce, the record count, the outer source MAC) are snapshotted; pointers that are written through or read repeatedly are re-derived.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hsr: fix memory leak on slave unregistration by removing synced VLANs When an HSR master device is brought UP, it auto-adds VLAN 0 via vlan_vid0_add(), which propagates VID 0 to its slave devices (slave A and B). If a slave device is later unregistered while HSR is active (e.g., during netns cleanup or interface destruction), hsr_del_port() is called to detach the slave port from the HSR master. However, hsr_del_port() currently does not delete the VLAN IDs that were synced to the slave device by HSR. As a result, the slave device retains a refcount on VID 0 (and any other synced VLANs). When the slave device is destroyed, its vlan_info / vlan_vid_info structure remains allocated, leading to a memory leak. Fix this by calling vlan_vids_del_by_dev(port->dev, master->dev) in hsr_del_port() before unlinking slave A or slave B ports, matching the propagation logic in hsr_ndo_vlan_rx_add_vid() / hsr_ndo_vlan_rx_kill_vid() and the cleanup behavior in bonding and team drivers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: auth: verify auth requirement when auth_chunk is NULL sctp_auth_chunk_verify() returns true unconditionally when chunk->auth_chunk is NULL, silently skipping authentication. This is incorrect when: 1. skb_clone() failed in the BH receive path, leaving auth_chunk NULL. In sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() asoc is NULL for new connections, so the early sctp_auth_recv_cid() check cannot catch this. 2. No AUTH chunk precedes COOKIE-ECHO, so skb_clone() is never called and auth_chunk remains NULL. Fix by checking sctp_auth_recv_cid() when auth_chunk is NULL: if authentication is required, return false to drop the chunk; otherwise continue normally.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vmxnet3: fix BUG_ON in vmxnet3_get_hdr_len() for Geneve packets vmxnet3_get_hdr_len() assumes gdesc->rcd.v4/v6/tcp always describe the outer header, but for a Geneve-encapsulated packet the device can set them based on the inner header instead, signalled by the VMXNET3_RCD_HDR_INNER_SHIFT bit in the completion descriptor. Since the function never skips the outer encapsulation, this mismatch triggers: - BUG_ON(hdr.ipv4->protocol != IPPROTO_TCP), because the outer protocol is UDP (Geneve), not TCP. - BUG_ON(hdr.eth->h_proto != ...), when the tunnel's outer and inner IP versions differ (e.g. outer IPv6/inner IPv4 or vice versa). Check VMXNET3_RCD_HDR_INNER_SHIFT up front and bail out, since the function cannot locate the inner header it would need to parse. Also convert the remaining BUG_ON()s in this function to return 0 defensively.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/vm: Fix SVM leak on resv obj alloc failure in xe_vm_create() Commit 9e9787414882 ("drm/xe/userptr: replace xe_hmm with gpusvm") made xe_svm_init() unconditional in xe_vm_create() and extended it to also initialize a "simple" gpusvm state for non-fault-mode VMs. The matching xe_svm_fini() call in xe_vm_close_and_put() was updated to run unconditionally, but the error unwind path in xe_vm_create() was not. On the drm_gpuvm_resv_object_alloc() failure path, xe_svm_init() has already succeeded but xe_svm_fini() is only called when XE_VM_FLAG_FAULT_MODE is set. For non-fault-mode VMs this leaves vm->svm.gpusvm partially initialized and leaks the resources allocated by drm_gpusvm_init(). For fault-mode VMs, xe_svm_init() additionally acquires the pagemap owner via drm_pagemap_acquire_owner() and the pagemaps via xe_svm_get_pagemaps(). Those resources are released by xe_svm_close(), not xe_svm_fini(). On the same error path, xe_svm_close() is not called either, so fault-mode VMs leak the pagemap owner and pagemaps. Fix both leaks: - Call xe_svm_fini() unconditionally on the err_svm_fini path, matching the unconditional xe_svm_init() call. Move the vm->size = 0 assignment out of the conditional so the xe_vm_is_closed() assert in xe_svm_fini() (and xe_svm_close()) holds for both modes. - Call xe_svm_close() for fault-mode VMs before xe_svm_fini(), matching the ordering used in xe_vm_close_and_put(). (cherry picked from commit ca2a3587d577ba764e0fe628fb676244fc33ddd4)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix u16 MTU truncation in media and bearer MTU validation Both TIPC_NL_MEDIA_SET and TIPC_NL_BEARER_SET accept user-supplied MTU values but only enforce a minimum bound, not a maximum. When a user sets the MTU to a value exceeding U16_MAX (65535), it passes validation but is silently truncated when assigned to u16 fields l->mtu and l->advertised_mtu in tipc_link_create(). Values like 65536 (0x10000) truncate to 0, causing a division by zero in tipc_link_set_queue_limits() which computes TIPC_MAX_PUBL / (l->mtu / ITEM_SIZE). Other overflowing values (e.g. 65537-131071) produce small incorrect MTU values, resulting in link malfunction behaviors. Crash stack (triggered as unprivileged user via user namespace): tipc_link_set_queue_limits net/tipc/link.c:2531 tipc_link_create net/tipc/link.c:520 tipc_node_check_dest net/tipc/node.c:1279 tipc_disc_rcv net/tipc/discover.c:252 tipc_rcv net/tipc/node.c:2129 tipc_udp_recv net/tipc/udp_media.c:392 Two independent paths lack the upper bound check: 1. tipc_udp_mtu_bad() -- called from __tipc_nl_media_set() (MEDIA_SET) 2. inline check in __tipc_nl_bearer_set() at bearer.c:1160 (BEARER_SET) Fix both by rejecting MTU values above U16_MAX.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: gre: fix lltx regression for GRE tunnels with SEQ/CSUM Before commit 00d066a4d4ed ("netdev_features: convert NETIF_F_LLTX to dev->lltx"), NETIF_F_LLTX was set unconditionally in both __gre_tunnel_init() and ip6gre_tnl_init_features() alongside GRE_FEATURES: dev->features |= GRE_FEATURES | NETIF_F_LLTX; When that commit converted NETIF_F_LLTX to the dev->lltx flag, it placed 'dev->lltx = true' after the SEQ/CSUM early returns instead of before them. This causes GRE/GRETAP/ip6gre tunnels with SEQ or CSUM+encap to lose lockless TX, reintroducing _xmit_lock acquisition around their ndo_start_xmit. Since GRE xmit re-enters the stack via ip_tunnel_xmit(), holding _xmit_lock risks ABBA deadlock with the underlay device. CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&qdisc_xmit_lock_key#6); lock(&qdisc_xmit_lock_key#3); lock(&qdisc_xmit_lock_key#6); lock(&qdisc_xmit_lock_key#3); Fix by moving dev->lltx = true before the early returns in both functions, restoring the original unconditional behavior.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: BPF: Zero-extend signed ALU32 div/mod results ALU32 operations write a 32-bit result and leave the upper 32 bits of the BPF register zero. The LoongArch JIT sign-extends the result of signed ALU32 BPF_DIV and BPF_MOD (off=1), so a negative 32-bit quotient or remainder leaves bits 63:32 set in JITted code while the verifier and interpreter model those bits as zero. Keep sign-extension on the operands, which signed divide needs, and zero-extend the ALU32 result after the divide or modulo instruction, matching the unsigned ALU32 div/mod paths and every other ALU32 operation in this JIT.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: qrtr: restrict socket creation to the initial network namespace QRTR keeps its entire port and node state in module-global variables that are not partitioned per network namespace: qrtr_local_nid is a single global node id (always 1) and qrtr_ports is a single global xarray. qrtr_port_lookup() and qrtr_local_enqueue() operate on that global state with no network-namespace check, and qrtr_create() places no restriction on the namespace a socket is created in. As a result an unprivileged process that creates an AF_QIPCRTR socket in a separate network namespace, e.g. via unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET), can send QRTR datagrams - including control-plane messages such as QRTR_TYPE_NEW_SERVER - to QRTR sockets owned by another namespace, and vice versa. The receiving socket sees such a message as coming from node id 1, indistinguishable from a legitimate local client, breaking the isolation that network namespaces are expected to provide. QRTR is a transport to global hardware endpoints (the modem and other remote processors) and has no per-namespace semantics; its in-kernel name service already creates its socket in init_net only. Confine the socket family to the initial network namespace, as other non-namespace-aware socket families do (see llc_ui_create() and the ieee802154 socket code).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: Fix MCIA register buffer overflow on 32 dword reads The MCIA register can return up to 32 dwords (128 bytes) when the device advertises the mcia_32dwords capability, but struct mlx5_ifc_mcia_reg_bits only defines dword_0..11, leaving room for just 12 dwords (48 bytes) of data. mlx5_query_mcia() clamps the read size to mlx5_mcia_max_bytes() and then memcpy()s that many bytes out of the register, potentially reading past the end of the 'out' buffer. On kernels built with FORTIFY_SOURCE this is caught as a buffer overflow while reading the module EEPROM via ethtool: detected buffer overflow in memcpy kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1048! RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0x13/0x20 Call Trace: mlx5_query_mcia.isra.0+0x200/0x210 [mlx5_core] mlx5_query_module_eeprom_by_page+0x4a/0xa0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_get_module_eeprom_by_page+0xbb/0x120 [mlx5_core] eeprom_prepare_data+0xf3/0x170 ethnl_default_doit+0xf1/0x3b0 Extend the mcia_reg layout to 32 dwords.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: prevent tstamp ring allocation for non-PF VSI types The pf->txtime_txqs bitmap tracks which Tx queues have ETF (Earliest TxTime First) offload enabled. This bitmap is indexed by queue number and is set by ice_offload_txtime(), which only operates on PF VSI queues. However, ice_is_txtime_ena() does not check the VSI type before consulting the bitmap. When ETF offload is enabled on PF Tx queue 0, bit 0 is set in pf->txtime_txqs. During a subsequent PCI reset rebuild, the CTRL VSI's Tx queue 0 is reconfigured and ice_is_txtime_ena() is called for that ring. Since it only checks pf->txtime_txqs by queue index without distinguishing VSI type, it finds bit 0 set and returns true, matching the PF VSI's ETF queue, not the CTRL VSI's. This causes ice_vsi_cfg_txq() to spuriously allocate a tstamp_ring for the CTRL VSI ring. Since CTRL VSI rings have no associated netdev, ice_clean_tx_ring() takes an early return at the !netdev check before reaching ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring(), leaking the allocation. Each PCI reset leaks one 64-byte tstamp_ring. Fix this by restricting ice_is_txtime_ena() to return true only for PF VSI rings, since txtime_txqs is only meaningful for PF VSI queues.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: idpf: fix max_vport related crash on allocation error during init Set adapter->max_vports only after successful allocation of vports, netdevs and vport_config buffers. This fixes possible crashes on reset or rmmod, following failed allocation on init [ 305.981402] idpf 0000:83:00.0: enabling device (0100 -> 0102) [ 305.994464] idpf 0000:83:00.0: Device HW Reset initiated [ 320.416872] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 320.416918] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 320.416942] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 320.416963] PGD 2099657067 P4D 0 [ 320.416983] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI ... [ 320.417093] RIP: 0010:idpf_remove+0x118/0x200 [idpf] [ 320.417130] Code: 8b bb 98 09 00 00 e8 17 0f 5b e5 48 8b bb e8 08 00 00 e8 0b 0f 5b e5 66 83 bb 28 06 00 00 00 48 8b bb 20 06 00 00 74 49 31 ed <48> 8b 04 ef 48 85 c0 74 2f 48 8b 78 20 e8 66 58 91 e5 48 8b 83 20 [ 320.417183] RSP: 0018:ff7322212903fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 320.417205] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff4463de40300000 RCX: ff7322212903fd4c [ 320.417228] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffa7f7d100 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 320.417250] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 320.417272] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ff4463de3a638f58 R12: ff4463be89ac7000 [ 320.417294] R13: ff4463be89ac7198 R14: ff4463be94fc7198 R15: ffffffffc0f10f20 [ 320.417317] FS: 00007f963c0e6740(0000) GS:ff4463fdd65d8000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 320.417342] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 320.417362] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000020ba674002 CR4: 0000000000773ef0 [ 320.417385] PKRU: 55555554 [ 320.417398] Call Trace: [ 320.417412] <TASK> [ 320.417429] pci_device_remove+0x42/0xb0 [ 320.417459] device_release_driver_internal+0x1a9/0x210 [ 320.417492] driver_detach+0x4b/0x90 [ 320.417516] bus_remove_driver+0x70/0x100 [ 320.417539] pci_unregister_driver+0x2e/0xb0 [ 320.417564] __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x190/0x2f0 [ 320.417592] ? kmem_cache_free+0x31e/0x550 [ 320.417619] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xde/0x190 [ 320.417644] ? do_syscall_64+0x38/0x6b0 [ 320.417665] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x6b0 [ 320.417683] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 [ 320.417706] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 320.417727] RIP: 0033:0x7f963bb30beb

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rds: tcp: unregister sysctl before tearing down listen socket rds_tcp_exit_net() frees the per-netns RDS TCP listen socket via rds_tcp_kill_sock() before unregistering the per-netns sysctl table. Since rds_tcp_skbuf_handler() derives the netns from rtn->rds_tcp_listen_sock->sk, a concurrent sysctl write can race with netns teardown and dereference the freed socket/sk. KASAN reports the race as: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rds_tcp_skbuf_handler+0x2aa/0x2e0 rds_tcp_skbuf_handler net/rds/tcp.c:721 proc_sys_call_handler fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c vfs_write fs/read_write.c __x64_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c Fix this by unregistering the RDS TCP sysctl table before calling rds_tcp_kill_sock(). unregister_net_sysctl_table() prevents new sysctl handlers from starting and waits for in-flight handlers to finish, so the listen socket can then be released safely. The fix was tested against the linked reproducer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix integer overflow in tipc_recvmsg() and tipc_recvstream() In tipc_recvmsg(), the copy length is computed as: copy = min_t(int, dlen - offset, buflen); buflen is size_t but min_t(int, ...) casts it to int. When buflen exceeds INT_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF via io_uring provided buffers), it wraps negative, wins the comparison, and the negative copy length propagates to simple_copy_to_iter() where int-to-size_t promotion makes it SIZE_MAX, triggering a WARN_ON. tipc_recvstream() has the same pattern. Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ... RIP: 0010:simple_copy_to_iter+0x9e/0xd0 (net/core/datagram.c:521) Call Trace: __skb_datagram_iter+0x123/0x8b0 (net/core/datagram.c:402) skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x77/0x1a0 (net/core/datagram.c:534) tipc_recvmsg+0x3d7/0xe80 (net/tipc/socket.c:1934) io_recvmsg+0x47e/0xda0 Fix by changing min_t(int, ...) to min_t(size_t, ...) in both functions. The result is always <= (dlen - offset), which is bounded by TIPC maximum message size (0x1ffff bytes), so the implicit narrowing on assignment to int copy is always safe.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: drop_monitor: fix info leak in NET_DM_ATTR_PAYLOAD net_dm_packet_report_fill() and net_dm_hw_packet_report_fill() open code the NET_DM_ATTR_PAYLOAD attribute to avoid zeroing the packet payload before overwriting it with skb_copy_bits(). skb_put() reserves nla_total_size(payload_len), i.e. the header plus the NLA_ALIGN() padding, but only payload_len bytes are copied in. When payload_len is not a multiple of 4 the 1-3 padding bytes are never initialized and are leaked to user space inside the netlink message. KMSAN confirms the leak for the software path when the packet payload length is not 4-byte aligned: BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter _copy_to_iter __skb_datagram_iter skb_copy_datagram_iter netlink_recvmsg sock_recvmsg __sys_recvfrom Uninit was created at: kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof __alloc_skb net_dm_packet_work Bytes 173-175 of 176 are uninitialized Use __nla_reserve(), which sets up the attribute header and zeroes the padding, instead of open coding the attribute construction.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drop_monitor: fix size calculations for 64-bit attributes net_dm_packet_report_fill() and net_dm_hw_packet_report_fill() use nla_put_u64_64bit() to append 64-bit attributes (NET_DM_ATTR_PC and NET_DM_ATTR_TIMESTAMP). On 32-bit architectures without CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, nla_put_u64_64bit() may append a 4-byte NET_DM_ATTR_PAD attribute for 64-bit alignment. However, net_dm_packet_report_size() and net_dm_hw_packet_report_size() used nla_total_size(sizeof(u64)) instead of nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(u64)), budgeting 12 bytes instead of up to 16 bytes. This under-estimation of SKB size can lead to an skb_over_panic() when __nla_reserve() or skb_put() is subsequently called. Fix this by using nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(u64)) in both size calculations.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drop_monitor: perform u64_stats updates under IRQ-disabled section In net_dm_packet_trace_kfree_skb_hit() and net_dm_hw_trap_packet_probe(), u64_stats_update_begin() / u64_stats_inc() / u64_stats_update_end() were called after spin_unlock_irqrestore(&...drop_queue.lock, flags), when local IRQs had already been re-enabled. Tracepoint probes can execute in IRQ or softirq context. On 32-bit architectures, u64_stats_update_begin() disables preemption but not interrupts, relying on seqcount writes. If a nested interrupt occurs on the same CPU during the 64-bit stats update, the reentrant seqcount update can corrupt the seqcount state or stats value. Fix this by performing the 64-bit per-CPU stats update before releasing drop_queue.lock via spin_unlock_irqrestore(), ensuring local interrupts remain disabled during the u64_stats update.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: BPF: Fix memory leak in bpf_jit_free() When bpf_int_jit_compile() is called for subprograms, it returns early during the first pass (!prog->is_func || extra_pass is false), keeping ctx->offset alive for the subsequent extra pass. If JIT compilation fails for a later subprogram, the BPF core aborts and calls bpf_jit_free() to clean up the first subprogram. However, bpf_jit_free() fails to free jit_data->ctx.offset, which causes a memory leak of the JIT context offsets array. So fix this by adding the missing kvfree(jit_data->ctx.offset) in bpf_jit_free().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Fix cork use-after-free in tcp_bpf_sendmsg() tcp_bpf_sendmsg() keeps msg_tx across sk_stream_wait_memory(), which drops and reacquires the socket lock. Its error path tries to decide whether msg_tx names the local temporary message by comparing it with the current value of psock->cork. This comparison is unsafe when two threads send on the same socket: Thread A Thread B msg_tx = psock->cork sk_msg_alloc() fails sk_stream_wait_memory() releases the socket lock acquires the socket lock completes the cork psock->cork = NULL frees the cork reacquires the socket lock msg_tx != psock->cork sk_msg_free(msg_tx) The stale cork is therefore mistaken for the local temporary message and freed again. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_msg_free+0x49/0x50 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810c908800 by task poc/90 Call Trace: sk_msg_free+0x49/0x50 tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0x14f5/0x1cc0 __sys_sendto+0x32c/0x3a0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdb/0x1b0 Allocated by task 89: __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0x16b3/0x1cc0 Freed by task 91: __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70 kfree+0x131/0x3c0 tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0xec3/0x1cc0 msg_tx can only name the stack-local tmp or the shared cork. Check for tmp directly so a changed psock->cork cannot turn a shared message into an apparent local one.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix use-after-free freeing trigger private data Commit 61d445af0a7c ("tracing: Add bulk garbage collection of freeing event_trigger_data") moved the kfree() of event_trigger_data to a kthread that runs tracepoint_synchronize_unregister() before freeing. That removed the synchronization the trigger .free callbacks used to get implicitly and inline from trigger_data_free(). event_hist_trigger_free(), event_hist_trigger_named_free() and event_enable_trigger_free() free their satellite data (hist_data, cmd_ops, enable_data) right after trigger_data_free() returns. With the synchronization now deferred to the kthread, a concurrent tracepoint handler can still reach that data through the list_del_rcu()'d trigger, causing a use-after-free. The histogram teardown must stay synchronous: remove_hist_vars() and unregister_field_var_hists() have to detach a synthetic event from the histogram before the trigger-removal write returns, otherwise a following command races in and the synthetic-event removal fails with -EBUSY, as the trigger-synthetic-eprobe.tc selftest catches. Make those callbacks wait with the correct barrier - tracepoint_synchronize_unregister(), matching the free kthread - before freeing. The enable trigger has no such synchronous requirement, and a blocking synchronize there would re-serialize the path that commit deliberately deferred. Give it an optional private_data_free() callback that the free kthread runs after its grace period, and free enable_data from there.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/rockchip: analogix_dp: Add missing error check for platform_get_resource() Add missing error check for platform_get_resource() return value to prevent NULL pointer dereference when memory resource is not available.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/imagination: Count paired job fence as dependency in prepare_job() The DRM scheduler's prepare_job() callback counts the remaining non-signaled native dependencies for a job, preventing job submission until those (plus job data and fence update) can fit in the job queue's CCCB. This means checking which dependencies can be waited upon in the firmware, i.e. whether they are backed by a UFO object, i.e. whether their drm_sched_fence::parent has been assigned to a pvr_queue_fence::base fence. That happens when the job owning the fence is submitted to the firmware. Paired geometry and fragment jobs are submitted at the same time, which means the dependency between them can't be checked this way before submission. Update job_count_remaining_native_deps() to take into account the dependency between paired jobs. This fixes cases where prepare_job() underestimated the space left in an almost full fragment CCCB, wrongly unblocking run_job(), which then returned early without writing the full sequence of commands to the CCCB. The above lead to kernel warnings such as the following and potentially job timeouts (depending on waiters on the missing commands): [ 375.702979] WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/imagination/pvr_cccb.c:178 at pvr_cccb_write_command_with_header+0x2c4/0x330 [powervr], CPU#1: kworker/u16:3/47 [ 375.703160] Modules linked in: [ 375.703571] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 47 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Tainted: G W 7.0.0-rc2-g817eb6b11ad5 #40 PREEMPT [ 375.703613] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 375.703627] Hardware name: Texas Instruments AM625 SK (DT) [ 375.703645] Workqueue: powervr-sched drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] [ 375.703741] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 375.703764] pc : pvr_cccb_write_command_with_header+0x2c4/0x330 [powervr] [ 375.703847] lr : pvr_queue_submit_job_to_cccb+0x578/0xa70 [powervr] [ 375.703921] sp : ffff800084a97650 [ 375.703934] x29: ffff800084a97740 x28: 0000000000000958 x27: ffff80008565d000 [ 375.703979] x26: 0000000000000030 x25: ffff800084a97680 x24: 0000000000001000 [ 375.704017] x23: ffff800084a97820 x22: 1ffff00010952ecc x21: 0000000000000008 [ 375.704056] x20: 00000000000006a8 x19: ffff00002ff7da88 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 375.704093] x17: 0000000020020000 x16: 0000000000020000 x15: 0000000000000000 [ 375.704132] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 375.704168] x11: 000000000000f2f2 x10: 00000000f3000000 x9 : 00000000f3f3f3f3 [ 375.704206] x8 : 00000000f2f2f200 x7 : ffff700010952ecc x6 : 0000000000000008 [ 375.704243] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 1ffff00010acba00 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 375.704279] x2 : 0000000000000007 x1 : 0000000000000fff x0 : 000000000000002f [ 375.704317] Call trace: [ 375.704331] pvr_cccb_write_command_with_header+0x2c4/0x330 [powervr] (P) [ 375.704411] pvr_queue_submit_job_to_cccb+0x578/0xa70 [powervr] [ 375.704487] pvr_queue_run_job+0x3a4/0x990 [powervr] [ 375.704562] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x580/0xd48 [gpu_sched] [ 375.704623] process_one_work+0x520/0x1288 [ 375.704658] worker_thread+0x3f0/0xb3c [ 375.704680] kthread+0x334/0x3d8 [ 375.704706] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 375.704736] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/bridge: cdns-dsi: Replace deprecated UNIVERSAL_DEV_PM_OPS() The deprecated UNIVERSAL_DEV_PM_OPS() macro uses the provided callbacks for both runtime PM and system sleep. This causes the DSI clocks to be disabled twice: once during runtime suspend and again during system suspend, resulting in a WARN message from the clock framework when attempting to disable already-disabled clocks. [ 84.384540] clk:231:5 already disabled [ 84.388314] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 531 at /drivers/clk/clk.c:1181 clk_core_disable+0xa4/0xac ... [ 84.579183] Call trace: [ 84.581624] clk_core_disable+0xa4/0xac [ 84.585457] clk_disable+0x30/0x4c [ 84.588857] cdns_dsi_suspend+0x20/0x58 [cdns_dsi] [ 84.593651] pm_generic_suspend+0x2c/0x44 [ 84.597661] ti_sci_pd_suspend+0xbc/0x15c [ 84.601670] dpm_run_callback+0x8c/0x14c [ 84.605588] __device_suspend+0x1a0/0x56c [ 84.609594] dpm_suspend+0x17c/0x21c [ 84.613165] dpm_suspend_start+0xa0/0xa8 [ 84.617083] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x12c/0x634 [ 84.621872] pm_suspend+0x1fc/0x368 To address this issue, replace UNIVERSAL_DEV_PM_OPS() with RUNTIME_PM_OPS(). Bridge and panel drivers should only deal with runtime PM, as the DRM framework manages system-wide power transitions through the bridge enable() and disable() hooks.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/dp/mst: fix OOB reads in remote DPCD/I2C sideband reply parsers drm_dp_sideband_parse_remote_dpcd_read() reads num_bytes from the raw message and then unconditionally does: memcpy(bytes, &raw->msg[idx], num_bytes); without checking that idx + num_bytes <= raw->curlen. raw->msg[] is 256 bytes; if a malicious or misbehaving MST hub sets num_bytes larger than the remaining payload, the memcpy reads past the received data into whatever follows in raw->msg[]. drm_dp_sideband_parse_remote_i2c_read_ack() has the same flaw (noted with a /* TODO check */ comment since the code was introduced). Fix both functions by using a single combined check (idx + num_bytes > curlen) before each memcpy. Since num_bytes is u8, it is always >= 0, so this strictly subsumes the simpler idx > curlen form and no separate step is needed. [added missing fixes tag]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/dp/mst: fix buffer overflows in sideband chunk accumulation drm_dp_sideband_append_payload() has three related bugs when processing device-provided sideband reply data: 1. Zero-length curchunk_len underflow: msg_len is a 6-bit field taken directly from the DP sideband header. If a device sends msg_len=0, curchunk_len is set to zero. The condition (curchunk_idx >= curchunk_len) is immediately true, and curchunk_len-1 wraps to 255 (u8 underflow). drm_dp_msg_data_crc4() reads 255 bytes from chunk[48], then memcpy() writes 255 bytes into msg[], both far out of bounds. 2. chunk[48] overflow: curchunk_len can reach 63 (6-bit field). chunk[] is only 48 bytes. Multi-iteration payload assembly appends 16-byte blocks until curchunk_idx reaches curchunk_len, writing up to 15 bytes past the end of chunk[] into msg[]. 3. msg[256] overflow: each chunk contributes (curchunk_len-1) bytes to msg[]. No check ensures curlen + (curchunk_len-1) stays within msg[256], so the memcpy can spill into adjacent struct fields. All three are reachable from any DP MST device that can forge sideband reply messages on a physical connection.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/dp/mst: fix OOB reads on 2-byte fields in sideband reply parsers Three sideband reply parsers read 16-bit fields as: val = (raw->msg[idx] << 8) | (raw->msg[idx+1]); and check bounds only after the fact. When idx == raw->curlen, raw->msg[idx+1] reads one byte past the received message data into the following struct fields (curchunk_len, curchunk_idx, curlen). Affected functions: - drm_dp_sideband_parse_enum_path_resources_ack() full_payload_bw_number and avail_payload_bw_number fields - drm_dp_sideband_parse_allocate_payload_ack() allocated_pbn field - drm_dp_sideband_parse_query_payload_ack() allocated_pbn field Fix by using a single combined check (idx + 2 > curlen) before each 2-byte read. Since the check is strictly tighter than idx > curlen, no separate step is needed. [added fixes tag]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/gfx: fix cleaner shader IB buffer overflow The cleaner shader sysfs path allocates a 16-dword (64 byte) IB but incorrectly fills (align_mask + 1) dwords. On GFX rings align_mask is 0xff, so the loop wrote 256 dwords into a 64-byte buffer, causing a kernel page fault. The IB only needs to be a minimal NOP shell to schedule the job; the cleaner shader itself is emitted on the ring via emit_cleaner_shader(). Fill 16 dwords to match the allocation. v2: Use ib_size_dw variable (Lijo) (cherry picked from commit bf21af331ebf72d0935fd70c73192414a422c03a)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: check amdgpu_vm_bo_find() result in GET_MAPPING_INFO The AMDGPU_GEM_OP_GET_MAPPING_INFO path of amdgpu_gem_op_ioctl() looks up the bo_va for the buffer object in the caller's VM via amdgpu_vm_bo_find(), but uses the returned pointer without checking it. amdgpu_vm_bo_find() returns NULL when the BO has no bo_va in that VM, which is the normal case for a BO that has never been mapped. The result is fed straight into amdgpu_vm_bo_va_for_each_valid_mapping(), which expands to list_for_each_entry(mapping, &(bo_va)->valids, list) and dereferences bo_va, causing a NULL pointer dereference. This is reachable by any process able to issue the ioctl (render group) simply by requesting mapping info for an unmapped BO. Return -ENOENT when no bo_va is found, jumping to out_exec so the drm_exec context and GEM object reference are released. (cherry picked from commit 528b19377affc1cc7362a70a254c1dda793595f9)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/guc: Fix buffer overflow in steered register list allocation The size calculation for the steered register extarray uses only the geometry DSS mask (g_dss_mask) to determine the number of entries to allocate: total = bitmap_weight(gt->fuse_topo.g_dss_mask, ...) * steer_reg_num; However, the filling loop uses for_each_dss_steering(), which iterates over for_each_dss(), defined as the union of g_dss_mask and c_dss_mask (geometry + compute DSS). On platforms with compute-only DSS bits, the loop writes past the allocated buffer, corrupting adjacent slab objects. This manifests as list_del corruption and SLUB redzone overwrites during drm_managed_release on device unbind, since the overflow corrupts the drmres list_head of neighboring allocations. Fix by computing the allocation size using the union of both DSS masks, matching the iteration pattern of for_each_dss_steering(). -- v2: - use bitmap_weighted_or() (Zhanjun) (cherry picked from commit 0a78a44f4901aa6c9263e66be7fce02282f1109f)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Fix context pstate override handling There are several problems in the context pstate handling code. The most serious ones are potential use-after-free and NULL pointer dereferences at context initialization time. Both are due amdgpu_ctx_init() not holding the adev->pm.stable_pstate_ctx_lock, which is otherwise used from both sysfs and the context code itself for modifying and clearing the stored context pointer. Second issue is that context fini can trample over the pstate configuration set via sysfs. This is due the restore state (ctx->stable_pstate) being saved at context init time, and not if, or when the context actually changes the pstate. As the context exits it will therefore incorrectly restore to what was set before the sysfs override was requested. The simplest fix is to drastically simplify how the state is tracked, by clearly defining the points at which pstate ownership is taken and released, and to handle all transitions under the correct lock. Instead of at context init time, the previous state is saved only at the point the context overrides the current state, and is restored on context exit only if the context is still the owner of the current override state. (cherry picked from commit 1b5e413713c0a93bc1818394d0ce49aaad21bd27)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: validate CP_GFX_SHADOW chunk size in CS pass1 Add a minimum-length check for the AMDGPU_CHUNK_ID_CP_GFX_SHADOW chunk in amdgpu_cs_pass1(), matching the gate already present for the IB, FENCE and BO_HANDLES chunk types. The CP_GFX_SHADOW case previously shared a bare break with the dependency and syncobj chunk types, which do not dereference a fixed-size struct. When userspace submits this chunk with length_dw == 0, vmemdup_array_user() is called with size 0 and returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the IS_ERR() check. amdgpu_cs_p2_shadow() then dereferences chunk->kdata as a struct drm_amdgpu_cs_chunk_cp_gfx_shadow (reading shadow->flags), faulting on the ZERO_SIZE_PTR and causing a NULL-pointer dereference. This is reachable by an unprivileged process in the render group. Reject undersized chunks with -EINVAL during pass1 so the bad submission is rejected before pass2 ever dereferences the data. (cherry picked from commit 7f61b2eef7415eccdb40850aca0de94211948657)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/nouveau: fix reversed error cleanup order in ucopy functions nouveau_uvmm_vm_bind_ucopy() and nouveau_exec_ucopy() place their error cleanup labels in allocation order rather than reverse allocation order. On a u_memcpya() failure for in_sync.s, the goto to err_free_ops (or err_free_pushs) frees the first allocation and then falls through to err_free_ins, which calls u_free() on args->in_sync.s. Since args->in_sync.s still holds the ERR_PTR returned by the failed u_memcpya(), and ERR_PTR values are not caught by ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(), kvfree() proceeds to dereference it, which can result in a kernel oops. A failure for out_sync.s instead jumps to err_free_ins and skips freeing the first allocation, leading to a memory leak. Fix by swapping the cleanup label order so resources are freed in the correct reverse allocation sequence.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/sysfb: Avoid possible truncation with calculating visible size Calculating the visible size of the system framebuffer can result in truncation of the result. The calculation uses 32-bit arithmetics, which can overflow if the values for height and stride are large. Fix the issue by multiplying with mul_u32_u32().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/gem: Add missing nospec on parallel submit slot Add missing Spectre mitigation for userspace controlled parallel submission slot. Discovered using AI-assisted static analysis confirmed by Intel Product Security. (cherry picked from commit 15b9353deff3cf72331c387780de3cf9c316b643)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Return error on non-migratable faults requiring devmem Non-migratable faults that require devmem incorrectly jump to the 'out' label, which squashes the error code intended to be returned to the upper layers. Fix this by returning -EACCES instead. (cherry picked from commit c4508edb2c723de93717272488ea65b165637eac)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/rtp: Add RING_FORCE_TO_NONPRIV_DENY to OA whitelists Unconditionally whitelisting OA registers is a security violation. Set RING_FORCE_TO_NONPRIV_DENY bit in OA nonpriv slots, so that OA registers don't get whitelisted by default after probe, gt reset, resume and engine reset. (cherry picked from commit 90511bdcfda97211c01f1d945d4ea616578d8fca)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs An imported dma-buf BO is created as a ttm_bo_type_sg BO whose reservation object is the exporter's dma_buf->resv. The importer, however, only takes a dma-buf reference after a successful dma_buf_dynamic_attach(). Until then nothing keeps the exporter alive, so if the exporter is freed while the BO still references its resv, a later access to that resv is a use-after-free: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b9c Workqueue: ttm ttm_bo_delayed_delete [ttm] RIP: 0010:mutex_can_spin_on_owner+0x3f/0xc0 This can be reached on two paths: - dma_buf_dynamic_attach() fails, or - ttm_bo_init_reserved() fails during BO creation. In both cases the BO already has bo->base.resv pointing at the exporter resv, and sg BOs are always torn down via ttm_bo_delayed_delete(), which locks bo->base.resv asynchronously - potentially after the exporter has been freed. Take the dma-buf reference in xe_bo_init_locked(), before ttm_bo_init_reserved(), so it also covers a creation failure there, and release it in xe_ttm_bo_destroy(). The reference is held for the whole BO lifetime, keeping the shared resv alive on every path. v2: - Reworked the fix to avoid creating the imported sg BO before dma_buf_dynamic_attach() succeeds. - Attach with importer_priv == NULL and make invalidate_mappings ignore incomplete imports. v3: - Dropped the xe-side reordering approach since importer_priv must be valid when dma_buf_dynamic_attach() publishes the attachment. - Per Christian's suggestion on the v1 thread, keyed the check on import_attach rather than removing the sg guard entirely. - Fixes both xe and amdgpu in a single TTM patch. v4: - Moved import_attach check to after dma_resv_copy_fences() so fences are copied before returning for successful imports (Thomas). - Removed exporter-alive claim from commit message (Thomas). v5: - Add drm/xe patch to keep imported sg BOs off the LRU before attach succeeds; the TTM fix alone is not sufficient for xe if the BO is already LRU-visible. (Thomas) v4 patch: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/736663/?series=169129&rev=2 - Patch 1 (drm/ttm) carries Christian's Reviewed-by from v4. v6: - Reworked the fix based on Thomas' suggestion. Instead of the TTM resv individualization (v1-v5) plus the xe off-LRU/placement handling (v5), just hold a dma-buf reference for the imported BO lifetime so the shared resv can never be freed while the BO still references it. Single xe patch, no TTM change. (Thomas) - Take the reference in xe_bo_init_locked() before ttm_bo_init_reserved() so a TTM creation failure is covered too (Thomas). - Dropped the v5 series (drm/ttm + drm/xe off-LRU); the off-LRU approach also regressed in CI BAT via ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting() creating a ghost BO that outlived the exporter. Link to v5: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/169984/ v7: - Move changelog above --- so it stays in the commit message. - Reorder changelog entries oldest-to-newest. (Thomas) (cherry picked from commit 3516f3fae6be35642f8f06f8a218da6425c0306a)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/vm: Fix BO prefetch with CONSULT_MEM_ADVISE_PREF_LOC When prefetch region is DRM_XE_CONSULT_MEM_ADVISE_PREF_LOC for a BO VMA, the code used it as an index into region_to_mem_type[], causing an out-of-bounds access since the value is -1. Resolve the preferred location for BO VMAs directly: local VRAM on dGFX (using the BO's tile placement) or system memory on iGPU. Discovered using AI-assisted static analysis confirmed by Intel Product Security. v2: -Fix null dereference (cherry picked from commit d9a4906ac03be9f6ed3f3b45c56c866b867fd75b)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/pt: Reset current_op in xe_pt_update_ops_init() xe_pt_update_ops_init() fails to reset current_op to 0. On the vm_bind path, ops_execute() calls xe_pt_update_ops_prepare() inside the xe_validation_guard() / drm_exec_until_all_locked() loop. When that loop retries due to lock contention or OOM eviction (drm_exec_retry_on_contention() / xe_validation_retry_on_oom()), xe_pt_update_ops_prepare() runs again on the same vops, and each call to bind_op_prepare() increments current_op without resetting it. After N retries current_op exceeds the array size allocated by xe_vma_ops_alloc(), causing an out-of-bounds write into SLUB-poisoned memory and a subsequent UAF crash in xe_migrate_update_pgtables_cpu() when reading the corrupted pt_op->bind. Also reset needs_svm_lock and needs_invalidation which are derived in the same prepare pass and would otherwise cause wrong migrate ops selection and redundant TLB invalidation on retry. Fix this by resetting current_op, needs_svm_lock and needs_invalidation in xe_pt_update_ops_init(). v2 (Matt): - Add details in commit message. - Add Fixes tag and Cc to stable@vger.kernel.org (cherry picked from commit 046045543e530605c441063535e7dca0075369a6)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/imagination: Fix double call to drm_sched_entity_fini() Call sequence of double call: pvr_context_destroy   pvr_context_kill_queues     pvr_queue_kill       drm_sched_entity_destroy         drm_sched_entity_fini // here   pvr_context_put     kref_put(..., pvr_context_release)       pvr_context_destroy_queues         pvr_queue_destroy           drm_sched_entity_fini // here Call to drm_sched_entity_destroy() from pvr_context_kill_queues() calls drm_sched_entity_flush() + drm_sched_entity_fini(). drm_sched_entity_flush() ensures all pending jobs are completed and drm_sched_entity_fini() ensures no further submission is allowed as per expectation from pvr_context_kill_queues(). Double call to drm_sched_entity_fini() is misuse of the API so keep call only in pvr_context_create() failure path. Stack trace for issue with addition of refcounting for DRM entity stats in commit fd177135f0e6 ("drm/sched: Account entity GPU time"): [ 789.490527] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 789.490559] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. [ 789.490657] WARNING: lib/refcount.c:28 at refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x144, CPU#0: kworker/u16:1/440 [ 789.490695] Modules linked in: powervr drm_gpuvm drm_exec gpu_sched drm_shmem_helper xhci_plat_hcd xhci_hcd dwc3 usbcore usb_common snd_soc_simple_card snd_soc_simple_card_utils sa2ul sha512 sha256 dwc3_am62 sha1 authenc rti_wdt libsha512 at24 sch_fq_codel fuse dm_mod ipv6 [ 789.490798] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 440 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc7-02049-g5e2c0700091b #22 PREEMPT [ 789.490809] Hardware name: Texas Instruments AM625 SK (DT) [ 789.490815] Workqueue: powervr-sched pvr_queue_fence_release_work [powervr] [ 789.490868] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 789.490876] pc : refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x144 [ 789.490884] lr : refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x144 [ 789.490892] sp : ffff8000822cbcc0 [ 789.490895] x29: ffff8000822cbcc0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 789.490909] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff800081b1e338 x24: ffff000004541405 [ 789.490922] x23: ffff000004bea950 x22: ffff00000042e400 x21: ffff000007123e30 [ 789.490935] x20: ffff000007123000 x19: ffff000007a80d50 x18: fffffffffffe7768 [ 789.490948] x17: 74736574202c6e6f x16: 697461746e656d65 x15: ffff800081b269f0 [ 789.490962] x14: 0000000000000030 x13: ffff800081b26a70 x12: 0000000000000211 [ 789.490975] x11: 00000000000000c0 x10: 0000000000000b50 x9 : ffff8000822cbb30 [ 789.490988] x8 : ffff0000014e7bb0 x7 : ffff00007725e780 x6 : 0000000372a05f49 [ 789.491001] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000010 [ 789.491013] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000014e7000 [ 789.491027] Call trace: [ 789.491032] refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x144 (P) [ 789.491043] drm_sched_entity_fini+0x164/0x18c [gpu_sched] [ 789.491081] pvr_queue_destroy+0x64/0x134 [powervr] [ 789.491110] pvr_context_destroy_queues+0x34/0x64 [powervr] [ 789.491138] pvr_context_release+0x70/0xac [powervr] [ 789.491166] pvr_context_put.part.0+0x5c/0x7c [powervr] [ 789.491193] pvr_context_put+0x14/0x24 [powervr] [ 789.491221] pvr_queue_fence_release_work+0x20/0x38 [powervr] [ 789.491249] process_one_work+0x160/0x4c4 [ 789.491264] worker_thread+0x188/0x310 [ 789.491276] kthread+0x130/0x13c [ 789.491287] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 789.491300] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/imagination: Fix user array stride in pvr_set_uobj_array() pvr_set_uobj_array() copies an array of kernel objects to a userspace array whose element size is described by out->stride. When out->stride is different from the kernel object size, the slow path advances the userspace pointer by the kernel object size and the kernel pointer by the userspace stride. This reverses the intended layout. For larger userspace strides, later copies read from the wrong kernel addresses. For smaller userspace strides, later copies are written at the wrong userspace offsets. The padding clear is also done only for the first element instead of the padding area for each element. Advance the userspace pointer by out->stride and the kernel pointer by obj_size, and clear per-element padding while the current userspace pointer is still available.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/imagination: fix error checking of pvr_vm_context_lookup() Since pvr_vm_context_lookup() returns either NULL or a pointer, then stop using IS_ERR() for checking the return value. Using IS_ERR() leads to the kernel oops reported below. It can be reproduced by passing an invalid VM context handle from userspace to the DRM_IOCTL_PVR_CREATE_CONTEXT ioctl. [ 92.733119] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000148 [ 92.742042] Mem abort info: [ 92.744890] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 92.748686] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 92.754020] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 92.757154] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 92.760337] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 92.765243] Data abort info: [ 92.768129] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 92.773626] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 92.778763] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 92.784098] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000088ed23000 [ 92.790550] [0000000000000148] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 92.797381] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP [ 92.803027] Modules linked in: powervr [ 92.852533] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 409 Comm: triangle Not tainted 7.1.0-rc5-g98b46e693b91 #1 PREEMPT [ 92.861385] Hardware name: Texas Instruments AM68 SK (DT) [ 92.866766] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 92.873709] pc : pvr_vm_get_fw_mem_context+0x0/0xc [powervr] [ 92.879376] lr : pvr_queue_create+0x26c/0x440 [powervr] [ 92.884595] sp : ffff8000837fbb00 [ 92.887895] x29: ffff8000837fbb60 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff8000837fbce8 [ 92.895015] x26: ffff000807f61a40 x25: ffff000807f61a00 x24: ffff000807f64400 [ 92.902135] x23: ffff00080a5ab000 x22: ffff800079b24730 x21: ffff000807f61800 [ 92.909254] x20: ffff00080999e680 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 92.916373] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000001 [ 92.923492] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000002 x12: ffff80008145b298 [ 92.930611] x11: ffff8000844e5000 x10: ffff80008165a130 x9 : 0000000000000100 [ 92.937730] x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : ffff0008076b27e0 x6 : ffff00080ec43b7c [ 92.944850] x5 : ffff00080ec43b78 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff00080999e680 [ 92.951968] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 92.959088] Call trace: [ 92.961521] pvr_vm_get_fw_mem_context+0x0/0xc [powervr] (P) [ 92.967173] pvr_context_create+0x190/0x410 [powervr] [ 92.972218] pvr_ioctl_create_context+0x44/0x8c [powervr] [ 92.977608] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xbc/0x124 [drm] [ 92.982127] drm_ioctl+0x1f8/0x4dc [drm] [ 92.986098] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x104 [ 92.990102] invoke_syscall+0x54/0x10c [ 92.993842] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 [ 92.998532] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ 93.001835] el0_svc+0x38/0x11c [ 93.004969] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4 [ 93.009139] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c [ 93.012792] Code: aa1703e0 d2800014 95cb0ba4 17ffffe8 (f940a400) [ 93.018869] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/imagination: acquire vm_ctx->lock before mapping memory to GPU VM The drm gpuvm code doesn't protect find operation against map operation, and the driver needs to ensure a map operation shouldn't happen when a find operation is in progress. In some cases a find operation will be in progress when doing map/unmap operations, and the find operation will do a NULL pointer dereference. An example of the stack trace of such NULL dereference is shown below: ``` Unable to handle kernel access to user memory without uaccess routines at virtual address 0000000000000010 [<ffffffff01e989d4>] drm_gpuva_find+0x28/0x6c [drm_gpuvm] [<ffffffff01ed3a40>] pvr_vm_unmap+0x34/0x68 [powervr] [<ffffffff01ec69da>] pvr_ioctl_vm_unmap+0x2e/0x50 [powervr] [<ffffffff8080ce0a>] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x8e/0xdc [<ffffffff8080d016>] drm_ioctl+0x1be/0x3e0 [<ffffffff802bec3e>] __riscv_sys_ioctl+0xba/0xc4 [<ffffffff80d858b2>] do_trap_ecall_u+0x23e/0x3f4 [<ffffffff80d92288>] handle_exception+0x168/0x174 ``` As all occurences of drm_gpuva_find*() are already guarded by vm_ctx->lock, make pvr_vm_map() to acquire this lock to prevent disturbing any find operation. This fixes the NULL deference problem in drm_gpuva_find*().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Check bounds in allocate_event_notification_slot The valid event ids go from 0 to KFD_SIGNAL_EVENT_LIMIT allocate_event_notification_slot has an option to specify an event id to allocate at, used by CRIU. We weren't checking the bounds on that value. Check them. v2: Lower bounds check is unecessary because of idr_alloc already rejecting negative numbers. Upper bounds check should be KFD_SIGNAL_EVENT_LIMIT since the signal mode mappings might not yet exist (cherry picked from commit 6853f1f6cbbeb3f53ebbbd7286536aeb2c5d5f50)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Check bounds on CRIU restore queue type and mqd size We weren't checking whether the values provided in the private data in kfd CRIU restore were within bounds. For queue type, add a KFD_QUEUE_TYPE_MAX and ensure the provided type is less than it. For mqd_size, add new function mqd_size_from_queue_type and confirm that the provided mqd_size matches expectations. (cherry picked from commit f19d8086f6644083c913d70bfdeee20e1b6f46a5)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: fix 32-bit overflow in CWSR total size calculation total_cwsr_size was computed in 32-bit before being used as a BO/SVM allocation size. With large ctx_save_restore_area_size and debug_memory_size multiplied by the XCC count, the product can wrap, yielding an undersized CWSR save area that firmware later overruns. Promote total_cwsr_size to u64 and use check_add_overflow()/ check_mul_overflow() in both kfd_queue_acquire_buffers() and kfd_queue_release_buffers(). (cherry picked from commit 319f7e13423ae3f486b9aea82f9ad2d6af0ee608)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: detect_link_and_local_sink: DP alt mode timeout path leaks prev_sink reference prev_sink is unconditionally retained via dc_sink_retain at function entry, but the DP alt mode timeout path inside SIGNAL_TYPE_DISPLAY_PORT returns false without releasing prev_sink. All other return paths in the function correctly call dc_sink_release(prev_sink), making this the only missing cleanup. (cherry picked from commit 45510cf662dcf46b5d8926d454f338809f107b9d)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the device-supplied resp->size field, never against the fixed-size resp->edid array. The EDID block index is driven by the device-supplied extension count, so a malicious virtio-gpu backend can advertise a large size together with a high block count and read far past the array into adjacent kernel memory, which is then surfaced in the parsed EDID (an out-of-bounds read / info leak). Also reject any read whose end exceeds the size of the edid array. Conforming EDID responses stay within the array and are unaffected.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/vrr: require valid min/max vfreq for VRR Ensure the EDID provided min/max vfreq are valid. Most scenarios are already covered (by coincidence) through the checks in intel_vrr_is_capable() and intel_vrr_is_in_range(), but be more explicit about it. At worst, a zero min_vfreq could lead to a division by zero in intel_vrr_compute_vmax(). Discovered using AI-assisted static analysis confirmed by Intel Product Security. (cherry picked from commit 1765cf59f517b02f3b0591fe5120930d08bddeb6)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/hdcp: check streams[] bounds before overflow The data->streams[] overflow check is done after the buffer overflow has already happened. Move the overflow check before the write. Side note, emitting a warning splat with a backtrace might be overkill here, but prefer not changing the behaviour other than not doing the overrun. Discovered using AI-assisted static analysis confirmed by Intel Product Security. (cherry picked from commit 9284ab3b6e776c315883ac2611283d263c9460fd)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/sdma7.0: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON() There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases. (cherry picked from commit 9723a8bed3aa251a26bee4583bac9d8fb064dd44)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/sdma6.0: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON() There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases. (cherry picked from commit c17a508a7d652da3728f8bbc481bfffe96d65a87)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/sdma5.2: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON() There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases. (cherry picked from commit ae658afc7f47f6147371ec42cc6b1a793dfdb5af)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/sdma5.0: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON() There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases. (cherry picked from commit 8d144a0eb09537055841af48c9e7c2d4cd48e84d)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915: Return NULL on error in active_instance Avoid returning &node->base when node is NULL due to OOM during GFP_ATOMIC allocation. Discovered using AI-assisted static analysis confirmed by Intel Product Security. (cherry picked from commit 6029bc064f0b1bac184203a50fbaaf070fa18832)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/bios: range check LFP Data Block panel_type2 While the panel_type from LFP Data Block is range checked, panel_type2 is not. Add a few helpers for range checking, and use them to not only check panel_type2, but also improve clarity and correctness in the panel type selection. Discovered using AI-assisted static analysis confirmed by Intel Product Security. v2: - Fix commit message typo (Michał) - Add is_panel_type_pnp() (Ville) (cherry picked from commit c9ebe5d2f25729d6cfbbb1235d640bf67f9275df)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/gfx11: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON() There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases. (cherry picked from commit daa62107452d2451787c4248ca38fa2d1a0cbefd)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix lifetime issue of amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid() The vm pointer returned from amdgpu_vm_get_vm_from_pasid() is only valid while the lock is still being held. Once xa_unlock_irqrestore is called and returned, the pointer is no longer under lock and is subject to modification. Since, the caller still dereferences vm->task_info in amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_vm() after the lock is removed, this causes a use after unlock problem. Remove the lifetime issue present in amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid() through removing the amdgpu_vm_get_vm_from_pasid() function from amdgpu_vm.c and making the relevant code inline to hold the lock while it is still in use. (cherry picked from commit 9d01579f3f868b333acc901815972685989092c7)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/gem: Do not leak siblings[] on proto context error After a successful BALANCE/PARALLEL_SUBMIT extension on context creation, error during processing of next user extension leaks the siblings[] array. Fix that. Discovered using AI-assisted static analysis confirmed by Intel Product Security. (cherry picked from commit aa65e0a4b51b3b54b53e4142aaa2d997aa1061ff)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/gem: Fix NULL deref in I915_CONTEXT_PARAM_SSEU Setting context engine slot N into I915_ENGINE_CLASS_INVALID / I915_ENGINE_CLASS_INVALID_NONE and attempting to apply I915_CONTEXT_PARAM_SSEU to the same slot N will deref NULL. Fix that. Discovered using AI-assisted static analysis confirmed by Intel Product Security. (cherry picked from commit 36eda5b5c2d40da41cc0a5403c26986237cf9e87)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/gt: Fix NULL deref on sched_engine alloc failure Avoid using intel_context_put() before intel_context_init() in execlists_create_virtual() as the kref_put() inside would lead to NULL deref on the IOCTL path when sched_engine allocation fails. Discovered using AI-assisted static analysis confirmed by Intel Product Security. (cherry picked from commit 4f2a12f2d50e9f48227656e4dcbd6423506be31d)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/mst: limit DP MST ESI service loop The loop in intel_dp_check_mst_status() keeps servicing interrupts originating from the sink without bound. Add an upper bound to the new interrupts occurring during interrupt processing to not get stuck on potentially stuck sink devices. Use arbitrary 32 tries to clear incoming interrupts in one go. Discovered using AI-assisted static analysis confirmed by Intel Product Security. Note: The condition likely pre-dates the commit in the Fixes: tag, but this is about as far back as a backport has any chance of succeeding. Before that, the retry had a goto. (cherry picked from commit b4ea5272133059acb493cc36599071a9e852ec2e)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/gpusvm: publish dpagemap early to avoid device mapping leak on error drm_gpusvm_get_pages() only stored the local dpagemap into svm_pages->dpagemap on the success path. If a later page failed (e.g. -EOPNOTSUPP when ctx->allow_mixed is false) and jumped to err_unmap, svm_pages->dpagemap was still NULL, so __drm_gpusvm_unmap_pages() skipped device_unmap() and leaked the device mappings already created. Assign svm_pages->dpagemap when the first device page is mapped so the err_unmap path can device_unmap() those mappings. This issue was found by Sashiko AI review.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/ttm: Account for NULL and handle pages in ttm_pool_backup Pages in ttm_pool_backup can be NULL or backup handles (ttm_backup_page_ptr_is_handle()), neither of which can be passed to set_pages_array_wb() or freed. Add a dedicated WB pass before the dma/purge loop that walks allocations using the same i += num_pages stride, skipping NULL and handle entries, and calls set_pages_array_wb() once per contiguous run of real pages. Apply the same NULL/handle guard to the dma/purge loop. Fixes the following oops: Oops: general protection fault, kernel NULL pointer dereference 0x0: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:__cpa_process_fault+0xf8/0x770 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000a87718 EFLAGS: 00010287 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90000a87868 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 0005088000000000 RDI: ffffffff827c5f34 RBP: 0005088000000000 R08: ffffc90000a877cb R09: ffffc90000a877d0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 000000000000001b R12: 000ffffffffff000 R13: ffffc90000a87868 R14: ffffc90000a87868 R15: ffff88815b882ae0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8884ec840000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f930b844000 CR3: 000000000262e003 CR4: 0000000008f70ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x989/0xe90 ? __purge_vmap_area_lazy+0x6c/0x3a0 ? _vm_unmap_aliases+0x250/0x2a0 set_pages_array_wb+0x7f/0x120 ttm_pool_backup+0x4c9/0x5b0 [ttm] ? dma_resv_wait_timeout+0x3b/0xf0 ttm_tt_backup+0x32/0x60 [ttm] ttm_bo_shrink+0x66/0x110 [ttm] xe_bo_shrink_purge+0x12b/0x1b0 [xe] xe_bo_shrink+0xbb/0x270 [xe] __xe_shrinker_walk+0xf7/0x160 [xe] xe_shrinker_walk+0x9d/0xc0 [xe] xe_shrinker_scan+0x11f/0x210 [xe] do_shrink_slab+0x13b/0x270 shrink_slab+0xf1/0x400 shrink_node+0x352/0x8a0 balance_pgdat+0x32c/0x700 kswapd+0x205/0x2f0 ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_kswapd+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xd1/0x110 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x1b1/0x200 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Release VFCT ACPI table reference amdgpu_acpi_vfct_bios() fetches the VFCT table with acpi_get_table() but never releases it. acpi_get_table() takes a reference on the table (incrementing its validation_count and mapping it on the 0->1 transition); without a paired acpi_put_table() the mapping is leaked on every call, whether or not a matching VBIOS image is found. Route all exit paths after the table is acquired through a common acpi_put_table(). The VBIOS image is copied out with kmemdup() before the table is released, so it remains valid for the caller. (cherry picked from commit ca5988682b4cba4cd125a0fa99b2de1239164ae4)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/userq: fix indefinite fence wait during GPU reset pre_reset only force-completes fences of MAPPED queues. A queue in any other state (e.g. mid-eviction) keeps its last_fence pending; after a GPU reset that fence never signals, so the eviction/suspend worker and process teardown (amdgpu_evf_mgr_flush_suspend) wait on it forever and wedge the machine: INFO: task kworker/6:28 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Workqueue: events amdgpu_eviction_fence_suspend_worker [amdgpu] Call Trace: dma_fence_wait_timeout+0x7e/0x130 amdgpu_userq_evict+0x67/0x140 [amdgpu] amdgpu_eviction_fence_suspend_worker+0xd8/0x160 [amdgpu] process_scheduled_works+0xa6/0x420 Force-complete every queue's fence regardless of state. The unmap and mark-hung step stays gated on MAPPED, since unmapping a queue that is not mapped is invalid. (cherry picked from commit 9102b39fa924dcc3dc75a3137bfa9633c40b88c0)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: set new_stream to NULL after release In dm_update_crtc_state(), the skip_modeset path releases new_stream via dc_stream_release() but does not set the pointer to NULL. If a later error (e.g., color management failure) triggers the fail label, the error path calls dc_stream_release() again on the same dangling pointer, causing a double release and potential use-after-free. Fix this by setting new_stream to NULL after the initial release. (cherry picked from commit 99f3af19073b3ddbfd96e789124cce12c4277b28)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: dce100: skip non-DP stream encoders for DP MST On DCE8-class ASICs (e.g. Bonaire), the resource pool contains digital DIG stream encoders plus one analog DAC encoder. When assigning a stream encoder for a second DisplayPort MST stream, if the preferred digital encoder is already acquired, dce100_find_first_free_match_stream_enc_for_link() falls back to the first free pool entry. That entry may be the analog encoder, whose funcs table lacks DP hooks such as dp_set_stream_attribute. The subsequent atomic commit then dereferences NULL function pointers in link_set_dpms_on() and crashes. Skip encoders without dp_set_stream_attribute when the stream uses a DP signal (including MST). Use dc_is_dp_signal(stream->signal) for the MST fallback path instead of checking only the link connector signal. Tested on: - GPU: AMD Radeon R7 260X (Bonaire / DCE8) - Board: Supermicro C9X299-PG300 - Setup: DP MST daisy chain, hotplug second monitor or have it connected on boot - Kernel: 7.1.3 (issue observed since 6.19) - Result: kernel oops without patch; dual monitors stable with patch (cherry picked from commit 28ec64943e3ee4d9b8d30cea61e380f1429953a8)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix bo->pin leaking in amdgpu_bo_create_reserved amdgpu_bo_create_reserved() only allocates a new BO when *bo_ptr (struct amdgpu_bo **bo_ptr as input parameter) is NULL, it simply skips creation when *bo_ptr is non-NULL. But it unconditionally reserves, pins, gart allocates and maps the BO afterwards. When the same non-NULL BO pointer is passed in again, for example firmware buffers that live in adev and are re-loaded on every resume / cp_resume / start under AMDGPU_FW_LOAD_DIRECT, amdgpu_bo_pin() just increases pin_count unconditionally, however the matching teardown only unpins once, so pin_count never drops to zero, so TTM is not able to move, swap or evict a BO, causing BO leaks. This commit fixes this issue by only pinning the bo once at creation, and repeated calls no longer take additional pin references. (cherry picked from commit 3ddc0ae76202c447b6aec61e907b852bc94671cf)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vc4: Shut down BO cache timer before teardown The BO cache timer callback schedules time_work, and time_work can rearm the timer through vc4_bo_cache_free_old(). vc4_bo_cache_destroy() deletes the timer and then cancels the work, which does not break that cycle: the work being cancelled can rearm the timer, and the timer then queues work again after teardown. Use timer_shutdown_sync() instead, so the timer cannot be rearmed and the cycle ends with cancel_work_sync().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/gpusvm: Fix MM reference leak in drm_gpusvm_range_evict If kvmalloc_array() fails in drm_gpusvm_range_evict(), the MM reference acquired earlier is not released, resulting in a reference leak. Fix this by dropping the MM reference on the kvmalloc_array() failure path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: airspy: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure The vb2 framework hands buffers to the driver via buf_queue() before calling start_streaming(). If start_streaming() returns an error without first returning those buffers via vb2_buffer_done(), vb2_start_streaming() fires WARN_ON(owned_by_drv_count) and the queued buffers leak. airspy_start_streaming() returned -ENODEV early when the USB device had been disconnected (s->udev == NULL) without returning any buffers that buf_queue() had already accepted. Take v4l2_lock first and jump to the existing err_clear_bit label, which already drains s->queued_bufs via vb2_buffer_done(..., VB2_BUF_STATE_QUEUED) before unlocking. This mirrors the uvcvideo fix in commit 4cf3b6fd54eb ("media: uvcvideo: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: amlogic-c3: Add validations for ae and awb config Avoid invalid memory access if the zones_num is bigger than zone_weight. This patch fixes the following smatch errors: drivers/media/platform/amlogic/c3/isp/c3-isp-params.c:111 c3_isp_params_awb_wt() error: buffer overflow 'cfg->zone_weight' 768 <= u32max drivers/media/platform/amlogic/c3/isp/c3-isp-params.c:111 c3_isp_params_awb_wt() error: buffer overflow 'cfg->zone_weight' 768 <= u32max drivers/media/platform/amlogic/c3/isp/c3-isp-params.c:227 c3_isp_params_ae_wt() error: buffer overflow 'cfg->zone_weight' 255 <= u32max drivers/media/platform/amlogic/c3/isp/c3-isp-params.c:227 c3_isp_params_ae_wt() error: buffer overflow 'cfg->zone_weight' 255 <= u32max

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cedrus: skip invalid H.264 reference list entries Cedrus consumes H.264 ref_pic_list0/ref_pic_list1 entries from the stateless slice control and later uses their indices to look up decode->dpb[] in _cedrus_write_ref_list(). Rejecting such controls in cedrus_try_ctrl() would break existing userspace, since stateless H.264 reference lists may legitimately carry out-of-range indices for missing references. Instead, guard the actual DPB lookup in Cedrus and skip entries whose indices do not fit the fixed V4L2_H264_NUM_DPB_ENTRIES array. This keeps the fix local to the driver use site and avoids out-of-bounds reads from malformed or unsupported reference list entries.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: chips-media: wave5: Move src_buf Removal to finish_encode During encoder processing, there is a case where the IRQ response could return the buffer back to userspace via v4l2_m2m_buf_done call. In this time, userspace could queue up this same buffer before start_encode removes the index from the ready queue. This would then lead to a case where the buffer in the ready queue could be a self loop due to the WRITE_ONCE(prev->next, new) call in __list_add. When __list_del is finally called, the loop is already made so nothing points back to ready queue list head and pointers are poisoned. A buffer should not be marked as DONE before the buffer is removed from m2m ready queue. Move removal entirely to finish_encode.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cx231xx: fix devres lifetime USB drivers bind to USB interfaces and any device managed resources should have their lifetime tied to the interface rather than parent USB device. This avoids issues like memory leaks when drivers are unbound without their devices being physically disconnected (e.g. on probe deferral or configuration changes). Fix the driver state lifetime so that it is released on driver unbind.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cx23885: add ioremap return check and cleanup Add a check for the return value of pci_ioremap_bar() in cx23885_dev_setup(). If ioremap for BAR0 fails, release the already allocated PCI memory region, decrement the device count, and return -ENODEV. This prevents a potential null pointer dereference and ensures proper cleanup on memory mapping failure.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: i2c: alvium: fix critical pointer access in alvium_ctrl_init The current implementation of alvium_ctrl_init creates several controls in function alvium_ctrl_init and uses the returned pointer without check. That can cause write access over NULL-pointer for several controls. The reworked code checks the pointers before adding flags.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: mali-c55: Fix possible ERR_PTR in enable_streams The media_pad_remote_pad_unique() function returns either a valid pointer or an ERR_PTR() on failure (-ENOTUNIQ if multiple links are enabled, -ENOLINK if no connected pad is found). The return value was assigned directly to isp->remote_src and dereferenced in the next line without checking for errors, which could lead to an ERR_PTR dereference. Add proper error checking with IS_ERR() before dereferencing the pointer. Also set isp->remote_src to NULL on error to maintain consistency with other error paths in the function.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: meson: vdec: Fix memory leak in error path of vdec_open The vdec_open() function previously jumped directly to err_m2m_release when vdec_init_ctrls() failed, skipping release of the m2m context. This caused a resource leak. Fix it by introducing a proper err_m2m_ctx_release label that calls v4l2_m2m_ctx_release(sess->m2m_ctx) before releasing the m2m device. This was identified via kmemleak: unreferenced object 0xffff0000205d6878 (size 8): comm "v4l_id", pid 5289, jiffies 4294938580 hex dump (first 8 bytes): 40 d2 49 18 00 00 ff ff @.I..... backtrace (crc d3204599): kmemleak_alloc+0xc8/0xf0 __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x60c/0x850 v4l2_ctrl_handler_init_class+0x1b4/0x2e8 [videodev] vdec_open+0x1f4/0x788 [meson_vdec] v4l2_open+0x144/0x460 [videodev] chrdev_open+0x1ac/0x500 do_dentry_open+0x3f0/0xfe8 vfs_open+0x68/0x320 do_open+0x2d8/0x9a8 path_openat+0x1d0/0x4f0 do_filp_open+0x190/0x380 do_sys_openat2+0xf8/0x1b0 __arm64_sys_openat+0x13c/0x1e8 invoke_syscall+0xdc/0x268 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x178/0x258 do_el0_svc+0x4c/0x70

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: msi2500: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure The vb2 framework hands buffers to the driver via buf_queue() before calling start_streaming(). If start_streaming() returns an error without first returning those buffers via vb2_buffer_done(), vb2_start_streaming() fires WARN_ON(owned_by_drv_count) and the queued buffers leak. msi2500_start_streaming() had five error paths that all hit this trap and were further tangled by ret-overwriting between calls: - -ENODEV when the USB device was already disconnected - -ERESTARTSYS when mutex_lock_interruptible() was interrupted - msi2500_set_usb_adc() failure: ret was silently overwritten by the next call (msi2500_isoc_init), so the error was lost entirely - msi2500_isoc_init() failure: cleanup_queued_bufs was called, but the function then fell through to msi2500_ctrl_msg() and again masked the original error by overwriting ret - msi2500_ctrl_msg(CMD_START_STREAMING) failure: no cleanup at all, leaving isoc URBs submitted with no way for the driver to consume them Consolidate the error paths into a small goto chain. Every failure now stops the function, drains the queued-buffer list, and returns the real error code. The ctrl_msg failure path also rolls back the preceding msi2500_isoc_init() via msi2500_isoc_cleanup() before unlocking and draining. The cleanup helper takes a vb2_buffer_state argument so that the start_streaming error paths can pass VB2_BUF_STATE_QUEUED (as expected by userspace on start_streaming failure) while stop_streaming keeps its existing VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR semantics. This mirrors the uvcvideo fix in commit 4cf3b6fd54eb ("media: uvcvideo: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: nuvoton: npcm-video: fix memory leaks in probe and remove npcm_video_probe() allocates the npcm_video structure with kzalloc_obj() but never frees it on any probe error path or in npcm_video_remove(), leaking the allocation on every failed probe and every normal unbind. Additionally, when npcm_video_setup_video() fails, the reserved memory association established by of_reserved_mem_device_init() in npcm_video_init() is not released, leaking the rmem_assigned_device entry on the global list. Fix both by adding kfree(video) to all probe error paths and to npcm_video_remove(), and adding the missing of_reserved_mem_device_release() call when npcm_video_setup_video() fails.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: nxp: imx8-isi: Add missing v4l2_subdev_cleanup() in crossbar and pipe Both mxc_isi_crossbar_init() and mxc_isi_pipe_init() call v4l2_subdev_init_finalize() which allocates the subdev active state, but neither mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup() nor mxc_isi_pipe_cleanup() calls v4l2_subdev_cleanup() to free it. This causes a memory leak on every rmmod, reported by kmemleak: unreferenced object 0xffff0000d06fc800 (size 192): comm "(udev-worker)", pid 254, jiffies 4294913455 backtrace (crc 36eeae58): kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40 __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x5f8/0x7d8 __v4l2_subdev_state_alloc+0x1fc/0x30c __v4l2_subdev_init_finalize+0x178/0x368 Add the missing v4l2_subdev_cleanup() calls before media_entity_cleanup() in both crossbar and pipe cleanup paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: nxp: imx8-isi: Fix potential out-of-bounds issues The maximum downscaling factor supported by ISI can be up to 16. Add minimum value constraint before applying the setting to hardware. Otherwise, the process will not respond even when Ctrl+C is executed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: pci: dm1105: Free allocated workqueue Destroy allocated workqueue in remove() callback to free its resources, thus fixing memory leak.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: pwc: Drain fill_buf on start_streaming() failure pwc_isoc_init() submits its isochronous URBs with usb_submit_urb(.., GFP_KERNEL) in a loop. After the first URB is submitted, its completion handler pwc_isoc_handler() can run on another CPU before the loop finishes: start_streaming() pwc_isoc_init() usb_submit_urb(urbs[0], GFP_KERNEL) pwc_isoc_handler(urbs[0]) pdev->fill_buf = pwc_get_next_fill_buf(pdev) usb_submit_urb(urbs[i>0], ..) -> fails pwc_isoc_cleanup(pdev) /* kills URBs */ return ret; pwc_cleanup_queued_bufs(pdev, VB2_BUF_STATE_QUEUED) pwc_get_next_fill_buf() detaches a buffer from pdev->queued_bufs and stores it in pdev->fill_buf. The error path in start_streaming() only drains pdev->queued_bufs, so the buffer parked in pdev->fill_buf is leaked. vb2_start_streaming() then triggers WARN_ON(owned_by_drv_count). stop_streaming() already handles this since commit 80b0963e1698 ("[media] pwc: fix WARN_ON"), which added the fill_buf drain in the teardown path but not in the start_streaming() error path. Mirror that handling on failure so start_streaming() returns with no buffer owned by the driver. Issue identified by automated review of the INV-003 series at https://sashiko.dev/

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: pwc: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure The vb2 framework hands buffers to the driver via buf_queue() before calling start_streaming(). If start_streaming() returns an error without first returning those buffers via vb2_buffer_done(), vb2_start_streaming() fires WARN_ON(owned_by_drv_count) and the queued buffers leak. pwc's start_streaming() had two early returns that hit this trap: -ENODEV when the USB device was already disconnected, and -ERESTARTSYS when mutex_lock_interruptible() was interrupted by a signal. Call the existing pwc_cleanup_queued_bufs() helper with VB2_BUF_STATE_QUEUED before returning (matching the state already used by the pwc_isoc_init() error path in the same function). This mirrors the uvcvideo fix in commit 4cf3b6fd54eb ("media: uvcvideo: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: radio-si476x: Unregister v4l2_device on probe failure si476x_radio_probe() registers radio->v4l2dev before allocating the V4L2 controls and before registering the video device. If any of those later steps fails, probe returns through the exit label after freeing only the control handler. A failed probe does not call si476x_radio_remove(), so the v4l2_device_unregister() there is not reached. This leaves the parent device reference taken by v4l2_device_register() behind on the error path. Unregister the V4L2 device in the probe error path after freeing the controls.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: rtl2832: fix use-after-free in rtl2832_remove() cancel_delayed_work_sync() is called before i2c_mux_del_adapters() in rtl2832_remove(). While the cancel waits for any running instance of i2c_gate_work to finish, it does not prevent the timer from being rescheduled by a concurrent thread. During probe, the r820t_attach() call attempts I2C transfers through the mux adapter. These transfers go through i2c_mux_master_xfer(), which calls rtl2832_deselect() after the transfer completes, rescheduling i2c_gate_work via schedule_delayed_work(). If this transfer is still in flight when rtl2832_remove() runs, rtl2832_deselect() can reschedule i2c_gate_work after it has been cancelled, causing a use-after-free when kfree(dev) is called. Fix this by calling i2c_mux_del_adapters() before cancel_delayed_work_sync(). Once the mux adapter is unregistered, no new I2C transfers can go through it, so rtl2832_deselect() can no longer reschedule i2c_gate_work. The subsequent cancel_delayed_work_sync() is then guaranteed to be final.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: rtl2832_sdr: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure The vb2 framework hands buffers to the driver via buf_queue() before calling start_streaming(). If start_streaming() returns an error without first returning those buffers via vb2_buffer_done(), vb2_start_streaming() fires WARN_ON(owned_by_drv_count) and the queued buffers leak. rtl2832_sdr_start_streaming() had multiple error paths that hit this trap: two direct early returns (-ENODEV, -ERESTARTSYS), plus six `goto err` paths covering subdev s_power, tuner setup, ADC setup, stream-buffer allocation, urb allocation, and urb submission failures. None of them returned the queued buffers. The original function had no distinct success exit and fell straight through into the err label, which previously only did mutex_unlock and "return ret". Adding queued-buffer cleanup at err must therefore be paired with an explicit success return; otherwise every successful start would also drain the buffer queue and kill streaming. Add that success return, then add rtl2832_sdr_cleanup_queued_bufs() at the err label and before each early return. The cleanup helper takes a vb2_buffer_state argument so that the start_streaming error paths can pass VB2_BUF_STATE_QUEUED (as expected by userspace on start_streaming failure) while stop_streaming keeps its existing VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR semantics. This mirrors the uvcvideo fix in commit 4cf3b6fd54eb ("media: uvcvideo: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure"). The err label still does not roll back power_ctrl(), frontend_ctrl(), the POWER_ON flag, or stream/URB allocations that may have happened before the failing step. Those are pre-existing leaks of a different class and are not addressed here.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: saa7134: Fix a possible memory leak in saa7134_video_init1 In saa7134_video_init1(), the return value of the first saa7134_pgtable_alloc() is not checked. If it fails, the function continues as if successful, leaving the driver with an invalid page table. Additionally, if vb2_queue_init() for the VBI queue fails after the video queue page table has been allocated, the allocated memory is not freed before returning. The second saa7134_pgtable_alloc() also lacks a return value check. Errors occur during device probing before the device is fully registered, the normal cleanup path in saa7134_finidev() is not executed, leading to memory leaks and potential use of uninitialized DMA resources. Check the return value of both saa7134_pgtable_alloc() calls and propagate errors. On failure of any later step, free allocated page tables to avoid memory leaks. Ensure control handlers are also released on error to prevent further resource leakage. Found by code review.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: stm32-dcmipp: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure The vb2 framework hands buffers to the driver via buf_queue() before calling start_streaming(). If start_streaming() returns an error without first returning those buffers via vb2_buffer_done(), vb2_start_streaming() fires WARN_ON(owned_by_drv_count) and the queued buffers leak. dcmipp_bytecap_start_streaming() returned -EINVAL when the source subdevice could not be resolved from the media graph, before pm_runtime_resume_and_get() and media_pipeline_start() had been called. The remaining error paths already converge on the err_buffer_done label, which calls dcmipp_bytecap_all_buffers_done(..., VB2_BUF_STATE_QUEUED). Jump to that label directly: the intermediate err_pm_put / err_media_pipeline_stop labels are skipped, which is correct because nothing they would undo has happened yet. This mirrors the uvcvideo fix in commit 4cf3b6fd54eb ("media: uvcvideo: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: stm32: dcmi: unregister notifier on probe failure dcmi_graph_init() registers the async notifier before dcmi_probe() toggles the reset line. If reset_control_assert() or reset_control_deassert() fails afterwards, probe returns through err_cleanup and the driver core will not call dcmi_remove(). Unregister the notifier before cleaning it up on that error path, matching the successful remove path and the V4L2 async notifier lifetime rules. [hverkuil: added Fixes tag]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: sun4i-csi: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure The vb2 framework hands buffers to the driver via buf_queue() before calling start_streaming(). If start_streaming() returns an error without first returning those buffers via vb2_buffer_done(), vb2_start_streaming() fires WARN_ON(owned_by_drv_count) and the queued buffers leak. sun4i_csi_start_streaming() returned -EINVAL when no matching CSI format could be found, before any setup (scratch buffer allocation, pipeline start) had been performed. The remaining error paths already converge on the err_clear_dma_queue label, which calls return_all_buffers(..., VB2_BUF_STATE_QUEUED) under csi->qlock. Jump to that label directly: the intermediate err_disable_device / err_disable_pipeline / err_free_scratch_buffer labels are skipped, which is correct because nothing they would undo has happened yet. This mirrors the uvcvideo fix in commit 4cf3b6fd54eb ("media: uvcvideo: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: ti: vpe: Fix the error code of devm_kzalloc() in vip_probe_slice() In vip_probe_slice(), the error check for devm_kzalloc() incorrectly uses PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO() which returns 0 for NULL pointer. Return -ENOMEM for devm_kzalloc() failure.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: ti: vpe: unwind v4l2 device registration on probe error If the vpe_top resource is missing, vpe_probe() returns -ENODEV after v4l2_device_register() has succeeded. Probe failures do not call the driver's remove callback, so the v4l2 device remains registered on that error path. Route that failure through the existing v4l2_device_unregister() unwind label, matching the other errors after v4l2_device_register().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: v4l2-ctrls: validate HEVC active reference counts HEVC slice parameters are shared stateless V4L2 controls, but the common validation path does not verify the active L0/L1 reference counts before driver-specific code consumes them. The original report came from Cedrus, but the active count bounds are not Cedrus-specific. Validate them in the common HEVC slice control path so stateless HEVC drivers get the same basic guarantees as soon as the control is queued. Do not reject ref_idx_l0/ref_idx_l1 entries here. Existing userspace may use out-of-range sentinel values such as 0xff for missing references, and some hardware can use that information for concealment. Keep this common check limited to the active reference counts.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: v4l2-fwnode: Fix subdev owner overwritten in v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() The v4l2 helper v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() calls v4l2_async_register_subdev(), which is a macro that expands to __v4l2_async_register_subdev(sd,THIS_MODULE). Since the macro is expanded inside v4l2-fwnode.c, THIS_MODULE resolves to the v4l2-fwnode module rather than the sensor driver module that originally set sd->owner. When v4l2-fwnode is built-in, THIS_MODULE evaluates to NULL, which then overwrites the sensor driver's owner with NULL. This causes the problem that the sensor module's reference count is never incremented during async registration, so the module can be removed while the subdevice is still in use by a notifier (e.g., a CSI-2 receiver bridge driver). Fix this by renaming v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() to __v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() with an added explicit module argument and introducing a wrapper macro: #define v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor(sd) \ __v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor(sd, THIS_MODULE) This ensures the sensor driver module is properly referenced even when the sensor driver does not init the owner field before calling v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() and prevents premature module removal.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: vivid: check for vb2_is_busy() when toggling caps The vivid_update_format_cap/out() functions must only be called if the capture/output queue are not busy. But for the controls that select the CROP/COMPOSE/SCALE capability that is not checked. Only when streaming starts will they be set to 'grabbed' and it is impossible to change the control, but between REQBUFS and STREAMON you are still allowed to set these controls. Since vivid_update_format_cap/out will change the format, this can cause unexpected results. Besides adding these checks, also add a WARN_ON in vivid_update_format_cap/out() if the queue is busy. I'm 90% certain that this is the cause of this syzbot bug: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=dac8f5eaa46837e97b89 But since we never have reproducers, it is hard to be certain. In any case, these checks are needed regardless.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: vivid: fix cleanup bugs in vivid_init() When platform_device_register() fails in vivid_init(), the embedded struct device in vivid_pdev has already been initialized by device_initialize(), but the failure path jumps to free_output_strings without dropping the device reference for the current platform device: vivid_init() -> platform_device_register(&vivid_pdev) -> device_initialize(&vivid_pdev.dev) -> setup_pdev_dma_masks(&vivid_pdev) -> platform_device_add(&vivid_pdev) This leads to a reference leak when platform_device_register() fails. Fix this by calling platform_device_put() before jumping to the common cleanup path. Also, the unreg_driver label incorrectly calls platform_driver_register() instead of platform_driver_unregister(), which breaks cleanup when workqueue creation fails after successful driver registration. Fix that as well. The reference leak was identified by a static analysis tool I developed and confirmed by manual review. The incorrect cleanup call was found during code inspection.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: close a re-opened queue timer in the destructor queue_delete() closes the queue timer, then frees it. snd_seq_timer_close() clears q->timer->timeri. snd_use_lock_sync() then drains borrowers, and snd_seq_timer_delete() frees q->timer. A borrower can re-open the timer inside that window. A SET_QUEUE_CLIENT that took a queueptr() use_lock reference before the queue was unlinked runs snd_seq_timer_open() after the close. Open refuses re-open only while timeri is set, and the close just cleared it, so it re-opens timeri. snd_seq_timer_delete() does not close that instance. Its snd_seq_timer_stop() is a no-op, because running was cleared first. So it frees q->timer with the instance still live. The queue is freed next. The instance stays on the global timer with callback_data pointing at the freed queue. A non-owner START on the unlocked queue arms it. The next tick derefs the freed queue in snd_seq_timer_interrupt(). Reachable by an unprivileged user with access to /dev/snd/seq. No CAP and no queue ownership required. Close any lingering instance in the destructor. There, ->timeri can no longer change: the queue is unlinked and all use_lock borrowers have drained, so no snd_seq_queue_use() can re-open it. Close it before clearing q->timer. snd_timer_close() waits for any in-flight snd_seq_timer_interrupt() to finish, and that callback still reads q->timer (via snd_seq_check_queue()), so q->timer must stay valid until it drains.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: timer: drain a slave's callback before its master detaches it snd_timer_close_locked() drains the closing instance's own in-flight callback (IFLG_CALLBACK) before freeing it, but not its slaves'. When a master instance is closed, remove_slave_links() clears each slave's ->timer; the slave's own close then reads timer == NULL and takes the branch that skips the drain entirely (snd_timer_stop_slave() also no-ops on a NULL timer). So a slave whose callback is still running when the master is closed is freed underneath the live callback, leading to use-after-free. Drain the slaves too before remove_slave_links() severs them. snd_timer_stop() has already taken this instance off the active list, so no new slave callback can be queued. Take the slaves off the ack list so a pending one can't fire either, then wait for any that is already in flight.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: timer: don't re-enter an instance callback that is still running The userspace-driven timer (utimer) TRIGGER ioctl calls snd_timer_interrupt() directly with no serialization, so two threads triggering the same utimer can run snd_timer_interrupt() on one snd_timer concurrently. snd_timer_process_callbacks() drops timer->lock around each instance callback and marks the in-flight callback with the single SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK bit; snd_timer_close_locked() waits on that bit to drain an in-flight callback before freeing the instance. The bit cannot represent two concurrent callbacks: when a second interrupt re-queues an instance whose callback is still running, both run at once, the first to finish clears the bit, and the close-path drain then frees the instance (and its callback_data) while the other callback is still live - a use-after-free reachable by any user able to open /dev/snd/timer, both via a user timer instance and via a sequencer queue timer bound to the utimer. snd_timer_interrupt() sets IFLG_CALLBACK before dropping timer->lock, so a concurrent interrupt already observes it under the lock. Skip re-queuing an instance (and its slaves) to the ack/sack list while its callback is in flight; the accumulated pticks are delivered on the next tick, so no event is lost.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath6kl: fix OOB access from firmware ADDBA window size aggr_recv_addba_req_evt() logs a debug message when the firmware-supplied win_sz is outside [AGGR_WIN_SZ_MIN, AGGR_WIN_SZ_MAX] but does not return. The out-of-range win_sz is then used in TID_WINDOW_SZ() to compute a kzalloc size and stored in rxtid->hold_q_sz, leading to zero-size or overflowed allocations and subsequent out-of-bounds access. Clean up any previously active aggregation session for the TID first, then return early when win_sz is out of the valid range, instead of proceeding with a broken allocation size.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath6kl: fix use-after-free in aggr_reset_state() The aggr_reset_state() function uses timer_delete() (non-synchronous) for the aggregation timer before proceeding to delete TID state and before the structure is freed by callers like aggr_module_destroy(). If the timer callback (aggr_timeout) is executing when aggr_reset_state() is called, the callback will continue to access aggr_conn fields like rx_tid[] and stat[] which may be freed immediately after by kfree(aggr_info->aggr_conn) in aggr_module_destroy(). Additionally, the timer callback can re-arm itself via mod_timer() while aggr_reset_state() is running, creating a more complex race condition. Use timer_delete_sync() instead to ensure any running timer callback has completed before returning.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: fix NULL dereference when the AP has HT-cap but no HT-oper mwifiex_tdls_add_ht_oper() gates its follow-the-AP-bandwidth path on bss_desc->bcn_ht_cap being present, but then dereferences a different pointer, bss_desc->bcn_ht_oper: if (ISSUPP_CHANWIDTH40(priv->adapter->hw_dot_11n_dev_cap) && bss_desc->bcn_ht_cap && ISALLOWED_CHANWIDTH40(bss_desc->bcn_ht_oper->ht_param)) bcn_ht_cap and bcn_ht_oper are populated independently while parsing the associated AP's beacon in mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(): an AP that advertises an HT Capabilities element but no HT Operation element leaves bcn_ht_cap non-NULL and bcn_ht_oper NULL. Setting up a TDLS link to a peer while associated to such an AP then dereferences the NULL bcn_ht_oper and crashes the kernel. Every other bcn_ht_oper user in the driver NULL-checks it first. Guard on the pointer that is actually dereferenced. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wilc1000: validate assoc response length before subtracting header wilc_parse_assoc_resp_info() computes the trailing IE length as ies_len = buffer_len - sizeof(*res); without first checking that buffer_len is at least sizeof(struct wilc_assoc_resp) (6 bytes). buffer_len is the length reported for a received association response (host_int_parse_assoc_resp_info() passes hif_drv->assoc_resp / assoc_resp_info_len straight in) and must be validated before the driver accesses the fixed header. For a frame shorter than the 6-byte fixed header, the subtraction wraps. For a four-byte response the result is truncated to a u16 ies_len of 65534, so kmemdup() then attempts to copy 65534 bytes starting at buffer + sizeof(*res), beyond the valid association-response data (CWE-125). A response shorter than four bytes can also cause an out-of-bounds read of res->status_code at offsets 2 and 3. Reject frames too short to hold the fixed header before touching the header or computing ies_len. Also set the connection status to a failure on this path: the caller falls through to a "conn_info->status == WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS" check after the parser returns, so leaving the status untouched could let a malformed short response be treated as a successful association.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7615: drop TXRX_NOTIFY on non-mmio buses PKT_TYPE_TXRX_NOTIFY is an mmio-only event, but mt7615_rx_check() and mt7615_queue_rx_skb() dispatch it to mt7615_mac_tx_free() on every bus. mt7615_mac_tx_free() cleans the DMA tx queues with mt76_queue_tx_cleanup(), which calls queue_ops->tx_cleanup(). Only the mmio queue ops implement that callback; on the mt7663 USB and SDIO buses it is NULL, so a TXRX_NOTIFY there calls a NULL pointer in the RX worker. Same defect as the mt7921 and mt7925 patches in this series. Drop the event on non-mmio buses via mt76_is_mmio(), as in commit 5683e1488aa9 ("wifi: mt76: connac: do not check WED status for non-mmio devices").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7921: drop TXRX_NOTIFY on non-mmio buses PKT_TYPE_TXRX_NOTIFY is an mmio-only event, but mt7921_rx_check() and mt7921_queue_rx_skb() dispatch it to mt7921_mac_tx_free() on every bus. mt7921_mac_tx_free() cleans the DMA tx queues with mt76_queue_tx_cleanup(), which calls queue_ops->tx_cleanup(). Only the mmio queue ops implement that callback; on USB and SDIO it is NULL, so a TXRX_NOTIFY there calls a NULL pointer in the RX worker: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:0x0 Call Trace: mt7921_mac_tx_free+0x64/0x310 [mt7921_common] mt7921_rx_check+0x5f/0xf0 [mt7921_common] mt76u_rx_worker+0x1b9/0x620 [mt76_usb] Drop the event on non-mmio buses via mt76_is_mmio(), as in commit 5683e1488aa9 ("wifi: mt76: connac: do not check WED status for non-mmio devices").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7925: drop TXRX_NOTIFY on non-mmio buses PKT_TYPE_TXRX_NOTIFY is an mmio-only event, but mt7925_rx_check() and mt7925_queue_rx_skb() dispatch it to mt7925_mac_tx_free() on every bus. mt7925_mac_tx_free() cleans the DMA tx queues with mt76_queue_tx_cleanup(), which calls queue_ops->tx_cleanup(). Only the mmio queue ops implement that callback; on USB it is NULL, so a TXRX_NOTIFY there calls a NULL pointer in the RX worker: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:0x0 Call Trace: mt7925_mac_tx_free+0x58/0x350 [mt7925_common] mt7925_rx_check+0xe2/0x130 [mt7925_common] mt76u_rx_worker+0x1b9/0x620 [mt76_usb] Drop the event on non-mmio buses via mt76_is_mmio(), as in commit 5683e1488aa9 ("wifi: mt76: connac: do not check WED status for non-mmio devices").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: make release_scratchbuffers idempotent brcmf_pcie_release_scratchbuffers() frees the shared.scratch and shared.ringupd DMA buffers with dma_free_coherent() but does not clear the pointers afterwards, unlike the sibling release_ringbuffers() which NULLs commonrings/flowrings/idxbuf on release. Both the bus_reset .reset callback (brcmf_pcie_reset) and brcmf_pcie_remove() call release_scratchbuffers. When reset teardown has run before removal, remove's own teardown would call dma_free_coherent() a second time on the already-freed DMA allocation. NULL the pointers after free, matching release_ringbuffers(), so a later release observes that the allocation has already been released. This patch makes repeated sequential release safe; the reset-work lifetime is handled separately by the following patch. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: fix NULL pointer dereference in rhash table destroy When unbinding the ath12k driver, kernel NULL pointer dereferences occur in irq_work_sync() called from rhashtable_destroy(). Two hash tables are affected: 1. ath12k_link_sta hash table in ath12k_base 2. ath12k_dp_link_peer hash table in ath12k_dp The issue happens because the destroy functions are called unconditionally in cleanup paths, but the hash tables are only initialized late in their respective init functions. If the device was never fully started or if the init functions failed before initializing the hash tables, the pointers will be NULL. The issues are always reproducible from a VM because the MSI addressing initialization is failing. Call trace for ath12k_link_sta_rhash_tbl_destroy: RIP: irq_work_sync+0x1e/0x70 rhashtable_destroy+0x12/0x60 ath12k_link_sta_rhash_tbl_destroy+0x19/0x40 [ath12k] ath12k_core_stop+0xe/0x80 [ath12k] ath12k_core_hw_group_cleanup+0x6b/0xb0 [ath12k] ath12k_pci_remove+0x60/0x110 [ath12k] Call trace for ath12k_dp_link_peer_rhash_tbl_destroy: RIP: irq_work_sync+0x1e/0x70 rhashtable_destroy+0x12/0x60 ath12k_dp_link_peer_rhash_tbl_destroy+0x29/0x50 [ath12k] ath12k_dp_cmn_device_deinit+0x21/0x140 [ath12k] ath12k_core_hw_group_cleanup+0x6b/0xb0 [ath12k] ath12k_pci_remove+0x60/0x110 [ath12k] Fix this by adding NULL checks before calling rhashtable_destroy() in both destroy functions. The NULL check approach was chosen because the rhashtable pointer serves as the initialization state indicator. The init can fail at various points, leaving some components uninitialized. Checking the pointer directly is simpler than adding separate state flags that would need synchronization.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_wps_ie() rtw_get_wps_ie() iterates over IE data from network frames without validating that the IE header and payload fit within the remaining buffer before reading them. Specifically: - in_ie[cnt + 1] is read without checking cnt + 1 < in_len - memcmp(&in_ie[cnt + 2], ...) accesses cnt + 2 without bounds check - in_ie[cnt + 1] is used as length without verifying payload fits Add bounds checks at the top of the loop body to break early if fewer than 2 bytes remain for the IE header, or if the declared payload extends past the end of the buffer. Also require at least 4 bytes of payload before comparing the WPS OUI.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: Protect UUID list traversal The hci_sync conversion moved class-of-device and EIR generation from an HCI request built under hdev->lock to asynchronous command sync work. The worker holds hdev->req_lock, but that lock does not serialize access to hdev->uuids against add_uuid() and remove_uuid(), which update the list under hdev->lock. The following interleaving can therefore occur: CPU0 (command sync work) CPU1 (management socket) fetch uuid from the list list_del(&uuid->list) kfree(uuid) read uuid->size KASAN reports the resulting use-after-free: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in eir_create+0xb8f/0xee0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810dbd8620 by task kworker/u17:0/87 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: eir_create+0xb8f/0xee0 hci_update_eir_sync+0x1c0/0x330 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x13c/0x290 process_one_work+0x63a/0x1070 worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10 Allocated by task 86: __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 add_uuid+0x18a/0x4b0 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1033/0x1ea0 Freed by task 92: __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70 kfree+0x131/0x3c0 remove_uuid+0x25e/0x560 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1033/0x1ea0 Hold hdev->lock while generating and committing the class-of-device and EIR snapshots. Release it before sending an HCI command, so controller waits do not happen under the device lock. This protects all UUID list walks in these paths and restores the serialization lost in the command sync conversion.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Fix session UAF in set_termios rfcomm_tty_set_termios() tests dlc->session without rfcomm_mutex and later passes the pointer to rfcomm_send_rpn(). The latter dereferences both session->initiator and session->sock. Meanwhile, krfcommd can unlink the DLC and free the session while holding rfcomm_mutex. The race can proceed as follows: TTY ioctl task krfcommd -------------- -------- load dlc->session enter rfcomm_send_rpn() lock rfcomm_mutex clear dlc->session free session unlock rfcomm_mutex read session->initiator KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rfcomm_send_rpn+0x297/0x2a0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810012a850 by task poc/92 Call Trace: rfcomm_send_rpn+0x297/0x2a0 rfcomm_tty_set_termios+0x50d/0x850 tty_set_termios+0x596/0x950 set_termios+0x46a/0x6e0 tty_mode_ioctl+0x152/0xbd0 tty_ioctl+0x915/0x1240 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x134/0x1c0 Allocated by task 92: rfcomm_session_add+0x9e/0x2e0 rfcomm_dlc_open+0x8b1/0xe00 rfcomm_dev_activate+0x85/0x1a0 rfcomm_tty_open+0x90/0x280 Freed by task 68: kfree+0x131/0x3c0 rfcomm_session_del+0x119/0x180 rfcomm_run+0x737/0x4710 Add rfcomm_dlc_send_rpn(), which holds rfcomm_mutex while it verifies that the DLC is still attached and sends the RPN frame. Have the TTY path use the helper and drop its unlocked session check. This keeps the session valid through both the frame construction and socket send.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exec: fix unsigned loop counter wrap in transfer_args_to_stack() The stop value is derived from bprm->p >> PAGE_SHIFT. The index variable is an unsigned long. If bprm->p drops below PAGE_SIZE and stop becomes zero the loop condition index >= stop is always true. After the index == 0 iteration the decrement wraps to ULONG_MAX and bprm->page[ULONG_MAX] reads sizeof(void *) bytes in front of the array. The pointer has wrapped to -1. That garbage pointer is then passed to kmap_local_page() and PAGE_SIZE bytes are copied from wherever that lands into the stack of the process being created. And the loop doesn't terminate either... Getting there only requires bprm->p < PAGE_SIZE. On !MMU bprm_set_stack_limit() and bprm_hit_stack_limit() are empty. So the only constraint on how far bprm->p is pushed down is valid_arg_len(), i.e. that each individual string still fits in what is left. bprm->p starts at PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *) so a single argument or environment string of a little over 31 pages leaves it in the first page: Oops - load access fault [#1] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: victim Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4 #1 epc : __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8 ra : transfer_args_to_stack+0xaa/0xae s4 : ffffffffffffffff s2 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ffffffdc98000000 a2 : 0000000000001000 status: 0000000a00001880 badaddr: ffffffdc98000000 cause: 0000000000000005 [<801a5324>] __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8 [<800d5f6a>] load_flat_binary+0x43a/0x65e [<800a2de4>] bprm_execve+0x1d4/0x316 [<800a351a>] do_execveat_common+0x12e/0x138 [<800a3d44>] __riscv_sys_execve+0x38/0x4e Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt This is an arcane bug but we should still fix it. Count down from MAX_ARG_PAGES so the loop ends when index reaches stop, stop == 0 included. The iterations performed are unchanged for every other value of stop. Only CONFIG_MMU=n builds are affected, transfer_args_to_stack() is used by binfmt_flat and binfmt_elf_fdpic on nommu only. The loop predates git history. commit 7e7ec6a93434 ("elf_fdpic_transfer_args_to_stack(): make it generic") only moved it from binfmt_elf_fdpic.c into fs/exec.c and narrowed the copy to the used part of the first page. The condition and the decrement are unchanged from 2.6.12-rc2.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binfmt_misc: set have_execfd only once the interpreter is opened load_misc_binary() raises bprm->have_execfd as soon as it sees the 'O' (or 'C') flag. This happens well before it opens the interpreter. If that open fails the flag stays set on the bprm. binfmt_misc is at the head of the format list so an interpreter open failure that returns -ENOEXEC lets the search fall through to a later format. This means it runs the matched binary directly having never staged an interpreter. So bprm->executable is NULL while have_execfd falsely claims a descriptor is present. Consequently, begin_new_exec() dereferences the missing executable: would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable); and NULL derefs. Had it not, the hand-off later in the same function would have failed anyway. FD_ADD(0, bprm->executable) rejects a NULL file with -ENOMEM. Both sites are past the point of no return so the exec cannot be unwound either way. This can be reached by unprivileged users as binfmt_misc can be mounted in user namespaces. So a user can register an 'O' entry whose interpreter lives on a FUSE mount, have the FUSE server fail the open with -ENOEXEC and execute a native ELF file that matches the entry. have_execfd only means anything alongside the executable it describes which is not set until the interpreter has been opened and staged. So lets raise it there, next to execfd_creds, which is already set at that point. An open failure now leaves it clear, so the fallback format derives credentials from the binary and emits no AT_EXECFD, as it would for any native exec. The argv rewrite load_misc_binary() performs before the open is still not undone. This means the binary sees the interpreter path in argv[0] and its own path in argv[1] but that predates this change and only became observable once the exec stopped faulting.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: Move jump_label_init() before parse_early_param() When enabling both CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING=y and CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT=y, then diabling memory profiling by adding the boot parameter 'sysctl.vm.mem_profiling=0' will cause the kernel failed to boot. After analysis, this is because jump_label_init() must be called before parse_early_param(), the early param handlers may modify static keys by static_branch_enable/disable(). Fix this by moving jump_label_init() to before parse_early_param(). The solution is similar to other architectures.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cdrom: fix stack out-of-bounds read in CDROMVOLCTRL mmc_ioctl_cdrom_volume() first reads the audio control mode page into a 32-byte stack buffer with cgc->buflen set to 24. If the device reports a block descriptor, the function increases cgc->buflen to include that descriptor and reads the page again. For CDROMVOLCTRL, the function then builds a MODE SELECT parameter list by moving cgc->buffer forward by offset - 8 bytes. This drops the block descriptor from the outgoing payload and leaves a new 8-byte mode parameter header in front of the audio control page. However, cgc->buflen is left unchanged. With a standard 8-byte block descriptor, cgc->buffer points at buffer + 8 but cgc->buflen remains 32. cdrom_mode_select() therefore asks the low level packet path to write 32 bytes from that adjusted pointer, reading 8 bytes past the end of the 32-byte stack buffer. This is not hit by CDROMVOLREAD, and CDROMVOLCTRL only triggers it on drives that return a non-zero block descriptor length, which helps explain why it has gone unnoticed. The overread is also sent to the device as extra MODE SELECT payload, so it may not produce an obvious local failure. Reduce cgc->buflen by the same amount as the buffer pointer adjustment so the MODE SELECT transfer covers only the intended parameter list.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: stratix10-svc: fix memory leaks and list corruption bugs Fix a memory leak when gen_pool_alloc() fails by freeing pmem on the error path. Switch pmem allocation from devm_kzalloc() to kzalloc() with explicit kfree() in the free path to match its list-managed lifetime. Remove the erroneous list_del(&svc_data_mem) which corrupted the list head on failed lookups.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: comedi: comedi_parport: deal with premature interrupt Syzbot reported a general protection fault in `comedi_get_is_subdevice_running()`, which was called from the interrupt handler `parport_interrupt()` in the "comedi_parport" driver, but it does not currently have a C reproducer for the problem. It's probably due to a premature interrupt for one of two reasons: 1. The driver sets up the interrupt handler before the comedi subdevices used by the interrupt handler have been allocated, but does not disable the interrupt in the parallel port's CTRL register first. 2. The driver uses a user-supplied I/O port base address which Syzbot would have supplied, but it might not be backed by real parallel port hardware. Change the initialization order in the driver's comedi "attach" handler (`parport_attach()`) so that the hardware registers are initialized before the interrupt handler is requested. This should prevent premature interrupts occurring for real hardware. Also add a test to the interrupt handler to ensure the comedi device is fully attached and return early if it isn't.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mei: bus: access mei_device under device_lock on cleanup Fix couple of problems in mei_cl_bus_dev_release(): mei_cl_flush_queues() is running without lock. bus->file_list access after mei_dev_bus_put(bus) can become a use-after-free if this was the last reference to bus. Protect queues cleanup and WARN traversal by device lock there to avoid the concurrent access problems. Move WARN traversal before mei_dev_bus_put(bus). This file uses bus variable name for mei_device, adjust code of mei_cl_bus_dev_release() to use bus variable too.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: intel_th: fix MSC output device reference leak intel_th_output_open() looks up the output device with bus_find_device_by_devt(), which returns the device with a reference that must be dropped after use. commit 95fc36a234da ("intel_th: fix device leak on output open()") attempted to drop the reference from intel_th_output_release(). However, a successful open replaces file->f_op with the output driver file operations before returning, so close runs the output driver release callback instead. For MSC outputs, close runs intel_th_msc_release(), which only removes the per-file iterator and does not drop the device reference taken by intel_th_output_open(). Consequently, every successful MSC output open leaks one device reference. Drop the device reference from intel_th_msc_release(), which is the release path actually used for MSC output files. Remove the now-unused intel_th_output_release() callback from intel_th_output_fops.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: nsm: only unlock nsm_dev on post-lock error paths nsm_dev_ioctl() jumps to the common out label even when the initial copy_from_user() fails before nsm->lock has been taken. The error path then blindly unlocks a mutex that was never acquired. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed against the current tree. The grounded PoC kept the miscdevice ioctl entry and the pre-lock copy_from_user(&raw, argp, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)) failure path by issuing NSM_IOCTL_RAW with an invalid user pointer. That failure reaches the shared out label before mutex_lock(&nsm->lock). Lockdep reported: WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! exploit/193 is trying to release lock (&global_nsm.lock) at: nsm_dev_ioctl+0x5f/0xcf [vuln_msv] but there are no more locks to release! no locks held by exploit/193. Return immediately on the pre-lock copy_from_user() failure and keep the common unlock label for the post-lock paths only.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: nsm: pin the module while the device is open misc_open() installs a misc driver's file operations with fops_get(), which pins file_operations::owner before replacing the file's f_op. The NSM misc device leaves nsm_dev_fops.owner unset, so opening /dev/nsm does not take a module reference on the nsm driver. If the driver is built as a module, an open file descriptor can therefore survive rmmod of the module that provides its ioctl callbacks. A later ioctl through that descriptor can call into unloaded module text. Set nsm_dev_fops.owner to THIS_MODULE so the misc core holds the module while any /dev/nsm file descriptor is open, matching the lifetime expectation for the installed file operations.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Delay module ref count for "enable_event" trigger Triggers are now delayed from freeing, but can still be triggered until after the RCU grace period has ended. The freeing of the enable_event data is put into the private_data_free() callback, but the put of the module refcount is done immediately. It is possible that if a module is removed that has an event that would enable (or disable) it is still active, it can read the data of the module after it is removed causing a use-after-free bug. Move the trace_event_put_ref() that releases the module into the delayed callback so that the module can not be removed until any reference to its events are finished.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix mmiotrace possible NULL dereferencing of hiter->dev If the mmio_pipe_open() fails to find a PCI device, the hiter->dev will be assigned to NULL. The mmiotrace read() function dereferences the hiter->dev if hiter exists. Change the test of the read to not only check hiter being NULL, but also the hiter->dev before dereferencing it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix resource leak on mmiotrace trace_pipe close The mmiotrace tracer was added May 12th 2008. At that time, resources created in pipe_open() could not be freed because there was not pipe_close function pointer of the tracer. The pipe_close function pointer was added in December 7th, 2009, but the mmiotrace tracer was not updated. mmio_pipe_open() allocates a header_iter and takes a pci_dev reference when trace_pipe is opened. mmio_close() frees them, but it was only wired to the tracer's .close callback. tracing_release_pipe() invokes .pipe_close, not .close, when the trace_pipe file is released. As a result, closing trace_pipe with the mmiotrace tracer active leaked the header_iter allocation and left a stale pci_dev reference. Set .pipe_close to mmio_close, matching how function_graph wires both callbacks to the same handler. Note, if the trace_pipe is read to completion, it will clean up the resources, but if one were to run: # head -n 1 /sys/kernel/tracing/trace_pipe VERSION 20070824 Over and over again, it would trigger a massive leak.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix union collision of module and refcnt for dynamic events In 'struct trace_event_call', the 'module' pointer and the 'refcnt' atomic variable share the same memory space in a union. For dynamic events, the union member is 'refcnt', which acts as an active reference counter. When a dynamic event (such as kprobe, uprobe, fprobe, eprobe, or wprobe) has a non-zero reference count (e.g. due to active event triggers or perf attachments), its 'call->module' evaluates to a small non-zero integer instead of NULL. When filtering or setting events for a specific module (e.g., writing ':mod:<module>' to 'set_event'), the code in '__ftrace_set_clr_event_nolock()' and 'update_event_fields()' reads 'call->module' directly without checking whether the event is dynamic. This causes the kernel to treat the small integer (refcnt) as a 'struct module' pointer, leading to a NULL/invalid pointer dereference (Oops) when dereferencing the module name. Fix this by ensuring that the 'TRACE_EVENT_FL_DYNAMIC' flag is checked before treating 'call->module' as a valid pointer in these code paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ublk: wait on ublk_dev_ready() instead of ub->completion ub->completion is only re-armed by a successful START_USER_RECOVERY. If the ublk server sends END_USER_RECOVERY without one - e.g. its START failed with -EBUSY and the error was ignored - the wait is satisfied by the stale completion of the previous recovery cycle, and the device is marked LIVE and the requeue list kicked while the FETCH stream is still running and ubq->canceling is still set. The kick redispatches a previously requeued request, __ublk_queue_rq_common() sees ->canceling and parks it again via __ublk_abort_rq(), and after the last FETCH clears ->canceling nothing ever kicks the requeue list again: the request is stranded there while holding its tag. If it is the flush machinery's flush_rq, every subsequent fsync piles up in uninterruptible sleep and teardown hangs on tag draining. This matches a report of a lost PREFLUSH with ext4 on top of ublk after daemon crash recovery. ub->completion is an edge-triggered latch used as a proxy for the level condition "every queue has fetched all I/O commands", which can regress (F_BATCH's UNPREP, daemon death) and whose re-arm can be skipped. Drop it and wait on the real condition instead: the new helper ublk_wait_dev_ready_and_lock() waits on ublk_dev_ready() via wait_var_event_interruptible(), woken from ublk_mark_io_ready(), then re-checks it under ub->mutex, waiting again on regression, and returns with the mutex held and readiness guaranteed. Readiness becomes true in the same ub->mutex critical section that clears the last queue's ->canceling, so END_USER_RECOVERY marks the device LIVE and kicks the requeue list strictly after ->canceling clears. The wait stays interruptible, so a server whose daemon died can still be signalled out. For ublk_ctrl_start_dev() this replaces the fail-fast -EINVAL on an F_BATCH ready->UNPREP regression with waiting until the device is ready again.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: make huge_ptep_get handled unaligned addresses huge_ptep_get() can be handed a virtual address pointing to the middle of a contpmd/contpte mapped hugetlb folio (examples of callers are pagemap_hugetlb_range, page_mapped_in_vma). The arm64 helper rewalks the pgtables in find_num_contig to answer whether the huge pte we have maps a contpmd or a contpte hugetlb folio, and returns CONT_PMDS or CONT_PTES, so that it can collect a/d bits over the contiguous ptes. We can falsely return CONT_PTES instead of CONT_PMDS if the addr is not aligned. On systems where CONT_PTES != CONT_PMDS (meaning page size is 16K), we could collect excess A/D bit state, meaning extra work for the kernel. Even worse, we may iterate beyond the PTE table and dereference a garbage ptep pointer to access physical memory we don't own. Since the ptep pointer is a linear map address, we may run off the end of the linear map or into a hole, dereference a VA not mapped into the kernel pgtables and cause kernel panic. Fix this by aligning the pmdp pointer down to a contpmd base before checking equality with the passed huge pte pointer, to correctly answer whether the huge pte is the base of a contpmd block.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: syscall: Ensure saved x0 is kept in-sync with tracer updates When seccomp support was originally added to arm64 in a1ae65b21941 ("arm64: add seccomp support"), seccomp was erroneously called _before_ the ptrace syscall-enter-stop and therefore the tracer could trivially manipulate the syscall register state after the seccomp check had passed. This was subsequently fixed in a5cd110cb836 ("arm64/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace") by moving the seccomp check after the tracer has run. Unfortunately, a decade later, that fix has been reported to be incomplete. On arm64, both the first argument to a syscall and its eventual return value are allocated to register x0. In order to facilitate syscall restarting and querying of syscall arguments on the syscall exit path, the original value of x0 is stashed in 'struct pt_regs::orig_x0' early during the syscall entry path and is returned for the first argument by syscall_get_arguments(). Unlike 32-bit Arm, this stashed value is not directly exposed via ptrace() and so changes to register x0 made by the tracer on a syscall-enter-stop are not reflected in 'orig_x0'. This means that seccomp, syscall tracepoints and audit can observe a stale value for the register compared to the argument that will be observed by the actual syscall. Re-sync 'orig_x0' from x0 on the syscall entry path following a potential ptrace stop (i.e. PTRACE_EVENTMSG_SYSCALL_ENTRY or SECCOMP_RET_TRACE). This behaviour is limited to native tasks (because compat tasks expose 'orig_r0' to ptrace) where the syscall is not being skipped (because x0 is updated to hold the return value of -ENOSYS in that case).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: fix stale skb->sk reference on subflow close The backlog list is updated by mptcp_data_ready() under mptcp_data_lock(). The cleanup of backlog references to a closing subflow, however, was performed in mptcp_close_ssk(), before __mptcp_close_ssk() acquires the ssk lock, and while holding neither the ssk lock nor mptcp_data_lock(). Because that traversal ran without mptcp_data_lock(), concurrent softirq RX processing on another CPU (subflow_data_ready() -> mptcp_data_ready() -> __mptcp_add_backlog(), under mptcp_data_lock()) could add a backlog entry referencing the ssk while the cleanup loop was in progress. Such an entry could be missed by the cleanup, or the concurrent list update could corrupt the traversal, leaving skb->sk pointing at the ssk after it is freed. A later mptcp_backlog_purge() then dereferences the stale pointer, triggering a warning in inet_sock_destruct() (ssk->sk_rmem_alloc != 0) followed by a use-after-free in mptcp_backlog_purge(). Fix this by moving the backlog cleanup into __mptcp_close_ssk(), after subflow->closing is set to 1 and while the ssk lock is still held, serialized under mptcp_data_lock(). The cleanup runs only on the push path (MPTCP_CF_PUSH), where backlog references accumulate; on other teardown paths the caller already handles cleanup. With subflow->closing set and mptcp_data_lock() held across the purge, any concurrent mptcp_data_ready() either completes its enqueue before the purge runs and is caught, or observes closing=1 and bails out. Once mptcp_data_unlock() is reached, no new skb referencing the ssk can be enqueued, so the cleanup is exhaustive. Remove the unprotected traversal from mptcp_close_ssk() entirely.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: pm: userspace: fix use-after-free in get_local_id In mptcp_pm_userspace_get_local_id(), the address entry is looked up under spinlock, but its id is read after dropping the lock. A concurrent deletion can free the entry between the unlock and the read, leading to UAF. The race window is narrow. It was reproduced only with a locally constructed stress test that repeatedly overlaps an MP_JOIN SYN with a MPTCP_PM_CMD_SUBFLOW_DESTROY request. However, the KASAN report below confirms that the race is reachable: [ 666.319376] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mptcp_userspace_pm_get_local_id+0x1dc/0x1f0 [ 666.319386] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888124845610 by task swapper/0/0 ... [ 666.319401] Call Trace: [ 666.319405] <IRQ> [ 666.319408] dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 [ 666.319412] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3b0 [ 666.319418] print_report+0xbe/0x2b0 [ 666.319421] ? mptcp_userspace_pm_get_local_id+0x1dc/0x1f0 [ 666.319423] kasan_report+0xce/0x100 [ 666.319426] ? mptcp_userspace_pm_get_local_id+0x1dc/0x1f0 [ 666.319429] mptcp_userspace_pm_get_local_id+0x1dc/0x1f0 [ 666.319433] mptcp_pm_get_local_id+0x371/0x440 ... [ 666.319821] Allocated by task 45539: [ 666.319844] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 [ 666.319855] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 666.319858] __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 [ 666.319863] __kmalloc_noprof+0x1e7/0x520 [ 666.319867] sock_kmalloc+0xdf/0x130 [ 666.319885] sock_kmemdup+0x1b/0x40 [ 666.319888] mptcp_userspace_pm_append_new_local_addr+0x261/0x500 [ 666.319910] mptcp_pm_nl_announce_doit+0x16a/0x610 ... [ 666.319967] Freed by task 45560: [ 666.319988] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 [ 666.319991] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 666.319994] kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 666.319998] __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70 [ 666.320000] kfree+0x166/0x440 [ 666.320003] sock_kfree_s+0x1d/0x50 [ 666.320007] mptcp_userspace_pm_delete_local_addr.isra.0+0x157/0x200 [ 666.320011] mptcp_pm_nl_subflow_destroy_doit+0x51d/0xea0 Fix by copying the id into a local variable while still holding the lock, and use -1 as a "not found" sentinel.